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ABSTRACT
Over the course of the twentieth century, labor unions emerged
across the globe in reaction to the widespread growth of industrial
wage labor. The relative strength of unions saw a secular decline in
the late twentieth century that has only continued in the early
twenty-first century. Debates among sympathetic activists and
scholars over the sources of this decline and how to reverse it have
intensified alongside resurgent contemporary concern with economic inequality. This article argues that the recurrent focus of
American labor scholars and activists within these debates on increasing internal union democracy as a means of revitalizing unions
is fundamentally misguided. The promotion of liberal procedural
rights, including broader and more direct elections, as a mechanism
of accountability and source of renewed institutional dynamism will
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only further hasten the demise of labor unions in the United States
and elsewhere.
By contrast, labor unions were historically founded in explicitly
corporatist, group-based notions of democratic process. Following
corporatist theories of politics which allow the state to legally identify and regulate collective bargaining agents, unions operate to centralize and aggregate labor interests to facilitate their core functions
of wage-bargaining and the acquisition of political capital. Thus,
unions’ potential for achieving social influence and economic justice
for their members is predicated on accumulating power through collective action. Collective action whose potency correlates with the
effective strength of unions’ powers of internal discipline in and outside the workplace – powers directly undermined by solely liberal
conceptions of the union/worker relationship and are unavoidably
sourced in performative loyalty rather than electoral accountability.
Following this corporatist logic, over the long-run, efforts to promote greater internal union democracy have failed to improve the
performance of unions as wage-bargainers or as political agents.
Unions have been key to movements for political democratization,
but this effect has been achieved by channeling and disciplining
class politics rather than serving as the foundation for the bottomup creation of social movement capital. Following a misconception
of the individual workplace as a source of class solidarity, procedural localism focuses labor conflict where workers are most vulnerable to retaliation and least likely to induce broad based solidarity, a mistake only worsened by contemporary workplace
authoritarianism. As a result, internal union democracy campaigns
over the long run have ultimately resulted in weakened unions later
returning to corporatist strategies. Moreover, the emphasis on internal union democracy has left unions susceptible to judicial and
political assaults across the globe which exemplify the limits of negative liberal rights to address social power asymmetries, especially
in common law countries. This mistaken focus on union democracy
is redoubled when the international influence of U.S. labor scholarship inspires calls for union democratization as a salutatory reform
elsewhere.
To substantiate these claims, this article uses a trilateral comparison between the development of collective bargaining in the United
States, Brazil, and China to demonstrate the inevitable pull of unions
towards corporatist bargaining, even among nations with quite different regulatory regimes—but all where calls for greater union
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democracy have at points been made. The article reinterprets the
history of the decentralized U.S. labor union model, formally infused with liberal procedural norms, as one where the success of
U.S. unions followed their ability to replicate corporatist behaviors
through union mergers, pattern bargaining, sympathy strikes and
other collective tactics, described as “aspirational corporatism.” By
contrast, the relative success of the now-threatened Brazilian union
model has been predicated on the elision of liberal norms, described
as “hyper-corporatism,” even though calls for union democracy
were a rallying cry during Brazil’s political democratization. These
two examples are then contrasted with the Chinese Communist
Party’s experiments with workplace proceduralism within its state
labor union as a tactic to weaken the horizontal bonds of the evergrowing Chinese labor movement, while also seeking to designate
collective bargaining units to ease labor unrest—described here as
“simulated corporatism.”
This comparative and historical analysis is not meant to critique
the role of unions as instruments for economic fairness, but it is
meant to help guide efforts to best realize their capabilities. The corporatist function of unions naturally moves them away from more
radical reforms to transform the modern workplace which would
alienate other established economic and political actors. In this regard, no structural configuration of internal union procedure can
substitute for the presence of a broader labor politics or specific labor party. Thus, efforts to create or foster workplace relations governed by deeper norms of participatory economic democracy should
be directed elsewhere.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Early in 2015, the Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU) celebrated one in a series of hard-won victories in its struggle within
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), in this case preserving the right for IBT members to directly elect their national representatives.1 As the largest union in the United States, the TDU’s
struggles have often served to symbolize the U.S. labor movement’s
long-standing preoccupation with the ideal of union democracy.
Union democracy herein is generally conceptualized as how internal union structures replicate the participatory and liberal procedural norms, and most are often focused on elections as a form of
institutional accountability. This American preoccupation with union democracy is not sourced solely in its parallels to political accountability but also the participatory spillover effects its proponents imagine for larger issues of economic and political equality.
The replication of electoral dynamics within the union is argued to
serve as a supportive microcosm of political democracy where citizens can develop democratic expectations and experience, all of
which contribute to the groundwork for social movements promoting more radical workplace reforms in the future.
Arguments about the social utility of union democracy thus engage with broader ideals concerning the nature and sources of economic democracy, understood to mean either, in the general sense,
the state of economic fairness in a society or, in the specific sense,
the participation of workers in workplace decision-making. In parallel to concerns regarding the health of political democracy more
generally,2 growing economic inequality has been seen as an indication of the decline of economic democracy in the general sense and
the advancement of technocratic conceptions of managerial expertise and authority in the workplace as tied to the decline of economic
democracy in the specific sense. While the modern citizen is often
assumed in her role as a consumer to effectively filter and process
complex data in a world of growing financialization, in her role as a
producer she is assumed to have little capacity to contribute
1 Alexandra Bradbury, Teamsters Secure Their Right to Vote, In Time for 2016
Election, LABOR NOTES (Jan. 28, 2015), http://labornotes.org/2015/01/teamsters-secure-their-right-vote-time-2016-election [https://perma.cc/CZP7-D4AW].
2 Compare ANTHONY DOWN, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957), with
BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER (2007).
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meaningfully to workplace decision-making and to have been rewarded with increasingly smaller shares of total economic production.
Current debates about inequality now occur as the global state
of labor unions has been one of an almost universal secular decline
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. Growing frustration has been expressed by labor scholars and activists that the
decline of unions is a root cause of economic inequality and labor’s
political relevance. The extensiveness of this trend has induced
what Guy Mundlak recently diagnosed as a deep anomie among labor scholars.3 Beyond growing inequality, this anomie also reflects
the continued rebuffing of hopes that the twentieth century rise of
collective bargaining, alongside the growth of welfare state arrangements, would progressively assuage the dislocations of labor commodification that Karl Polanyi identified at the heart of industrial
capitalism.4
In the context of this growing concern with economic inequality,
it is not surprising then that in American debates over how to combat inequality union democracy is cited as a critical means to revitalize American unions and recapture the link between meaningful
work and citizenship. Notably, intra-corporate forms of worker organization are illegal in the United States, even though workplace
governance is also precluded as a topic of collective bargaining.
Nonetheless, a tight association is believed to exist between union
democracy and general economic democracy, or at least the expectation of a future inter-relationship, and as an asserted form of participatory specific economic democracy. In turn, the international
influence of American labor scholarship has both directly suggested
and indirectly inspired calls for union democracy abroad.
Yet, in many ways the American preoccupation with union democracy is an exceptional one. Labor unions first emerged in early
ninetieth century Europe and then spread worldwide, not as liberal
democratic institutions but as corporatist institutions. In its broadest terms, corporatism refers to a general theory of politics holding
that group-based bargaining and negotiation over economic and social differences were the fulcrum of general economic democracy,
often called social democracy. Many early forms of corporatism
3 Guy Mundlak, Workplace—Democracy: Reclaiming the Effort to Foster Public and
Private Isomorphism, 15 THEOR. INQ. LAW 160 (2014).
4 KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944).
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were wholly illiberal in conception, most notably Italian fascism, but
still made claim to democratic legitimacy by virtue of representing
social interests through corporatist groups, including those predicated on economic, religious or other significant social cleavages. In
most corporatist regimes the state took an active role in designating
corporatist actors and regulating the structure of their bargaining.
In the context of wage labor, labor unions were designated to represent the interests of workers in negotiations with employer groups.
The very success of these corporatist regimes was then dependent
on both channeling and disciplining workers collectively in order to
strengthen unions’ broader social bargaining power. This discipline
was needed to make unions’ bargaining credible, and centrally included the ability to induce strikes, but also included other forms of
political discipline, such as voting, economic discipline, such as consumer boycotts, but also workplace discipline, in order compete
with managerial discipline over issues of performance. As such, unions’ relationships with workers constituted intertwined channel of
obligations and loyalty.
As a result of the European influence of corporatist theories, the
place of individual procedural rights associated with American union democracy as a one-sided restraint of individual workers over
unions is still largely absent from the majority of national labor union traditions. Pathways for workplace participation exist in these
traditions, including work councils and forms of co-determination,
but even here these institutions are distinct from labor unions and
their internal procedures deviate significantly from norms of liberal
representation. Moreover, the wage bargaining and political aggregation functions of corporatist unions are predicated on at least partial insulation from individual legal claims against their decisions
and actions, and unions are thus often granted some combinations
of the disciplinary powers cited above. In such context, a general
distinction is easy to draw between union democracy and workplace democracy.
The corporatist roots of unions also reflect a presumption that
unions would have an integral relationship with larger national labor movements and specific labor parties. Throughout the course of
the twentieth century, corporatist unions played key roles as societies transitioned from feudalism or colonialism to political democracies. In the vast majority of these national histories, unions’ power
was directly tied to their ability to nurture political solidarity among
diverse workers. However, even the crucial grassroots actions of
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unions during times of democratic transitions were not organized at
the level of individual workplaces. The effectiveness of unions as
bargainers for their constituents was never uncontroversial, but
mechanisms of accountability were presumed to exist not through
elections or the litigation of other procedural legal rights but rather
through external state regulation of labor union institutional design
and the loyalty that unions inspired from their performance as collective bargainers. Moreover, the larger responsibility of actually engaging in social democratic political action was the purview of labor
movements and parties which, no matter how strong the overlap,
were distinct from unions themselves.
In contrast to the presumptions of American proponents of union democracy, for corporatist unions the introduction of procedural
liberalism thus not only undermines union discipline but leaves
them vulnerable to opportunistic judicial assault. Whenever unions
are expected to reconcile their collective action on equal footing with
negative individual rights, the consequence is deconstruction—already near completion in the United Kingdom and well in progress
in the United States. Not surprisingly, this deconstruction has in
recent decades been paired with the increasing insulation of unions’
historical twin, the corporation, from these same claims of democratic proceduralism.
Even more acutely, the expectation that union democracy will
fuel the systemic revitalization of unions fundamentally misconceptualizes how the social power of unions is generated. To link union
democracy to collective action requires viewing the individual
workplace as the motor force of labor activism. Yet, the generally
transitory effects of union revitalization efforts in the United States
and elsewhere reveal that such efforts are illusory and heavily dependent on the external infusion of social capital into unions from
labor movements rather than the reverse. While unions were key to
channeling worker interests into the social movements necessary to
provoke political democratization, this success was rarely, if ever,
dependent on intensifying intra-union participatory decision-making. And, in turn, most post-democratization unions either turned
to embrace corporatism or faded from social influence.
Moreover, however one may imagine earlier industrial workplaces, the general social atomization of modern work, and the
growth of managerial authority therein, has rendered individual
workplaces even more unreliable as long-term generators of social
capital for unions. The ideal of the workplace as a bottom-up
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foundation for social democratic vitality is, unfortunately, fundamentally at odds with the logics of capital formation that now discipline the modern workplace. Further, any structural focus on the individual workplace aims at both where workers are most vulnerable
to retaliation and least likely to inspire recognition of their larger
social context and interests.
Following the global proliferation of what David Harvey has
called flexible accumulation5—ever accelerated by the denationalization of financial capital—no human process of localized social
capital formation can match the current logistical speed and scope
of capital mobility.6 In specific contexts over limited time horizons—most often involving intense general political mobilization or
small homogenous nations—episodic union democracy campaigns
can appear to transcend this mismatch. Yet, without a larger labor
politics to sustain them these apparent successes are ground away
by the steady-state operation of the mobility mismatch between human and financial capital. As a result, efforts at promoting union
revitalization through the promotion of union democracy ultimately
leave weakened unions and labor movements returning to corporatist patterns of formal and informal centralization. And such recurrence is especially prominent in spatially large and demographically
diverse nations.
It is thus not surprising that the American norm of union democracy traditionally found little sustained purchase outside its national
border. Regardless of variations in their specific institutional structure and legal regulation, the success of most every union tradition
has been grounded in corporatism, identified over a century ago by
Robert Michels as an example of his iron law of oligarchy.7 While
American labor union activists often decry these trends, the comparative and historical scholarship on labor unions reveals that collective bargaining systems that have been best able to serve the collective interests of their workers are those of corporatist variety. This
is not a claim that labor unions, as part of their political and economic bargaining, do not, or should not, directly engage with workers, but that their need to operate collectively requires them to do so
largely outside the bounds of the liberal proceduralism epitomized
by elections and individual rights-claims. Corporatist unions are
DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY (1989).
Sanford Jacoby, Finance and Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and Democracy, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 17 (2008).
7 ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES (1911).
5
6
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susceptible to bureaucratic inertia, especially after eras of relative
success, and many regimes may falter in their direct engagement
and collective mobilization of workers. However, a strategic preoccupation with electoralism as a form of accountability often saps and
localizes the very energy that sustains large forms of collective mobilization, a reality that the enemies of labor organization have
learned well in the United States and elsewhere.
It is this corporatist reality of labor union organization and action that gives lie to the false hope of union democracy. To exemplify such, this article will explore the early twentieth to early
twenty-first century trajectories of three labor traditions with very
different modern institutional and legal arrangements, namely,
those of the United States, Brazil and China. These comparative examples represent quite divergent economic and political contexts,
but they represent not only large swaths of the workers globally, but
each has also taken turns as promoted models of economic development. In addition, for all three countries a historical relationship exists between labor unions and movements towards or away from
political democratization.8 Of further concern, labor discourse in
Brazil and China have shown signs of the influence of American labor scholarship’s focus on union democracy, where its asserted
promises are held out to energize the performance and social relevance of unions.
The ultimate aim of this comparative analysis is not to critique
labor unions as instruments for great social equality or general economic democracy. Quite to the contrary, this article unabashedly
does not attempt to persuade those currently unconvinced of the
value of labor unions, but to reshape the orientation of those who
do. Nor does it advance holistic indicia to comparatively evaluate
union performance.9 What is does seek, especially in the American
context, is to properly orientate reforms that will improve labor union performance through recognition of their function as corporatist
institutions. Furthermore, this corporatist nature does argue against
expectations that labor unions themselves will act as the vanguard
of more transformative economic reforms, especially those that
8 Jedidiah Kroncke, Property Rights, Labor Rights and Democratization: Lessons
from China and Experimental Authoritarians, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (2013).
9 One pitfall of competing agendas for labor reform is the different metrics of
evaluation employed by researchers. Claudia Senik, Income Distribution and Subjective Happiness: A Survey (OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, Working Paper No. 96, 2009) (providing a subjective discussion on the issues
of income inequality and income comparisons).
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would promote genuine workplace democracy. Labor unions are,
rather, at their best as creatures of social democracy. The need of
unions to bargain with other social interests militates against such
radicalism, as it would alienate its bargaining partners. While it is
understandable that some may want to breath more radical dreams
into unions, such often only speaks to the weakness in larger labor
politics or the absence of a genuine labor party. But, again, this
dream is ultimately self-defeating.
Refocusing on a larger labor politics in the context of Mundlak’s
global labor anomie eschews the defensive posture encouraged by
the enervating trends of global labor politics. This article sees a lucid
understanding of corporatism as itself part of a more aggressive or
aspirational re-envisioning, and shows how at this point in history
such attempts must be informed by comparative analysis. While
comparative analysis is traditionally fraught with methodological
challenges,10 the empirical richness and general interconnection of
the global economy militate against arguments asserting cultural exceptionalism.11 Moreover, domestic labor politics invariably invoke
the experience of foreign nations, and without active comparative
analysis these invocations tend towards idealization and mutual
misrepresentation.12 Similarly, comparative historical work can
draw out general dynamics from the long wave of twentieth century
union development and activities. This long wave perspective helps
to deconstruct domestic mythologies and to displace arguments that
extrapolate from more transitory developments, of which union democracy is the most evident American example.13
10 See, e.g., Guy Mundlak & Matthew W. Finkin, Introduction to the Comparative
Labor Law Handbook, in COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW 1 (Matthew W. Finkin & Guy
Mundlak eds., 2015) (indicating the inherently comparative nature of the law and
specifically, labor law).
11 See Anita Chan, The Fallacy of Chinese Exceptionalism, in CHINESE WORKERS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 3 (Anita Chan ed., 2015) (arguing that the concept of
exceptionalism diverts researchers’ attention away from similarities between national systems).
12 Harry Arthurs, Cross-National Legal Learning: The Uses of Comparative Labor
Knowledge, Law, and Policy, in RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND THE
STANDARD CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 357 (Katherine Stone & Harry Arthurs eds.,
2013); Katherine Stone, Green Shoots in the Labor Market: A Cornucopia of Social Experiments, 36 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 293 (2015).
13 Compare Kim Voss & Rachel Sherman, Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization in the American Labor Movement, 106 AM. J. SOC. 303, 304 (2000) (examining union revitalization through the use of disruptive tactics), with Kate Bronfenbrenner, The American Labour Movement and the Resurgence in Union Organizing,
in TRADE UNIONS IN RENEWAL 32 (Peter Fairbrother & Charlotte A. B. Yates eds.,
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To develop this general argument, this article progresses in four
parts. Section 1 will provide background on theories of corporatism
and the historical roots of labor unions’ development as a central
instantiation of corporatist politics. Section 2 will present a revisionist interpretation of the rise and fall of the U.S. labor union model,
exemplar of the decentralized and privately-ordered variety, that
has been undermined by the Sisyphean and ultimately counterproductive effort to prioritize liberal proceduralism. To wit, the onetime success of the U.S. labor movement was heavily dependent on
creating informal corporatist dynamics through union mergers, pattern bargaining, sympathy strikes and other tactics to scale-up bargaining with employers, herein described as “aspirational corporatism.” Section 3 discusses the modern Brazilian experience, perhaps
the most successful contemporary large-scale labor movement. A
central actor in the country’s 1988 transition to political democracy,
in Brazil unions had long promised greater union democracy in their
rise to political relevance, but immediately turned to entrench a
strong corporatist labor regime post-democratization with near zero
internal democratic norms, described herein as “hyper-corporatism.” Brazil now has a labor regime whose corporatist elements
have been specifically targeted to undermine unions’ political
power. Section 4 engages the contentious role of the state labor union in contemporary China, where the communist presumption of
perfect alignment between Party and worker interests left the state
union scrambling for relevance after 1978. Local union elections
have emerged in recent years as a permitted site of experimentation
within the state union as a preemptive strike against broader labor
mobilization that could fuel political democratization. Simultaneously, the central government has also allowed experimentation
with large scale collective bargaining as a solution to growing labor
unrest—described herein as “simulated corporatism.” Section 5
concludes by arguing that these examples all demonstrate, in different ways, why labor union reform should always emphasize
strengthening corporatism, and that union democracy is often a
practical and rhetorical liability in contemporary labor politics. This
is a pressing issue for clarity in the U.S. and elsewhere as the health
2006) (discussing signs of resurgence in the American labor movement through
grassroots education). The view of Michels’ law as something ideologically distasteful often motivates focusing on short-term surveys and analysis within nations
to find counterexamples. The latter is illustrative as it took the brief uptick in late
1990s’ American union membership to extrapolate optimistic trends into the future.
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of general economic democracy is at risk worldwide. To the extent
that we may hope of a world where both general and specific economic democracy suffuses our economies, these hopes should look
beyond unions to other alternatives and in a way that does not ultimately undermine labor unions’ current, and pressing, utility in the
present.
2. THE INEVITABILITY OF LABOR UNIONS AS CORPORATIST
BARGAINERS

2.1. The Gravitational Pull of Union Corporatism
There exists a wide range of arguments traditionally advanced
for why labor’s empowerment in the workplace is a desirable social
goal, ranging from the moral to the purely utilitarian.14 In recent
decades, labor politics has had to respond to the failure of communist regimes that presumed that ideological adherence to worker
welfare in command and control economies was sufficient to
achieve worker empowerment.15 Within capitalist nations, most of
these arguments are tied to variants of economic democracy, emphasizing either the fairness of income/wealth distribution or the
empowerment of works in social politics.16 Proponents of economic
democracy take a wide range of positions on the welfare state, which
provides direct subsidies to insulate workers from the vagaries of
labor market turnover.17 And there is an equally wide range of objections to arguments regarding such protections, including the neoclassical argument that such efforts are ultimately

14 See, e.g., Guy Mundlak, Workplace – Democracy: Reclaiming the Effort to Foster
Public and Private Isomorphism, 15 THEOR. INQ. L. 159 (2014). Note that this article
will not provide an independent defense of labor unions, as its audience is primarily labor scholars and activists who almost exclusively share a normative commitment to labor politics.
15 Monty L. Lynn, Matjas Mulej & Karin Jurse, Democracy without Empowerment: The Grant Vision and Demise of Yugoslav Self-Management, 40 MGMT. DECISION
797 (2002).
16 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1956).
17 James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001).
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counterproductive for both social and individual welfare.18 Such
disagreements stem from quite fundamental disjunctions as to the
goals of economic development, from maximizing measurable indices of leisure or income19 to more aesthetic considerations of personal development or virtue.20 And underlying these variations are
often opposed visions of the very nature of social life itself.21 Disentangling the relationship between economic freedom and liberty is
as challenging as articulating the gaps between formal legal freedom
and political liberty.22 The recent revival of interest in theories of
economic republicanism, which refute the private/public liberty
distinction, reflects the ongoing turmoil to reconcile economic capitalism with political democracy.23
However, if we return to the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, we can see an even more diverse and contested range of
possibilities than exist today about what regulation of the workplace
should look like and what role the state should play therein. The
historical emergence of labor unions was not based on any single
vision of political economy. Fascism and communism were originally cast as “democratic” systems in a political vernacular very far
from the presumptions of modern liberal democratic norms.24
Unregulated, privately organized labor movements were active
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in most every
18 See John Pencavel, The Legal Framework for Collective Bargaining in Developing
Economies, in LABOR MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA 27, 45 (Sebastian Edwards & Nora
Claudia Lustig eds., 1999) (arguing that labor unions harm economic growth).
19 Take, for example, the anthropological critique of Keynes’ optimistic view
of industrial progress as yielding high levels of modern leisure in MARSHALL
SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS (1972).
20 A popular meta-theory today is Amartya Sen’s concept of human capabilities. See Kevin Kolben, Labour Regulation, Human Capacities and Industrial Citizenship,
in LABOUR REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 60 (Shelley
Marsh & Colin Fenwick ed., 2016).
21 Perhaps no greater disjuncture exists between proponents and critics of labor unions than regarding the nature of social coercion. More libertarian conceptions see labor markets as places of natural freedom, where others see the need to
participate in labor markets as itself the coercive effect of biology and industrial
economics. The background presumption of this article falls toward the latter, seeing a lack of state intervention in creating or regulating labor markets as leading to
private feudalism. See, e.g., MARK S. WEINER, THE RULE OF THE CLAN (2013).
22 Compare the discussion of economic liberty versus economic freedom in Peter Levine, The Libertarian Critique of Labor Unions, 21 PHIL. & PUBLIC POL’Y Q. 17
(2001), with RAYMOND HOGLER, THE END OF AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS (2015).
23 ROBIN HAHNEL, ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY: FROM C OMPETITION TO
COOPERATION (2005).
24 Michael J. Hogan, Corporatism, 77 J. AMER. HIST. 153, 153-54 (1990).
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industrializing nation, naturally incident to large scale transitions to
wage labor. Such labor movements often advanced aggressive visions of economic democracy from those grounded in communism
to those grounded in republicanism. Yet, as the contest between
these new political visions played out in industrializing nations, the
specific way in which the questions of how collective labor organizations were to be institutionalized in non-communist regimes took
on a distinctly corporatist character.
In contrast to democratic theories that rest upon individual conceptions of rights and participation, corporatist theories of social organization were originally predicated on facilitating the bargaining
of particular group interests.25 Thus, in contrast to pluralist versions
of democratic participation,26 corporatist theories asserted that social harmony was best achieved through state designation of collective intermediaries to both formulate and express the interests of
particular social forces.27 The role of individual rights, both vis-àvis the state and these groups, was peripheral at best in corporatist
politics. In fact, the ability of corporatist agents—whether representing class, religious, ethnic, or other broad social interests—to
bargain effectively with other designated groups was predicated on
their ability to discipline their constituents in order to make good on
the social pacts they achieved, as well as to effectively mobilize collective action in support of these bargaining processes in and outside of the workplace.
Following this logic, Robert Michels classically articulated his influential theory of social politics in what he called the iron rule of
oligarchy.28 Michels argued that the demands of centralization were
inescapable in any new social movement as it moved into the realm
of regular politics. Corporatist arrangements were the natural outgrowth of this tendency, and attempts to infuse these groups with
liberal notions of democratic participation were doomed given the
inevitable bureaucratization of any hierarchical organization and
25 Larry G. Gerber, Corporatism and State Theory: A Review Essay for Historians,
19 SOC. SCI. HIST. 313 (1995).
26 Francesca Bignami, Civil Society and International Organizations: A Liberal
Framework for Global Governance, 9 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 14 (2009).
27 John Goldthorpe, The End of Convergence: Corporatist and Dualist Tendencies
in Modern Western Societies, in NEW APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC LIFE 124 (Bryan Roberts et al. eds., 1985).
28 ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Eden & Cedar Paul trans., Dover Publications) (1962).
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would undermine their functioning in the regular politics after revolutionary moments.29 While beyond the scope of this analysis, the
resistance of corporations to liberal norms tells a parallel story as the
historical corporatist twin of unions.
With these broad strokes in common, where most corporatist
theories of politics diverged, especially in their normative frames,
was in their view of the role of state. Philippe Schmitter, pioneering
modern scholar of corporatism, argued that traditionally state-dominated forms of corporatism would give way to what he identified
as societal corporatism. Schmitter’s key distinction was that under
state corporatism, the state legally designates and licenses the
groups eligible to participate in political and economic bargaining.
In contrast, under societal corporatism, such groups arise spontaneously from civil society.30 The analytic frame of “neo-corporatism”
emerged in the 1980s as scholars tried to divine the increasingly
murky dynamics of formal and informal bargaining that characterized the relationship of the state to particular economic and social
interests,31 a term redeployed to help describe the persistence of bureaucratic authoritarianism32 and financial corporatism in otherwise
neoliberal economies.33
Yet, while most European nations eventually came to embrace
liberal theories of political democracy to varying extents as they
built up their post-World War II welfare states, the most lasting impact of corporatist theories in modern life was in the institutionalization of labor unions.34 Labor corporatism was attractive to a
29 A dreary diagnosis from a more participatory democratic frame, and it is
not surprising that Michels himself grew disenchanted with German social democracy and later became an apologist for Italian fascism. The coherence and general
validity of Michels’s work, in contrast to his common citation, is critiqued in Ewan
McGaughey, Democracy or Oligarchy? Models of Union Governance in the UK, Germany
and US (King's College London Law School Research Paper No. 35, 2017).
30 Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, 36 REV. OF POL. 85
(1974).
31 Klaus Von Beyme, Neo-Corporatism: A New Nut in an Old Shell?, 4 INT’L POL.
SCI. REV. 173 (1983).
32 See GUILLERMO A. O’DONNELL, MODERNIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC
AUTHORITARIANISM 51–53 (1973) (charting the degree of modernization in connection to the level of democracy in the political system in South American countries).
33 Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (1987); Mark Blyth, The Ghosts of Corporatism’s Past and Past Corporatisms: Commentary on Three Articles, 5 CAPITALISM & SOC’Y Art. 4 (2010).
34 HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOUR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF
WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1974); Ruth Dukes, Constitutionalizing Employment Relations: Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freund, and the Role of Labour Law, 35 J. L. & SOC’Y
341 (2008).
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variety of political regimes, especially those concerned with subverting more radical labor movements. Fascist and authoritarian regimes, even those that came into power with the support of labor
movements, routinely acted to purge labor leaders and re-organize
private labor unions under a single state-controlled union.35 For liberal democratic regimes, creating systems of labor corporatism still
served to quell and channel labor unrest while appealing to notions
of social democracy.36
Today, ongoing state certification of labor unions continues to
be popular, and reflects the general presumption that collective bargaining is an instrument for industrial peace and coordination. The
common tripartite structure of union regulation in Europe and in
many post-colonial nations developed macro-level variations in
how, and through which institutions, unions were regulated—but
the role of the state remained statistically central.37 As a result, in
the context of labor regulation, a transition from state to societal corporatism has been rare. Only a few Scandinavian labor unions operate outside of a formal system where they are directly sanctioned
by the state as the formal bargaining representatives for workers.
As such, labor corporatism continues to be a key feature of many
varieties of capitalism,38 even after nations have transitioned to formally non-corporatist political arrangements.39 Today the legitimacy of labor unions has some overt constitutional recognition,
even in liberal constitutional regimes, as associative rights validated
by the need for collective action. It is thus not surprising that Michels used labor unions as a paradigmatic example of his iron rule.40
For Michels the corporatist political ideas embedded in the
35 DIETRICH ORLOW, THE HISTORY OF THE NAZI PARTY: 1919-1933 103 (1969);
PAUL W. DRAKE, LABOR MOVEMENT AND DICTATORSHIPS: THE SOUTHERN CONE IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 192 (1996).
36 Stephen McBride, Corporatism, Public Policy and the Labour Movement: A Comparative Study 33 POL. STUD. 439 (1985).
37 For variations in state mechanisms for tripartite labor regulation, see Ralf
Rogowski, Meso-Corporatism and Labour Conflict Resolution: The Theory and its Application to the Analysis of Labour Judiciaries in France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Great Britain and the United States, 1 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL, 143 (1985).
38 PETER A. HALL & DAVID SOSKICE, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (2001); Kathleen Thelen,
Varieties of Capitalism: Trajectories of Liberalization and the New Politics of Social Solidarity, 15 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 137 (2012).
39 For the turn of the “Oxford school” of industrial relations to electoral politics following a loss of faith in democratic bargaining, see Ben Jackson, Economic
Democracy and the Labour Tradition, JUNCTURE (May 22, 2014).
40 MICHELS, supra note 28.
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foundations of modern collective bargaining were not pathological,
but desirable processes if labor unions were going to function
properly as social bargainers.
A full examination of European labor corporatism is not needed
here, as, contrary to some external perceptions, the official recognition of the value of corporatism is traditionally more secure in European labor discourse, if also under judicial and legislative assault.41 Two of the most commonly cited examples by U.S. labor
scholars as emulatable systems, German co-determination and Scandinavia social unionism, operate without emphasizing the liberal
procedural norms of union democracy. German co-determination
and most other forms of worker participation in corporate governance are, in fact, formally distinct from union governance,42 even if
there is significant informal overlap.43 Additionally, it is notable that
such attempts at intra-corporate participation have never fed into
more radical social movements predicted by some of co-determination’s or universal unionism’s ideological opponents.44
And while the relatively small scale of many Nordic countries
may often give the appearance of greater participatory dynamics,
most of these countries have traditionally been strong examples of
extensive corporatist social bargaining tied to strong union disciplinary powers.45 The alignment of unions with political parties which
took up the formal mantle of “Labor” has been increasingly uneasy
in many countries; however, this has primarily been the result of
more conservative economic ideologies emerging outside of labor
unions rather than a result of changes in their internal organization.
Intellectual resistance to recognizing Michels’ iron law by labor
scholars or activists is often grounded in the hope that unions themselves would serve as a transitional compromise for more radical
41 Wolfgang Streeck, Editorial Introduction to Special Issue on Organizational Democracy in Trade Unions, 9 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 310 (1988).
42 Ingo Schmidt, Can Germany's Corporatist Labor Movement Survive?, 57
MONTHLY REV. 49 (2005).
43 Ewan McGaughey, British Codetermination and the Churchillian Circle
(UCL Lab. Rts. Inst. On-Line Working Papers, Working Paper No. 2, 2014); Walther
Müller-Jentsch & Nicholas Levis, Industrial Democracy: From Representative Codetermination to Direct Participation, 25 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 50 (1995).
44 Ruth Dukes, Constitutionalizing Employment Relations, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y 341,
342 (2008); Matthew Dimick, Productive Unionism, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 679, 689
(2014).
45 Arend Lijphart and Markus M. L. Crepaz, Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages, 21 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 235
(1991).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/2

2018]

The False Hope of Union Democracy

633

shifts toward reworking democratic norms into economic production itself.46 Thus, the classic analytical dichotomy between the requirements of institutional bureaucracy and member participation
in unions is expressed as a subset of the general tension between
democratic movements and democratic organizations.47 The question of whether unions should themselves be internally democratic,
and move away from their corporatist origins, has been debated
across a wide range of nations.48
These forward-looking and ideologically aspirational debates
have been recurrently matched by comparative empirical analysis
which establishes that union behavior and organization is consistently driven by the corporatist desire to build political capital to effectively bargain at the social level.49 In general, these studies point
out that it was far more costly for unions to bargain at the employer
level, especially as capital acquires higher levels of concentration
and more extensive abilities to arbitrage local and national conditions.50 While unattractive to more utopian visions of labor activism,
scholars in corporatist systems have had to recognize that centrality
of power accumulation, rather than individual empowerment, is
necessary for unions’ effective promotion of social democracy.51
The least utopian implication of this accumulative function is the
need for unions to be able to discipline workers as their collective
agents. Certainly, labor unions have had a difficulty truly representing the interests of all workers, especially those from minority
groups, but the militancy that culminates in the organization of
46 Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793 (1984); Michael Doherty, Corporatism or Cop-out? The Impact of Social Partnership on UnionMember Relations (Dublin City U. Socio-Legal Res. Ctr. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 01-07, 2007) (analyzing the Irish social partnership process and its
relationship to union membership and workplace agreements).
47 Richard Hyman, Union Renewal: A View from Europe, 45 LAB. HIST. 340 (2004);
HEATHER CONNOLLY, RENEWAL IN THE FRENCH TRADE UNION MOVEMENT: A
GRASSROOTS PERSPECTIVE (2010).
48 Ulrich Mückenberger & Nicholas Levis, Trade Union Difficulties with Participation, 25 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 20 (1995).
49 James A. Craft, Unions, Bureaucracy, and Change: Old Dogs Learn New Tricks
Very Slowly, 4 J. LAB. RES. 393 (1991).
50 Lars Calmfors & John Driffill, Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance, 3 ECON. POL’Y 13 (1988). But see John Driffill, The Centralization
of Wage Bargaining Revisited: What Have We Learnt? (Paper for The European Inst. of
Lab., 2006) (discussing the effects of collective bargaining on macroeconomic performance in growth and employment).
51 S. Muthuchidambaram, Democracy as a Goal of Union Organization: An Interpretation of the United States Experience, 3 INDUS. REL. 579, 586 (1969).
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strikes, the lynchpin of unions’ ability to threaten industrial peace,
requires the same sort of limited participation that still characterizes
most political parties. Union discipline and striking are thus intimately intertwined, both to organize effective strikes and to limit
strikes outside of the union control. Even Otto Kahn Freund’s classic ideal of collective laissez-faire, which fully excluded the state
from regulation of labor unions, was predicated on the need for unions to be able to discipline their membership.52 And this discipline
is not simply in regard to strikes, but bargaining power can be increased through discipline of workers’ actions as voters and consumers—as well as a way to compete with managerial discipline.
As a result, the demands of collective bargaining led few systems to be remolded into internally democratic institutions where
workers were actively engaged in electoral mechanisms or could
make outside judicial claims against unions. Systems that have attempted to move toward greater local participation and less discipline have led to the routine observation of the inefficiencies of localism in comparison to the strength of broader labor politics.53
What is true is that the corporatist nature of labor unions imbues
them with a decidedly conservative bend when it comes to more
transformative visions of economic change. The clearest example of
this conservatism was the purging or marginalization of members
sympathetic to communism in a number of nations, who themselves
held out hope that unions could help stage communist revolutions.
Perhaps more illustrative of the limits/demands of corporatist bargaining is the beating back of Rudolf Meidner’s proposal for “wageearner funds” in Sweden during the 1970s.54 Here, as powerful and
successful as Swedish unions are often portrayed internationally,
the idea that share levies could lead to increasing levels of corporate
ownership by unions was fiercely resisted by Sweden’s highly concentrated family owners. The threat of this system-breaking tactic
essentially led to the threat that the Swedish corporatist system
52 Otto Kahn-Freund, Trade Union Democracy and the Law, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 10
(1961); JOHN HEMINGWAY, CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY: STUDIES IN TRADE UNION
GOVERNMENT (1978). See generally ADRIAN WILLIAMSON, CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC
POLICYMAKING AND THE BIRTH OF THATCHERISM, 1964-1979, Ch. 5 (2015).
53 See Guy Mundlak, Organizing Workers in ‘Hybrid Systems’: Comparing Trade
Union Strategies in Four Countries – Austria, Germany, Israel and the Netherlands, 17
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 163 (2016) (explaining the gap that exists between local
activism and social partnerships at higher levels).
54 Philip Whyman, Post-Keynesianism, Socialisation of Investment and Swedish
Wage-Earner Funds, 30 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 49 (2006).
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would collapse through financial capital walking away from the
bargaining table.55 The very cooperative logic that corporatism
feeds on restricts the range of positions labor unions could take. As
such, unions have also generally stopped short of pushing participatory dynamics into core aspects of enterprise decision-making beyond the consultative.
As a result, while some labor scholars continue to imagine a relationship between unions and more transformative versions of the
workplace,56 hopes that unionization would lead to the growth of
the more extensive forms of specific economic democracy,57 such as
direct ownership or co-governance, have not materialized. More
successful have been calls for unions to participate in general economic re-democratization under the rubric of social unionism,
which is predicated on union participation to include non-economic
issues of social justice, and to serve as social movements actors engaged in politics far beyond the workplace.58
2.2. Social Capital Formation and the Authoritarian Workplace
The anomie of labor scholars cited earlier is not primarily
sourced in the relative failure of unions to promote specific forms of
participatory economic democracy, but instead springs from the impact of global economic and political trends on unions general effectiveness to represent the interests of workers at any level. In contrast
to even the intermediary role of unions imagined under corporatist
social theory, the ideal that workers or their representatives should
play a role in state or corporate decision-making has become more
difficult to realize in an environment where the very desirability of
labor protections has been called into question.
55 Magnus Henrekson and Ulf Jakobsson, Two Attacks on the Swedish Corporate
Model: From Wage-Earner Funds to Corporatist Pension Funds, RESEARCHGATE (Feb.
24th, 2003); Bengt Furåker, The Swedish Wage-Earner Funds and Economic Democracy:
Is There Anything to be Learned From Them?, 22 EUR. REV. LAB. & RES. 121 (2016).
56 Dionne M. Pohler & Andrew A. Luchak, Balancing Efficiency, Equity, and
Voice: The Impact of Unions and High-Involvement Work Practices on Work Outcomes, 67
INT’L LAB. REV. 1063 (2014).
57 Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment
Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 565-67 (1981).
58 See Stephanie Ross, Social Unionism and Membership Participation: What Role
for Union Democracy?, 81 STUD. POL. ECON. 129 (2008) (arguing that social unionism
is not necessarily the solution to more expansive and inclusive labor movements).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

636

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 39:3]

A great deal of contemporary scholarship on labor markets in
recent decades has promoted the ideal of “labor flexibilization,”
which asserts that all labor protections hamper GDP growth, and
labor unions as the greatest threat to economic productivity.59 Related but distinct from the traditional neoclassical idea that formal
labor protection simply induces labor informalism, the flexibilization discourse has found resonance in developed and developing
countries alike, especially due to its popularity among international
financial institutions.60
The primarily efficiency-based arguments of flexibilization proponents is compounded by the continued, if not ever-strengthening,
belief that democratic norms are inapposite to economic processes,
including among corporate shareholders.61 The idea that economic
decision-making, again outside of consumption, is too complex for
workers to participate in also reinforces the notion that economic
success is tied to exceptional individual meritocratic performance.62
While some impetus exists for expanding worker participation in
corporate governance through stakeholder theories,63 such theories
have yet to be translated successfully into practice or reconciled with
the quite divergent participatory logics of worker and shareholder
democracy.64 The same holds true after the formal recognition of

59 Jedidiah Kroncke, Precariousness as Growth: Meritocracy, Human Capital Formation, and Workplace Regulation in Brazil, China and India, 9 L. & DEV. REV. 321 (2016).
60 Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform, and Economic Development, 50
VA. J. INT’L L. 43, 52 (2009).
61 See Robin Blackburn, Economic Democracy: Meaningful, Desirable, Feasible?,
136 DAEDALUS 36 (2007) (noting the general rise in director primacy in international
corporate governance literature).
62 See Bruce Baum, Governing ‘Democratic’ Equality: Mill, Tawney, and Liberal
Democratic Governmentality, 65 POL. RES. Q. 714, 726 (2012). For a US-specific discussion of the excision of democratic norms from even government action, see SABEEL
RAHMAN, DOMINATION AGAINST DOMINATION (2016).
63 Timothy P. Glynn, Communities and Their Corporations: Towards a Stakeholder
Conception of the Production of Corporate Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1067 (2008);
Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043
(2008) (dealing with the collective action problems of investments). See also Marleen
O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB
L. & POL’Y J. 97 (2000) (looking at the American model of corporate governance
where employees do not have much of a voice, and arguing that corporate governance rights for workers are necessary as shareholders).
64 Michael J. Goldberg, Democracy in the Private Sector: The Rights of Shareholders
and Union Members, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 393 (2015) (addressing corporate governance
by comparing corporations and labor unions and the role of democracy in each). In
fact, stakeholder theories of corporate governance are far closer to corporatist theories of politics than liberal models.
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norms of economic democracy in international treaties, such as the
European Union’s Lisbon Treaty.65
Moreover, such derogation of worker competency reflects a
broader disenchantment with participatory aspects of political democracy manifest in debates about transnational financial regulation and supranational political organization.66 Many developed
nations are now in a historical fugue about the centrality of labor
unions to their processes of democratic transformation and consolidation.67 Such developments are further exacerbated by the efforts
of politically authoritarian regimes to proactively and openly delimit the scope of democratic norms within international legal regimes.68
Dovetailing once more with the rapid growth of capital mobility
and denationalization, the modern workplace thus finds itself subject to increasing capital arbitrage of international and sub-national
variations in labor protections. Thus, in countries with very different political and social demographics there has been a convergent
emphasis on contractualist labor norms69 and the proliferation of hyper-Taylorist management practices. Workers increasingly enjoy
limited individual privacy as well as speech rights in and outside of
the workplace, alongside growing use of other forms of automated
workplace monitoring.70 Elizabeth Anderson marked the rise of
what she calls “private government” to convey how, in many cases,

65 Niklas Bruun, Employees’ Participation Rights and Business Restructuring, 2
EUR. LAB. L.J. 27 (2011).
66 Victor V. Magagna, Representing Efficiency: Corporatism and Democratic Theory, 50 REV. OF POL. 420 (1988); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy and the
Need for a New Administrative Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002) (arguing that globalization affects markets and leads to less democratic rights for individuals).
67 HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002).
68 Stephen F. Diamond, The ‘Race to the Bottom’ Returns: China’s Challenge to the
International Labor Movement, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 39 (2003).
69 MARK FREEDLAND & NICOLA KOUNTOURIS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
PERSONAL WORK RELATIONS (2011); RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND
THE STANDARD CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT (Stone & Arthurs eds. 2013).
70 See Chris Bertram, Let It Bleed: Libertarianism and the Workplace, Out of the
Crooked Timber (Jul. 1, 2012), crookedtimber.org/2012/07/01/let-it-bleed-libertarianism-and-the-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/3F6H-USSB]. See also LEWIS
MALTBY, CAN THEY DO THAT? (2009); Shelley Wallach, The Medusa Stare: Surveillance and Monitoring of Employees and the Right to Privacy, 27 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. &
INDUS. REL. 189 (2011).
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employers exert far greater regulatory power over the lives of their
workers than any governmental agency.71
This growth of authoritarian norms within global workplaces
and reforms focused on atomistic conceptions of labor/capital interactions has been resisted with varying degrees of success, but few
evaluations of this resistance, perhaps outside of technological utopianism, are brightly optimistic.72 The implications of these trends
for social democracy are hotly debated today as a subset of debates
over the sources of economic inequality. Yet, these trends have been
even more devastating for the realization of specific economic democracy in the form of workplace participation. More radical visions of worker autonomy have generally been replaced with far
milder calls for worker “voice” in corporate decision-making, much
of which is framed in voluntary and consultative terms.
These trends render individual workplaces as increasingly difficult and inhospitable loci for generating worker solidarity, what David Weil calls the “fissured workplace.”73 Such dislocation and alienation gives an ever-increasing advantage to employers over
particularized or localized organizational tactics.74 Critics that argue
that unions should themselves be internally democratic take for
granted that more localized participation will generate greater social
capital for a union to draw on.
By contrast, such workplace alienation is compatible with corporatist politics which looks to aggregate and discipline the interests
of diverse workers who are called into collective action outside of
the workplace. Focusing on individual workplaces asks workers to
participate in action which most easily indentifies them for specific
employer retaliation, rather than more diffuse striking and protest
actions. Moreover, the very shared interests that workers share as a
social class are obfuscated when their individual actions are centered in more localized identities, without direct interaction with or
71 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR
LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) (2017).
72 KRONCKE, supra note 59, at 355.
73 DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014). Contra CYNTHIA ESTLUND,
WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY
(2003).
74 But see Michael M. Oswalt, Improvisational Unionism, 104 CAL. L. REV. 597
(2016) (highlighting that the sociological premises of this argument are utopian, but
it presents a useful entryway into thinking about how collective action can occur in
systems which are traditionally organized at the enterprise level).
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participation in broader union-organized actions. In this sense, one’s
identity as a worker as employee can be as narrow as their atomizing
identity as a consumer.
Here, we should remember that Michels’ Iron Law, as any political theory, constitutes a descriptive, not necessarily normative, theory of power. The inevitability of centralization and bureaucratization of political democratic movements is as much a response to
financial capital’s ability to agglomerate as it is a response to the
general needs of large-scale action and hierarchy. While this overgeneralizes the homogenous interests of financial capital and underplays its own coordination issues, it is key to remember the inherently social nature of labor in its general dependence on consistently
generating and utilizing social capital as the basis of its bargaining
power.
Social capital formation is generally a fragile, organic process,
whose inner workings are consistently reviewed by modern social
science. Suffice it to say that even in formally democratic political
systems with active civil society dynamics, it has been an ongoing
challenge to create conditions conducive to its consistent production.75 Part of this challenge is that while humans may thrive in high
social capital settings, they are, on the whole, highly adverse cognitively to conditions of uncertainty and social unpredictability inherent in the commodification of labor.76 Therefore, processes of social
capital formation that are organized around sites of wage-labor will
never be able to keep pace with forms of financial capital formation
that are far more agnostic to their fungible translation from one institutional setting to another.77 The fragmentation of the workplace,
and thereby work itself, as a source of solidarity between workers
beyond their general class interests refocuses the generation of social
capital by unions into the more traditional collective venues imagined by corporatist politics.
Thus, while many studies have made strong claims about attempts to revitalize unions through re-democratizing their internal
structures, over longer time frames these revitalizations are revealed
to be driven by the larger social movements which infused unions
75 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN
MODERN ITALY (1993).
76 Carol Graham, Happiness and Uncertainty, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 2010,
https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/02/happiness_and_uncertainty [https://perma.cc/565T-G4Q4].
77
John Peters, Labour Market Deregulation and the Decline of Labour Power in
North America and Western Europe, 27 POL’Y & SOC’Y 83 (2008).
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with social capital, rather than the reverse. Unions have many varieties of tools to engage and mobilize workers, but the legitimacy of
this engagement has always been an interplay of performance and
loyalty, rather than simple satisfaction with procedures of representation. There is committed psychological literature related to the
force of procedural justice or the effects of empowerment within social movements, but such studies rarely point to electoral accountability as a long-term generator of social capital.78
Outside moments of acute crises, participation by individual
workers in union management invariable wanes—even in comparatively active union systems.79 For unions, bargaining with financial
capital makes internal dissensus crippling on an already compromised terrain. Instead, the ability of unions to promote political consolidation and effective representation of worker interests requires
that they organize themselves as political actors and promote general economic democracy as part of their external, not internal, actions.80 It is telling that labor movements which contribute critically
to democratic political transitions often find their power greatly diminished if they do not succeed in acquiring corporatist status in the
resulting regime.81
Studies on smaller countries over short time frames often present the appearance of local participatory action being integral to
specific bargaining successes. Perhaps Robert Putnam’s most controversial claim regarding social capital formation is that it is easier

78 See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and the Effective Rule of Law,
30 CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003) (discussing procedural justice); W. LANCE BENNETT &
ALEXANDRA SEGERBERG, THE LOGIC OF CONNECTIVE ACTION: DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE
PERSONALIZATION OF CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (2013). See also Sandra González-Bailón,
Networked Discontent: The Anatomy of Protest Campaigns, 44 SOC. NETWORKS 95 (2016)
(discussing further the limitations of individualized action for new social movements).
79 Compare Michael Lynk, Union Democracy and the Law in Canada, 21 J. LAB.
RES. 37 (2001) (suggesting that greater legal intervention in labor unions may ensure
membership control and participation by regulating democratic behavior), with
Jonathan Eaton & Anil Verma, Does "Fighting Back" Make a Difference?: The Case of
the Canadian Auto Workers Union, 27 J. LAB. RES. 187 (2006) (arguing that organization, political action, and collective bargaining can also help revitalize labor unions).
80 Barbara J. Fick, Not Just Collective Bargaining: The Role of Trade Unions in Creating and Maintaining a Democratic Society, 12 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 249 (2009).
81 Eva Bellin, Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in
Late-Developing Countries, 52 WORLD POL. 175, 180–81 (2000).
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under conditions of social uniformity.82 The dynamics in small, relatively homogenous countries where social capital formation is easier to consistently generate provides a deceptively hopeful comparison for geographically and demographically diverse countries.83
Moreover, almost every study pointing to a success in local democratization in small countries can be matched by a longitudinal study
revealing that even here, centralization is the far more durable artifact of labor mobilizations.84
Larger, comparatively homogenous, countries have to rely on
intense cultural pressures to maintain labor representation over
time.85 The rise and fall of Australia’s movement for industrial bargaining reflects this general dynamic, as well as the difficulties present in strong federalist systems that inherently fragment the scale
of bargaining.86 Still, small size or social homogeneity is not necessarily a panacea, as it also provides advantages to authoritarian actors, such as in Singapore, perhaps the most successful example of
unionism as labor coordination institution,87 and Vietnam, which
has felt freer to allow union strike experimentation than its larger
communist and semi-authoritarian cohort.88 Among countries
which possess strong union movements post-democratic transition,
82 Robert Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, 30 SCAN. POL. STUD. 137 (2007) (discussing
the short and long terms effects of immigration and ethnic diversity, and stating
that in the short run, these factors reduce social capital and social diversity).
83 See Inyi Choi, Creating Union Democracy, Workers' Consciousness and Solidarity: Decision-Making Process, Election, and Education in Korean Unions (U.C. Irvine
Center for the Study of Democracy and Development Paper Series, 2005); Itai
Svirski, Moving to Bottom-Up Representation, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 915 (2011)
(discussing trade union systems in Israel).
84 Compare Andrienne Eaton & Kill Kriesky, Decentralization of Bargaining Structures, 2 INDUS. REL. 1 (1998) (discussing and applying the forces that determine bargaining structure), with Lucio Baccaro, Centralized Wage Bargaining and the ‘Celtic
Tiger’ Phenomenon, 46 INDUS. REL. 426 (2007) (discussing centralized wage bargaining and its influence on the Irish growth).
85 Dennis McNamara, Corporatism and Cooperation among Japanese Labor, 28
COMP. POL. 379 (1996); Kenneth Dau-Schmidt & Benjamin Ellis, The Relative Bargaining Power of Employers and Unions in the Global Information Age, in ENTERPRISE L. 81
(Zenichi Shishido ed., 2010).
86 See Bradley Bowden, The Rise and Decline of Australian Unionism, 100 LAB.
HIST., 50 (2011); Mark Barenberg, Constitutional Constraints on Redistribution Through
Class Power, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 313 (1999).
87 Chris Leggett, Trade Unions in Singapore: Corporatist Paternalism, in TRADE
UNIONS IN ASIA: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 102 (Benson & Zhu eds.,
2008); Chew Beng & Rosalind Chew, A New Form of Union Representation to Meet the
Challenges of a Globalized World (Paper, 16th ILERA World Congress, 2012).
88 Anita Chan, Strikes in China’s Export Industries in Comparative Perspective, 65
CHINA J. 27 (2011).
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it is their ultimate strength relative to other social actors that drives
their success rather than any specific internal democratic features,89
and most acute when able to lead to the formation of a specific labor
party.
The issue of scale and social capital formation also helps explain
the disappointing track record of transnational labor organizing.90
Even when labor rights have been conceptualized as human rights,91
the recurrent challenge of disciplining diverse worker interests is
replicated exponentially in transnational labor organizing.92 While
no doubt inhibited by the marginalization of class as an organization
framed by the international NGO community,93 it is nonetheless true
that few national unions have taken large risks for international
partners.94 Labor organizations rarely find abroad what they cannot
find in their own states.95 In the European Union, the progress that
has been made in constructing a regional labor regime has worked
not through democratic processes, but through corporatist processes.96
If we return to the global discourse on labor flexibilization, we
can find the unsurprising result that labor flexibilization reforms
have hit countries that lack corporatist labor regimes the hardest.97
89 Yoonkyung Lee, Labor's Political Representation, in WORKING THROUGH THE
PAST (Teri Caraway et al. eds, 2015).
90 See Mark Barenberg, Sustaining Workers’ Bargaining Power in an Age of
Globalization (EPI Institute Briefing Papers, Paper No. 246, 2009); TRANSNATIONAL
COOPERATION AMONG LABOR UNIONS (Gordon & Turner eds., 2000) (presenting
transnational cooperation among labor unions as effective weapon against the exploitation of workers); JAMIE MCCALLUM, GLOBAL UNIONS, LOCAL POWER: THE NEW
SPIRIT OF TRANSNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZING (2013) (examining an important campaign by the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) in 2007).
91 PHILIP ALSTON, LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS (2005).
92 CARSTEN ECKEL, THE DILEMMA OF LABOR UNIONS: LOCAL OBJECTIVES VS.
GLOBAL BARGAINING (2011).
93 See, e.g., Joseph Roman, The Trade Union Solution or the NGO Problem?, 14
DEV. IN PRAC. 100 (2004).
94 See Dean Frutiger, AFL-CIO China Policy: Labor’s New Step Forward or The
Cold War Revisited?, 27 LAB. STUD. J. 67 (2002) (discussing the dynamic between
China’s trade relations with other countries and with international entities such as
the WTO and World Bank given its human rights record).
95 PAUL BUCHANAN, STATE, LABOR, CAPITAL (1987).
96 Tonia Novitz & Phil Syrpis, Assessing Legitimate Structures for the Making of
Transnational Labour Law, 35 IND. L.J. 367 (2006).
97 See Kevin Kolben, Transnational Labor Regulation and the Limits of Governance,
12 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 403 (2011) (suggesting that transitional labor regulation may
be achieved by an integrated approach that coupled governance theory with developing state capacity for a comparative advantage); Baldur Thorhallsson and Rainer
Kattel, Neo-Liberal Small States and Economic Crisis, 44:1 J. BALTIC STUD. 83 (2012)
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We can see this dynamic illustrated in tandem by the experience of
Mexico, where critiques of the oligopic, undemocratic nature of unions were popular,98 but subsequently absent after de-corporatization reforms ultimately led not to a renewed labor movement, but
simply to greater subjection to workplace authoritarianism.99
But such focus on corporatist politics raises the question of exactly how labor unions gain the loyalty of workers and motivate
them to participate in collective action, if not through direct election
or decertification. On the level of institutional design this may be
through making unions as broad and undemocratic as possible.
Many European labor unions that are still active politically are financed through mandatory due payments by sectors of workers
who may only interact with their union representatives during times
of strikes. The Scandinavian examples represent, even when fully
deregulated by the state, highly concentrated corporatist actors with
no formal mechanisms of electoral accountability.100
The ability of such unions to gain legitimacy and maintain loyalty is then completely driven by a combination of general faith that
unions are loyal to workers demonstrated by economic and political
outcome performance. Other design elements, such as a devolving
provision of social welfare subsidies to unions, can strengthen these
linkages, but there is little sustained cross-national evidence that a
specific lack of participatory legitimacy weakens high-performing
unions.101 Labor politics are ultimately sustained by the same principles that spur and sap social/political movements more broadly,
and can be facilitated or delimited, but never fully determined, by
particular issues of institutional design. While elections seem like a
(arguing that corporatist features play an important role in a country’s survival
during a neo-liberal era).
98 Jorge Ventura de Morais, Rejane Medeiros and Luis Esparza Source, México
Dinámica de la Política Interna del "Nuevo" Sindicalismo Brasileño, 59 REV. MEX. DE SOC.
205 (1997).
99 See Andra Miljanic, Union-Party Links and the Reconfiguration of the Labor Movement: Brazil and Mexico (2010) (Dissertation, U.C. Berkeley),
https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt2144t6bs/qt2144t6bs.pdf?t=mtfvgy [https://perma.cc/E63R-P3UR] (last
visited Jan. 15, 2018) (looking at the reconfiguration of labor movements in Latin
America, particularly within the automotive industry, and the link between labor
unions and political parties); Trudie Coker, Globalization and Corporatism, 60 INT’L
LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 180 (2001) (discussing the historical development of
Venezuela’s labor forces).
100 Matthew Dimick, Paths to Power, 50 N.C. L. REV. 473, 476-27 (2012).
101 Id. This is also a key lesson of the comparative example of Brazil discussed
below, infra (Section 4.).
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natural form of accountability in political democracies, the limits of
elections as such has been well-explored in recent decades, and
elides the possibility that wide-spread worker resistance to union
discipline is far from indicative of genuine problems in representation than individual workplace elections or individual judicial challenges.
In turn, simply creating a formally corporatist systems is no
guarantee of such worker loyalty. It must be earned through social
engagement and programming, but cannot be simply designed. The
post-communist experience in Eastern Europe is indicative of a
wide-range of possible worker viewpoints on unions in such systems. David Ost has called many of the post-Soviet systems variations of “illusory corporatism.”102 Russia’s state union survived democratization and it claims to be in social partnership with the
current regime; however, in part reflecting the general failure of
worker oriented reforms,103 it currently has one of the lowest global
rates of social legitimacy.104 The fate of labor in most post-Soviet
countries has depended on the actual bargaining power of corporatist unions,105 the weakest of which are those organized around enterprise level bargaining.106
2.3. Union Democracy and the Comparative Historical Frame
It is in this general theoretical and empirical context that this article seeks to make its contribution. It does so by placing in a comparative historical frame three nationally large and globally significant labor union systems – those of the United States, Brazil, and

102 David Ost, 'Illusory Corporatism' Ten Years Later, 2 WARSAW F. ECON. SOC.
19 (2011).
103 Joel Moses, Worker Self-Management and the Reformist Alternative in Soviet
Labour Policy, 39 SOVIET STUD. 205 (1987).
104 SARAH ASHWIN & SIMON CLARKE, RUSSIAN TRADE UNIONS AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN TRANSITION (2002); Calvin Chen & Rudra Sil, Communist Legacies, Postcommunist Transformations, and the Fate of Organized Labor in Russia and China, 41
STUD. COMP. INT'L DEV. 62, 82 (2006); Tim Pringle, Trade Union Reform in Russia and
China, in CHINESE WORKERS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 210 (Anita Chan ed., 2015).
105 Paul Kubicek, Civil Society, Trade Unions and the Political Economy of Postcommunist Transformation in ORGANIZED LABOR IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES: FROM
SOLIDARITY TO INFIRMITY (Kubicek, 2004).
106 Stephen Crowley, Explaining Labor Weakness in Post-Communist Europe, 18:3
EAST EUROPEAN POL. & SOCIETIES 394 (2004).
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China. Each union system represents quite different, if at times interrelated, historical trajectories.
The relative parochialism of U.S. labor scholarship is one of the
reasons it has remained uniquely preoccupied with the promotion
of union democracy as salve for union weakness, with U.S. labor
scholars openly celebrating union democracy as a universally held
value.107 As discussed in depth later, these calls fundamentally
shape proposed agendas for union revitalization and reform in the
U.S., with even harsh critics of the current system focusing on union
electoral processes as the motor force for stimulating a grassroots
revival of the labor movement.108 Moreover, while U.S. labor scholarship and the concept of union democracy are not unknown in Europe, the comparative impact of U.S. scholarship is much stronger
across the general asymmetries of international academia and policy
discourse. In this case, while far from determinative of union discourse in Brazil or China, threads of the union democracy literature
in U.S. scholarship have given rise to its presence in those countries’
discourses and also help prefigure, for the worst, comparative analysis of those systems by U.S. scholars.
In contrast, comparative examination of the modern labor histories of each country reinforces the notion that corporatism is the
state of affairs to which all labor unions hew, even if the formal legal
design of their systems is quite different. Moreover, the solidarities
that such corporatism requires to work in practice makes it a desirable structural dynamic from the perspective of social democracy.
This common development pattern is significant precisely because
these three countries represent distinct political regimes and span
the two primary axes of labor union formation: from public to private aegis, and from sectoral to enterprise organization. The United
States is an established liberal democracy whose decentralized system of private unionization ideally operates at the enterprise level.
Brazil is a young social democracy with a centralized system of
107 George Strauss, Union Democracy, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 201 (George
Strauss et al. eds., 1991) (“That unions should be democratic almost everyone
agrees.”). See also Catherine Fisk, Workplace Democracy and Democratic Worker Organizations, 17 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 101, 169 (2016).
108 See Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. RES. 247
(2000) (arguing that union democracy regulation is ineffective and counterproductive); Michael Goldberg, Derailing Union Democracy, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
137 (2002) (reviewing Estreicher’s propositions as incorrect in that unions are not
strictly economic entities and the current regulatory scheme as not necessarily ineffective).
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formally private but hyper-corporatist unionization. And China is
governed by a modern bureaucratic authoritarian regime with a
state union structure which is trying to promote industrial peace
through an informal corporatization of labor politics. In each of
these systems, aspects of their general political logics are under
stress, but these stresses reinforce the general corporatist principles
herein argued for.
As in any area of law, the granularity of comparative legal analysis suffers when global trends are at issue. For each point in this
triadic analysis there are points of convergence and divergence that
will be elided. However, as stated earlier, given the state of economic globalization, comparative legal analysis is both empirically
necessary109 and the best disruptive intervention for spurring national labor intellectuals to escape intellectual and strategic ossification. Parochialism is in some sense necessary for understanding the
cultural frameworks required to communicate effectively with
workers and build social solidarity, but it also encourages the tendency to pursue narrow tactical solutions to those that are in modern labor politics.110
Fortunately, the methodological sophistication of labor studies
has progressed significantly in recent decades, applying empirical
techniques—ethnographic,111 historical,112 and statistical113—to
move beyond the belabored laments of traditional comparative legal
formalism or cultural over-determination. The relevance of comparative legal experience in labor law cannot be ignored on almost any
facet of labor research which presumes to be honestly engaged in a
search for novel solutions. For those committed to notions of economic democracy, the comparative analysis presented herein is
meant not as another biting wound, but as a way to help face the
harsher reality that some old battles, no matter the emotional or intellectual energy hereto committed, have to be retasked.

109 William Gould, Labor Law Beyond U.S. Borders: Does What Happens Outside
of America Stay Outside of America, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 401, 409 (2010).
110 Harry Arthurs, Compared to What? The UCLA Comparative Labor Law Project
and the Future of Comparative Labor Law, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 591, 596-97 (2007).
111 THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LABOR UNIONS (Paul Durrenberger & Karaleigh
Reichart eds., 2010).
112 John Witt, Rethinking the Nineteenth-Century Employment Contract, Again, 18
LAW & HIST. REV. 627 (2000).
113 ROBERT KARASEK & TORES THEORELL, HEALTHY WORK (1990).
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3. CORPORATISM AS INFORMAL ASPIRATION IN U.S. LABOR UNIONS

3.1. U.S. Labor from Republican Radicalism to Corporatist Peace
In many ways, the modern structure of union organization and
regulation in the United States is the exception that proves the corporatist rule. In contrast to bargaining structures that emerged out
of social democratic movements in Europe or post-authoritarian and
post-colonial regimes elsewhere, the legal formalization of U.S. labor unions in 1935 followed a distinctly decentralized vision of labor
union formation and operation. It became one of the few union systems that formally set bargaining agents at the enterprise level—between individual employers and a single, exclusive union formed
by its employees. Moreover, the type of social bargaining that defined corporatist political process elsewhere was explicitly barred,
limited to an enumerated list of wage and benefits questions and
accompanied by a ban on any form of intra-corporate participatory
representation.
This particular and relatively exceptional form was the outgrowth of decades of struggle to reconcile U.S. ideals of a republican
government with the dislocations of industrialization.114 From the
outset, finding a place for labor unions in U.S. law faced the hurdle
of the common law’s traditional adherence to notions of contractual
equality and preference for private ordering of economic affairs.115
Thus, much employer resistance to labor organization in the early
American industrial era was formally articulated through legal challenges to labor organization as a form of combinatory conspiracy.116
Up until 1935, even when unions succeeded in discrete moments of
bargaining with employers, there was little clarity as to how and under what doctrinal categories collective agreements would be

114 ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH
(2015); Anna di Robilant, Populist Property Law, 49 CONN. L. REV. 936 (2017) (emphasizing that ordinary people can become participants in the creation of property law,
which in turn improves access to essential economic resources).
115 JOHN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLE WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004).
116 See WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT (1991); VICTORIA HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER (1993).
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enforced under existing U.S. law.117 General judicial hostility, along
with the traditional private self-help of employers and their political
allies,118 were initially matched by quite radical critiques of wagelabor which sought to challenge worker subordination economically
and politically.119 None of these movements were able to successfully institutionalize themselves as a labor party within U.S. politics,
and bitter internecine conflicts expressed key divergence as to what
a particularly American labor movement should represent.
Central to these conflicts was the extent to which class conflict
was at the heart of different labor visions. This divergence is classically analogized to the competing philosophies of Samuel Gompers
and Eugene Debs, with the former’s conciliatory “business unionism” contrasted with the latter’s more radical vision of industrial democracy.120 Reading the labor debates of this era through the lens of
union democracy is difficult, as political-economic thinking was
roundly focused on the issue of remediating the social and political
status of employer power.121 Yet, the practical legal issue always
remained as to how any particular labor vision would be entrenched
in U.S. law given its lack of a specific constitutional provision.
It was not until the administration of Franklin Roosevelt reacted
to the Great Depression that unions were presented with a genuine
opportunity to gain formal legal and political endorsement.122 During World War II, FDR had attempted to pass legislation, notably
the National Recover Administration (NRA), to more openly coordinate industrial and worker interests. The Supreme Court ruling
that the NRA was unconstitutional highlighted the resistance of
American liberal legal thought to the group democratic logic of

117 See William Gorham Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44
HARV. L. REV. 572 (1930).
118 See AHMED WHITE, THE LAST GREAT STRIKE (2016); Alex Gourevitch, Police
Work, 13 PERSP. ON POL. 762 (2015) (discussing the role of formal state violence in
support of strikebreaking).
119 See Stephen McFarland, With the Class Conscious Workers Under One
Roof (2014) (Diss. CUNY); Rebecca Tarlau, Education and Labor in Tension, 36 LAB.
STUD. J. 363, 364 (2011).
120 See ROSANNE CURRARINO, THE LABOR QUESTION IN AMERICAN 105 (2011).
121 See Bruce Kaufman, The Early Institutionalists on Industrial Democracy and
Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. RES. 189, 207 (2000).
122 Woodrow Wilson, one of the leading progressive thinkers of his generation, was also attracted to corporatist ideas and during World War I he tried unsuccessfully to set up a Tri-Partite War Labor Board to manage growing labor tensions.
See generally Joseph McCartin, LABOR'S GREAT WAR (1997).
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corporatism that had then become entrenched in Europe.123 The defeat of the NRA prompted a constitutional crisis over the role of the
Supreme Court in reviewing economic legislation, and ultimately
FDR was undeterred. Drawing in part on fears that social unrest
surrounding the Great Depression could empower calls for European-style socialism, Roosevelt subsequently advanced a series of
social reforms dubbed the New Deal as a solution to economic stagnation and industrial conflict.
The resulting passage of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) in 1935, while still contested by the Republican Party and
most business interests, was explicitly infused with notions of procedural liberalism absent from its European analogs. Drawing on
Gomper’s more conciliatory view of employer/employee relationships, the NLRA enshrined a labor vision where economic production within individual companies resulted in profits that could then
be allocated through a bargaining process, whose proper functioning could itself facilitate what Kenneth Dau-Schmidt calls the “cooperative surplus.”124 At the same time, this bargaining process
would ideally facilitate a type of implicit psychological contract between individual owners and workers that would appropriately respect dignitary claims regarding workplace management.125
Many U.S. politicians and intellectuals had been drawn to ideas
about labor corporatism then popular in Europe, especially given
that corporatism was then articulated as a pathway to achieve both
industrial peace and systematically organize the allocation of labor.126 Yet, James Whitman has detailed how in the U.S., in contrast
to the European experience which saw industrial peace as a resolution of class conflict, this corporatist view of group bargaining was
re-cast as an expression of liberal democracy,127 with the aim of
123

(1997).

See Jeffrey Haydu, MAKING AMERICAN INDUSTRY SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY 93

124 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and
the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 424 (1992).
125 See generally Denise M. Rousseau, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS IN
ORGANIZATIONS: UNDERSTANDING WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN AGREEMENTS (1995).
126 See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol,
and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1454-55 (1993) (explaining that
collective empowerment became an important tool to elicit workers’ sense of responsibility for efficient operations and provide discipline when individuals detracted from the group’s interests).
127 See James Q. Whitman, Of Corporatism, Fascism, and the First New Deal, 39
AM. J. COMP. L. 747, 774-75 (1991) (describing that unlike Europeans, Americans
never perceived class warfare as a defining political problem within society).
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creating a private system of welfare as an alternative to the public
welfare states emerging in Europe.128
During the 1930s, the reception of labor corporatism from Europe was mediated by the influx of European intellectual émigrés
fleeing fascism and communism. These intellectuals were influential in part by providing an account of labor organization that would
be distinguishable from that which operated under these anti-liberal
regimes, and this representation helped them appear relevant to a
genuinely American political conversion. Many of these émigrés
had originally placed their hope that European labor unions would
be a pathway to greater socialism, and then had to translate their
arguments for American audiences.129 Franz Neumann was perhaps best known for his attempt to reconcile liberal legalism with
economic corporatism, helping to popularize the substitute notion
of “industrial pluralism.”130 Though some debate exists over the influence of these particular thinkers on U.S. labor regulation, they
clearly present the need to repackage even formally corporatist
ideas into the American political milieu.131
The U.S. system was still formally one of state corporatism given
that the NLRA, or Wagner Act, established the electoral procedures
that employees at an individual enterprise needed to follow in order
to enjoy legal recognition for a union as well as specific regulations
of the bargaining process—all in exchange for state enforcement of
collective bargains. The regime was regulated through a then novel
grant of legal power to an American federal administrative agency,
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The focus on the
NLRB’s oversight was the integrity of the electoral process that certified unions and to ensure that both unions’ and employees’
See Nelson Lichtenstein, STATE OF THE UNION (2002).
See generally Alfred Kähler, The Trade Union Approach to Economic Democracy, in POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (Max Ascoli & Fritz Lehmann eds.,
1937); Gerhard Colm, Is Economic Planning Compatible with Democracy?, in POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 21 (Max Ascoli & Fritz Lehmann eds., 1937).
130 Franz Neumann, ON THE PRECONDITIONS AND LEGAL CONCEPT OF AN
ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (1931); Franz Neumann, The Change in the Function of Law
in Modern Society, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN STATE: ESSAYS IN
POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY (Herbert Marcuse ed., 1957).
131 Compare Matthew W. Finkin, Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REV. 23,
88-90 (1984) (discussing the work of Karl Klare, who despite disagreeing with the
labor organization system in the U.S., celebrates the intellectual elites who formulated it), with Reuel Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor
Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1214 (1999) (explaining that American political thinkers belonged to too many interest
groups to be considered members of any single “class”).
128
129
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bargaining tactics fell within the delimited scope laid out in the
NLRA. Critically, this concern with procedural democracy was restricted to union formation itself, and through its regulation of the
topics and tactics collective bargaining process, the NLRA enforced
the wage and benefit focus of Gompers in contrast to labor leaders
who wanted unions to participate in corporate decision-making.
The NLRA also cut out huge swaths of workers, as it sanctioned unions only for its definition of non-supervisory workers, and omitted
most agricultural labor.132
The NLRA’s designation of the workplace as a microcosm of political democracy was held out politically to labor organizations as
rejecting the distinction between economic and political democracy.133 Such institutionalization was still resisted by a range of unconvinced existing labor organizations,134 many of whom wanted to
avoid the requirement of formal state certification and saw the limitation on bargaining topics as too complete a concession over the
role of democratic norms in the workplace itself. Yet, the weakening
of the labor movement in the early 1930s paved the way for general
acquiescence to the Wagner Act in relatively short order.
Even with this particularly decentralized and procedurally-oriented view of collective bargaining, from the outset of the NLRA,
regime labor unions struggled to find sustained acceptance within
the U.S. legal and political culture. What was, in practice, a functional political bargain that lacked a particular constitutional foundation, subjected it to easy legislative and judicial revision.135 There
were continuous arguments advanced that the collective action of
labor unions violated norms of U.S. liberty and individualism. Defenders of unionization disagreed but they did so in consonant ideological terms,136 or made recourse to more inchoate invocations of
132

(2013).

See generally Jean-Christian Vinel, THE EMPLOYEE: A POLITICAL HISTORY

133 See Katherine van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor
Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981) (identifying the “industrial pluralism” model, which
shaped the collective bargaining process towards a legislative system with political
representation and democratic participation); Clyde W. Summers, From Industrial
Democracy to Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. RES. 1, 4-5 (2000).
134 Christopher L. Tomlins, AFL Unions in the 1930s: Their Performance in Historical Perspective, 65 J. AMER. HIST. 1021 (1979).
135 See Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 169 (2015) (noting the relative flexibility and ease with which U.S. legislature
and courts could shape labor relations).
136 See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A Democratic Labor Policy, 7 L. GUILD REV. 6
(1947) (describing the labor movement’s decision to seek advancement through

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

652

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 39:3]

“economic nationalism” popular during times of war.137 The particular historical aperture that allowed Roosevelt to pass the NLRA
and avoid annulment by the Supreme Court was, in retrospect, exceptional.138
While the U.S. government would promote this regime of collective bargaining as an expression of liberal democracy in the workplace abroad for decades —especially in its post-World War II reconstruction projects,139 broad social and legal hostility to unions
would persist and grow in the following decades.140 As a result, the
vision of labor corporatism used to initially justify the NLRA would
rarely come to fruition in practice.141 However, the institutionalization of labor unions did serve to eventually sideline more radical
visions within the labor movement,142 as symbolized by the merger
of the AFL and CIO in 1955.143

existing political channels); Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of
American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394 (1970) (detailing the United States’ path
towards the development of a unique labor relations, collective bargaining, and
trade unionism system); Thomas C. Kohler, The Notion of Solidarity and the Secret
History of American Labor Law, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 883 (2005) (discussing the shaping of
the American labor system by existing norms around the understanding of “liberties” and “solidarity”).
137 See William Hard, National Policy Toward Labor, 224 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 152 (1943) (advocating for the development of “economic patriotism,”
which requires active collaboration among labor to achieve national advancement).
138 See Whitman, supra note 127; Jefferson Cowie, Reframing the New Deal: The
Past and Future of American Labor and the Law, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 13 (2016)
(identifying the period from 1935 to 1973 as a “long exception” to a sustained pattern of legal hostility to labor organizing in the United States).
139 See generally Anthony Carew, LABOUR UNDER THE MARSHALL PLAN: THE
POLITICS OF PRODUCTIVITY AND THE MARKETING OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE (1987);
AMERICAN LABOR AND THE COLD WAR: GRASSROOTS POLITICS AND POSTWAR POLITICAL
CULTURE (Robert W. Cherny et al. eds., 2004).
140 See generally Christopher L. Tomlins, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR
RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960
(1985); Robert J. Watt, Collective Bargaining as a Basis for Labor Co-Operation, 224
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84 (1942).
141 See Michael L Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 604, 612 (2007) (describing that neither management nor labor wanted to adopt and implement labor corporatist ideals).
142 For an attempt to recover some of this earlier history today, see Gourevitch,
supra note 114.
143 See Judith Stepan-Norris & Maurice Zeitlin, Union Democracy, Radical Leadership, and the Hegemony of Capital, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 829 (1995).
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3.2. Legal Deradicalization Amid Failed Corporatism
The rise and fall of the influence of American labor unions after
the Wagner Act is one that has been retold many times, with the turn
to Gompers’ more depoliticized vision of collective bargaining seen
by more critical scholars as something akin to an original sin.144 Yet,
one aspect of this history often taken for granted was how, almost
instantly, union mergers and coordination beyond individual workplaces became the core dynamics of union activity. Even though enterprise-level union affiliation with larger union organizations, such
as the AFL-CIO, was purely voluntary in the NLRA scheme, in practice, the strength of the labor movement was always recognized as
lying in its potential for collective solidarity. Attempts to utilize collective labor power emerged with tactics such as “whipsawing,”
“fractional bargaining,” or “pattern bargaining,” all of which were
some variations of replicating and leveraging collective bargains
across various industries.145 Through union mergers and these collective tactics, union leaders aggressively aspired to the type of political influence enjoyed by their European counterparts - thus, the
label “aspirational corporatism.”
Following the dynamics outlined by Michel’s iron law, American unions de facto pursued corporatism in practice. As a result,
while the decentralized Wagner system ideally represented a victory for liberal procedural norms, the type of democracy at stake
was ever-contested. Almost every judicial and legislative assault on
unions was made by attacking the strategies and tactics that would
transform voluntary union mergers into real collective, corporatist
power.146 While calls for greater internal union democracy would
later become a rallying cry for activists sympathetic to the labor

144 See Christopher L. Tomlins, The New Deal, Collective Bargaining, and the Triumph of Industrial Pluralism, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 19, 20 (1988) (discussing the
development of labor laws to “integrate the labor movement into the mainstream
contours of pressure-group politics and to institutionalize, regulate, and thereby
dampen industrial conflict.”); George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The
Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 187 (1994) (explaining that
labor’s challenge collapsed due to the traditional hostility that they received in
courts for challenging fundamental societal institutions).
145 For a discussion of these tactics in the U.S., and their decline in comparative
frame, see Margaret Goralski et al., International Difference in Labor Conflicts, 6 J. BUS.
MANAG. & CHANGE 75 (2011).
146 See Joel Seidman, Democracy in Labor Unions, 61 J. POL. ECON. 221, 231 (1953).
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movement, it was much more effectively wielded as a weapon by
critics of unionization.
The Wagner Act initially gave little attention to the internal affairs of unions once they were formed. Yet, this relative freedom
was short lived. Judicial doctrine had already begun to develop
prior to the 1930s, limiting union discipline of workers.147 The passage of the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947, popularly
known as the Taft-Hartley Act, placed greater procedural restrictions on union bargaining, as did the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. The LMRDA, popularly known
as the Landrum-Griffin Act, was explicitly justified on the basis of
promoting union democracy in the wake of a variety of union corruption scandals.148 These new legislative actions were a response
to how quickly unions had grown in influence by centralizing their
operations. The relative success of the AFL-CIO merger fueled arguments that labor unions were powerful enough to oppress other
legitimate social interests.149 It was further true that in union workplaces, dissenting workers were often left with little legal recourse
or voice when faced with individual miscarriages of justice,150
though exceptions like that did persist at the local level.151
In 1956, Lipset, Trow and Coleman’s work on the decentralized
and democratically vibrant International Typographical Union held
147 See Miller D. Steever, Control of Labor through Union Discipline, 16 CORNELL
L.Q. 212 (1931).
148 See Kurt L. Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 25 (1959) (describing legal restrictions placed upon membership
rights within unions); Clyde W. Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy,
25 MOD. L. REV. 273 (1962) (detailing the extensive investigative efforts spent towards identifying union corruption and improper practices in the field of labor
management relations).
149 See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Group Interests in Labor Law, 13 RUTGERS L. REV.
432, 482 (1958) (articulating the belief that labor organizations had become so powerful that legal measures would have to be taken to ensure protection against their
influence).
150 See Clyde W. Summers, Legal Limitation on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L.
REV. 1049 (1950) (highlighting that union discipline represents a double-edged
sword as it is both necessary for union effectiveness but may be a tool of oppression); Paul H. Tobias, A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by His
Union, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 55 (1972) (exploring union-employee relations through the
case of an employee who the union refuses to represent in his wrongful discharge
arbitration).
151 See, e.g., Lon W. Smith, An Experiment in Trade Union Democracy: Harold
Gibbons and the Formation of Teamsters Local 688, 1937-1957 (Dec. 1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Illinois State University) (on file with University Microfilms International).
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the ITU as a validation of the promise of unions as bottom-up generators of democratic civil society and was written as an open counterpoint to Michel’s iron law.152 Most U.S. labor scholars were sympathetic to critiques of insufficient participatory norms within
unions regardless of their effectiveness as collective bargainers, often directly criticizing, à la Gerald Frug, the necessity of bureaucratic
norms and processes on efficiency grounds.153 Many openly
claimed that union membership had grown exactly because of their
particularly American internally democratic nature and their consonance with norms of individual democratic rights,154 and even the
localism of U.S. federalism.155
Yet, the impact of Taft-Hartley and the LMRD was not a reinvigoration of the democratic potential of unions, but central to the ongoing judicial assault on the collective tools that unions relied on to
simulate corporatist dynamics, such as sympathy strikes. These developments placed pro-union democracy activists in the awkward
position of finding their loyalty to the large union movement questioned.156
The scholarship of Clyde Summers, key contributor to the
Landrum-Griffin Act, would for decades try to reconcile this commitment to union democracy with the progressive weakening of the
labor movement.157 Summers’ exchanges with Archibald Cox during this era often circled around the role of union discipline in
152 Though often cited as a pure counter-point to Michels, Lipset, Trow and
Coleman recognized the risk that a more localized union culture would distract
from larger issues of worker interest. See Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow &
James Coleman, UNION DEMOCRACY: THE INSIDE POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 431-32 (1956).
153 Frug noted that his general critique of bureaucracy necessity applied to
workplace dynamics. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1278 n.29 (1983).
154 See Seidman, supra note 146 (explaining that American labor organizations
garnered support by adhering to democratic representative ideals); Hanslowe, supra note 148, (highlighting that labor participation depended, in large part, on unions’ concessions over absolute discipline ideologies).
155 See Harry H. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal
Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958) (discussing the presence of
local investigative efforts aimed at combatting problems inherent in labor management collusion, misuse of union funds, and suppression of civil rights by labor leaders).
156 See Clyde Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
483, 491 (1949) (articulating the intricacies of union priorities, which included both
active efforts against the employer and rival unions).
157 See generally Michael J. Goldberg, Present at the Creation: Clyde W. Summers
and the Field of Union Democracy Law, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 121 (2010).
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promoting labor power.158 Others were explicit that the search for
union democracy was a distraction to the core issue of bargaining
power that the turn to more corporatist operations at the national
level had quickly revealed.159 Industrial relations scholars outside
of law schools would continue to be far more sympathetic to more
European notions of labor corporatism that often saw internal democracy as antithetical to collective labor union power.160
The passage of the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts
showed how, whatever initial opening the NLRA had provided for
the recognition and expansion of U.S. labor unions, the corporatist
conception of industrial peace imagined during the New Deal was
not in sync with the general organization of the U.S. economic or
political arenas.161 The social movements that sustained labor organization up until this point fed into a system that demanded
greater centralization to achieve any economic results through collective bargaining. This distinct structural weakness left unions recursively less powerless to resist repeated losses at the judicial and
legislative levels, even as they increasingly turned to electoral politics without the corporatist underpinnings enjoyed by their European counterparts—most specifically as a distinct labor party. Retelling and reinterpreting what Karl Klare has called the
“deradicalization” of the NLRA has become a staple among contemporary labor law scholars,162 culminating in perhaps the most

158 Compare Summers, Legal Limitation, supra note 150 (describing the issue of
union discipline to be an internal challenge for labor organizations to resolve), with
Archibald Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58
MICH. L. REV. 819 (1960) (underscoring the importance of federal regulation of unions due to the misbehavior of several union leaders).
159 See C. Peter Magrath, Democracy in Overalls: The Futile Quest for Union Democracy, 12 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 503 (1959).
160 See generally HERBERT S. PARNES, UNION STRIKE VOTES: CURRENT PRACTICE
AND PROPOSED CONTROLS (1956); JACK BARBASH, AMERICAN UNIONS: STRUCTURE,
GOVERNMENT, AND POLITICS (1967); DEREK C. BOK & JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1970).
161 See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative
Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE
L.J. 2013 (2009) (reviewing the deficiencies of the NLRB and its inability to re-shape
U.S. attitudes toward labor organization).
162 Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978). See also William
B. Gould, Union Organizational Rights and the Concept of “Quasi-Public” Property, 49
MINN. L. REV. 505 (1965) (describing the difficulty faced by unions to resist public
antagonism while ensuring employee persuasion); Daniel R. Ernst, LAWYERS
AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE LIBERALISM (1995)
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restrictive and regulated collective bargaining regime among industrial democracies.163
Foundationally, while the Wagner Act itself was deemed constitutional, its constitutional justification was achieved incidentally to
the federal power to regulate interstate commerce rather than
through a positive articulation of constitutionalized labor rights.164
At one point, some hope had existed that the success of civil rights
legislation in penetrating the traditional insulation of economic organizations from rights-based claims could empower the NLRB to
articulate a more substantive vision of associative labor rights,165
but, as Sophia Lee has recently demonstrated, the use of racial discrimination as a constitutional bridge into the workplace failed to
materialize.166 Some unions themselves openly resisted this development by attempting to shield their internal operations from critiques of racial discrimination,167 and such a choice still stands today
as one of the greatest lost opportunities for the U.S. labor movement
to expand on the positive precedents of black labor activism.168
(examining the agency of lawyers within the American Anti-Boycott Association,
which litigated and lobbied against organized labor).
163 See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1527 (2002); Paul C. Weiler, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990) (examining the social and economic changes
that have led to the deterioration of labor representation within the U.S.); Lance
Compa, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED
STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
ed., 2000) (reviewing the range of U.S. workers seeking to exercise their right to
freedom of association).
164 See Barenberg, supra note 86, at 315-16 (explaining that the Supreme Court
has interpreted the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to mean that states cannot
excessively regulate matters of interstate commerce).
165 See Archibald Cox, Labor Law and the American Constitution, 3 U.
QUEENSLAND L.J. 5 (1956) (identifying that the NLRB’s acquisition of power to make
unreviewable rulings exercising or refusing to exercise NLRA jurisdiction limited
labor’s ability to associate and organize).
166

(2014).

Sophia Lee, The Workplace Constitution: From the New Deal to the New Right

167 See Harry H. Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union and “Governmental Action,” 70 YALE L.J. 345 (1960) (discussing union disagreement over incorporation of diverse racial memberships).
168 See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV.
1, 81 (1999) (identifying black labor organization as among the most unified within
the labor movement of the mid-twentieth century); see, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, Singing “The Right-to-Work Blues”: The Politics of Race in the Campaign for “Voluntary Unionism” in Postwar California in THE RIGHT AND LABOR IN AMERICA: POLITICS,
IDEOLOGY, AND IMAGINATION 139 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Elizabeth Tandy Shermer
eds., 2012) (covering the failed attempt to pass a right-to-work proposition in 1958
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The lack of a distinct constitutional basis for labor organizing
found in many other countries did not simply enable later legislative
encroachment, but directly enabled a litany of decisions by the
courts and the NRLB that hearkened back to the common law treatment of unions during the 19th-century.169 Progressively, the scope
of legal and political contests over unions was narrowed to focus
almost exclusively on procedural formalities, the evaluation of
which is weighed against the implicitly constitutionalized common
law property rights of owners,170 and with an unrestrained and overt
hostility to forms of collective action such as secondary strikes,171 sitins,172 and even the right to strike itself.173 The frame of union democracy led to labor unions becoming the most regulated private
associations in American society.174
Today, private unionization in the U.S. exists at an all-time low
today.175 No gains to better facilitate collective action have ever been
because union activists could not gain African Americans support because unions
engaged in discriminatory practices).
169 See Patrick Macklem, Property, Status, and Workplace Organizing, 40 U.
TORONTO L.J. 74 (1990) (arguing that liberal attitudes toward property and status
continue to limit the transformation of organized labor in western economies); Ken
Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and “Un-American” Labor Law, 82 N.C.L.
REV. 1705 (2004) (exploring the relationship between common law’s historical vision of the employment-at-will doctrine and the emerging redefinition of labor organization in the mid-twentieth century).
170 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46
STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994) (examining the Supreme Court decision in Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, in which the Court held that employers may lawfully prohibit union organizers from soliciting on private property unless the organizers faced “unique obstacles” to communication); Jeffery M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C.L. REV. 891 (2006) (reviewing the NLRB’s current formulation
of employers’ “right to exclude” union organizers from private property); James
Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 518 (2004) (underlining the lengthy history of legal decisions supporting
employers’ rights); Nathan S. Newman, The Legal Foundations for State Laws Granting
Labor Unions Access to Employer Property, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 689 (2013).
171 See Howard Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 1363 (1962) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision to outlaw secondary
boycotts because of its effects on third parties who are not involved in the actual
labor dispute).
172 See Ahmed A. White, The Depression Era Sit-Down Strikes and the Limits of
Liberal Labor Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2010).
173 See Ahmed A. White, The Crime of Staging an Effective Strike and the Enduring
Role of the Criminal Law in Modern Labor Relations, 11 WORKINGUSA 23 (2008) (linking
criminal law’s role in limiting basic labor rights to organize, strike, and provoke
collective bargaining).
174 See Fisk, supra note 107 (examining the development of workplace democracy and regulations of labor organization).
175 See Harry G. Hutchinson, Liberty, Liberalism, and Neutrality: Labor
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achieved for unions at the federal level, even after multiple economic and financial crises.176
Over time, the response of labor intellectuals to this judicial assault has been to articulate alternative constitutional frames that
would better support collective labor actions, largely grounded in
anti-subordination readings of the 13th Amendment177 or more expansive readings of the associative content of the First Amendment.178 However, such arguments still face the reality that the original compromise of the Wagner Act was the result of losses at the
level of cultural imagination as much as they were legislative. The
Preemption and First Amendment Values, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 779 (2009) (pointing
to employers and anti-organizing activists’ ability to ground their efforts on First
Amendment free speech grounds as a crucial factor towards their relative power in
modern labor relations); Lonnie K. Stevans, The Effect of Endogenous Right-to-Work
Laws on Business and Economic Conditions in the United States: A Multivariate Approach,
5 REV. L. & ECON. 595 (2009) (commenting on the effects of “right-to-work” laws
and their effects on unions’ efficacy).
176 See Samuel Estreicher, “Come the Revolution”: Employee Involvement in the
Workers’ State, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 87, 87 (1998) (presenting the possibility of
labor transformations during economic downturn).
177 See James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474 (2010) (discussing the relationship between labor rights claims and the Involuntary Servitude Clause); Jack
M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1459 (2012) (addressing the narrowly tailored use of the Thirteenth Amendment and its definition of “slavery” and “involuntary servitude”); Mark Dudzic,
Saving the Right to Organize: Substituting the Thirteenth Amendment for the Wagner Act,
14 NEW LAB. F. 59 (2005) (articulating the possibility of using the Thirteenth Amendment to push forward modern labor movements); William E. Forbath, The New Deal
Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 220-1 (2001) (arguing that Wagner missed an
opportunity to rest labor rights on the Reconstruction Amendments).
178 See Kenneth Cloke, Mandatory Political Contributions and Union Democracy,
4 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527 (1981) (discussing the Supreme Court’s restrictions
for unions to compel contributions from members for political expenditures due to
first amendment rights); Charlotte Garden, Labor Law Values Are First Amendment
Values: Why Union Comprehensive Campaigns Are Protected Speech, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2617 (2011) (linking labor speech to the same weight as civil rights speech);
Charlotte Garden, Citizens United and the First Amendment of Labor Law, 43 STETSON
L. REV. 571 (2013) (applying the Citizens United decision to labor unions and judicial
interpretation of unions); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations and Political OptOut Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (2012) (labeling the Citizens
United decision as an asymmetrical decision to existing application of political optout rights for union members); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of
Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011) (questioning the triumphalism of Citizens
United as a First Amendment victory and predicting further incoherence on issues
of campaign financing); Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and
Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023 (2012) (attempting to reconcile the Citizens United decision with Knox, in which the Court
continued to limit unions’ ability to levy special assessments for members due to
First Amendment rights).
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compromise itself never represented a genuine renegotiation of the
U.S. social compact.179 Such is the inevitable consequence of James
Atleson’s classic Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law and
Catherine Fisk’s critique of Karen Orren’s Belated Feudalism—that
the Wagner Act did not ward off socialism as much as it failed to
deracinate the feudal presumptions of the common law regarding
the basic property/commodity divide in employee-employer relations.180
Yet, while some of these larger cultural arguments are recognized by labor scholars, it is most common for reforms to embrace
the basic proceduralism of labor union certification and advance
modifications either to union formation181 or to further decentralize
labor regulation to the state level.182 Some of these calls directly critique union reactions to changing labor market conditions183 or, especially those looking to remove the ban on intra-corporate worker
representation, seek more conciliatory engagement with

179 See Stone, supra note 133, at 1580 (emphasizing the need for any new approach to include a “more accurate description of the industrial world and a more
viable analysis of the impediments to democracy built into it”).
180 See James B. Atleson, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
(1983) (expressing misgivings about the political orientation, legislative history,
and contemporary practice of American labor law); Catherine Fisk, Still “Learning
Something of Legislation”: The Judiciary in the History of Labor Law, 19 L. & SOC. INQ.
151 (1994) (examining the fall of collective bargaining from its NLRA roots).
181 See Catherine L. Fisk & Adam R. Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and the
Employee Free Choice Act, 70 LA. L. REV. 47 (2009) (labeling the underenforcement of
employees’ statutory right to bargain as a significant failure of the law governing
unions); William B. Gould IV, The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform,
and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management Relations Law in
the United States, 43 U.S.F.L. REV. 291 (2009) (raising alternative factors for unions’
decline and explaining that a shift in union participation requires more than just
reform of existing labor laws).
182 See Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law:
Preemption Doctrine to Allow the States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L.
REV 97 (2009) (articulating the positive impacts that increased state influence of labor relations may have); Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in
Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (2011) (exploring states and cities’ persistent
efforts to impact labor relations in their domains); Michael M. Oswalt, The Grand
Bargain: Revitalizing Labor Through NLRA Reform and Radical Workplace Relations, 57
DUKE L.J. 691 (2007) (arguing for grand legislative reform of NLRA); Catherine L.
Fisk & Benjamin I. Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right-to-Work Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
857, 858–59 (2014) (examining the conflict between state right-to-work laws and
federal labor laws).
183 See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Markets –
The Kenneth M. Piper Lectureship Series, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 39-42 (1993); Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 124-5 (1993).
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employers.184 Some take up more abstract arguments about the
framing of workplace justice arguments,185 but again, almost all
have the often open assumption that better altering union elections
will lead to significant progress. This need to anchor proposals to
the ideal that unions properly express the U.S. liberal democratic
tradition remains,186 enabled by the corollary faith that removing
such roadblocks would allow U.S. workers to achieve the greater
level of union representation that they desire.187
Again, most all of these legal proposals are accompanied by a
critique of current union operations—in particular those that reflect
and encourage greater corporatist behavior.188 Many scholars still
trace the decline of union democracy with the progressive shift of
expenditures from organizing to legislative lobbying189 and a debilitating focus on short-term electoral politics.190 Such observations
184 See John Pencavel, WORLD BANK, WPS NO. 1469 (1995) (explaining that legal
frameworks should neither encourage nor discourage unionism but should keep
unions in a domain where they can be an effective intermediary between employers
and employees).
185 See David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U.
RICH. L. REV. 523 (2009) (describing the state of American employment relations to
be at a “critical juncture” due to a prolonged history of anti-employment); Brishen
Rogers, “Acting Like a Union”: Protecting Workers’ Free Choice by Promoting Workers’ Collective Action, 123 HARV. L. REV. F. 38 (2010) (highlighting the American
labor discussion has been rooted upon the normative preference against unionization).
186 Even Samuel Estreicher, a proponent of reforming union elections through
systemic deregulation and simplification instead of various “procedural niceties,”
still works normatively within the enterprise level election paradigm. See Estreicher, supra note 108. But see Goldberg, supra note 108 (articulating that Estreicher
fails to give enough credit to the current approach towards unions and does not
factor in sufficient guarantees of democracy and basic civil liberties).
187 See generally RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT
(2006).
188 See, e.g., Teresa Sharpe, Union Democracy and Successful Campaigns: The Dynamics of Staff Authority and Worker Participation in an Organizing Union, in
REBUILDING LABOR: ORGANIZING AND ORGANIZERS IN THE NEW UNION MOVEMENT 62,
63 (Ruth Milkman & Kim Voss eds., 2004) (arguing that labor revitalization requires
tactical innovation from union leaders and active participation in actual organizing
campaigns from rank and file members); Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute
Resolution: Systems Design and the New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11 (2005).
189 See James B. Atleson, Law and Union Power: Thoughts on the United States and
Canada, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 463, 488-89 (1994).
190 See, e.g., Emily J. Charnock, The Rise of Political Action: Labor Unions and the
Democratic Party (Working Paper, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, 2012) (examining the role of Political Action Committee (P.A.C.) and
exploring its role in underpinning the labor-Democratic alliance); Paul C. Mishler,
Trade Unions in the United States and the Crisis in Values, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 861 (2006) (proposing labor reforms to increase efficiency including
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inform arguments that union democracy and the effectiveness of the
U.S. labor movement are linked,191 even when such claims call for
otherwise more radical reforms, such as abandoning striking.192 Of
great current popularity, labor scholars have attempted to adapt to
labor contractualism by imagining organizing around individual
employment rights so that unions can use aggregate litigation as a
new source of worker solidarity.193 At the local level, there has certainly been a range of internal union innovations on these grounds,
but they have only achieved for a short time the hoped for renewed
democratic energy.194
Ironically, arguments about union democracy harken back to the
social unionism of earlier eras, or even in systems abroad.195 It is in
reforms to union representation); HERBERT B. ASHER ET AL., AMERICAN LABOR
UNIONS IN THE ELECTORAL ARENA (2001). But see Bob Master, Engaging with Democrats, 19 NEW LAB. FOR. 16 (2010) (describing the limitations of labor’s strategic shift
toward member based political mobilization).
191 See, e.g., Matthew J. Parlow, Lessons from the NBA Lockout: Union Democracy,
Public Support, and the Folly of the National Basketball Players Association, 67 OKLA. L.
REV. 1 (2014) (looking at the NBA to highlight the critical importance of intra-union
communications, public relations campaigns, and union democracy when unions
negotiate); Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy and the Market for Union
Control, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367 (1992) (using an efficiency analysis to conclude that
perfect interest alignment between members and leaders is not always optimal).
192 See, e.g., STANLEY ARONOWITZ, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AMERICAN LABOR:
TOWARD A NEW WORKERS’ MOVEMENT (2014).
193 See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
2685, 2687 (2008) (explaining that workers and lawyers have increasingly turned to
employment statutes such as the Fair Labor Standards Act to secure their substantive employment rights); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004) (exploring the
changing nature of the employment relationship and its implications for labor and
employment law); Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 57, 58 (2002) (identifying that most modern workplace
protections for employees stem from statutes and common law, not from collective
bargaining agreements); Ann C. Hodges, Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to Rebuild
the Labor Movement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1682, 1684 (2014) (analyzing the possibility of
creating a program that provides representation to workers who are bound to arbitrate their legal disputes with their employers).
194 See Paul M. Secunda, The Wagner Model of Labour Law is Dead, Long Live Labour Law!, 38 QUEEN'S L.J. 549 (2013).
195 See Ian Robinson, Neoliberal Restructuring and U.S. Unions: Toward Social
Movement Unionism?, 26 CRIT. SOC. 109 (2000) (identifying pathways in which neoliberal policies have promoted shifts toward social movement unionism); Kyle Albert, Labor Union Political Strategy in an Era of Decline and Revitalization, 84 SOC.
INQUIRY 210 (2014) (analyzing union appearances in congressional hearings and unions’ legislative advocacy activities); Scott L. Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement’s Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CAL. L. REV.
1927 (2007) (using the Inglewood Wal-Mart case to illustrate unions’ use of legislative advocacy to achieve their goals); Ann C. Hodges, Avoiding Legal Seduction:
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calls for social unionism that more biting critiques do emerge regarding the Wagner Act regulatory framework,196 but again on the
level that it inhibits not internal union democracy but the capacities
of unions to engage in broader forms of social activism;197 especially
so as to remediate its historical errors of racial or gender exclusion198
or hostility to immigrant labor.199 Social unionism is seen as providing the link between unions and the participation of those workers
outside of the traditional industrial employment.200 And at their
apex, calls for social unionism expand to the transnational level.201
Reinvigorating the Labor Movement to Balance Corporate Power, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 889
(2011) (reviewing the ways that legal and political action have become central strategies for labor unions).
196 See Orly Lobel, Orchestrated Experimentalism in the Regulation of Work, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2146 (2003) (reviewing PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA:
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW LABOR MARKET; Catherine Fisk and Xenia Tashlitsky, Imagine a World Where Employers Are Required to Bargain with Minority Unions, 27 A.B.A.
J. Lab. & Emp. L. 1 (2012).
197 See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237 (2009) (defining a new type of employee - one who focuses more on their public duty than
their loyalty to corporations). But see Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological
Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48
UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001) (focusing on the internal effects of labor changes when
assumptions of long term attachment between employer and employee are not present).
198 See Marion Crain, Whitewashed Labor Law, Skinwalking Unions, 23 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 211 (2002) (addressing unions’ historical membership and structure
around blue-collar white males); Charlotte Garden and Nancy Leong, ”So Closely
Intertwined”: Labor and Racial Solidarity, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1135 (2013) (presenting a nuanced view against the conventional narrative of rivalry between unions
and people of color). But see Angela Onwuachi-Willis and Mario L. Barnes, The
Obama Effect: Understanding Emerging Meanings of "Obama" in Anti-Discrimination
Law, 87 IND. L.J. 325 (2012) (exploring the significance of having a biracial, blackwhite president to the enforcement of anti-discrimination law); Harry G.
Hutchison, Employee Forced Choice? Race in the Mirror of Exclusionary Hierarchy, 15
MICH. J. RACE & L. 369 (2010) (tracing the disproportionate impact that key labor
legislation had on African Americans).
199 See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
503 (2007).
200 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251 (2006) (identifying that laws and courts’ interpretations of employment protections for atypical workers have largely been based on
workplaces and employment relationships that no longer exist); Lisa J. Bernt, Suppressing the Mischief: New Work, Old Problems, 6 NE. U. L.J. 311 (2014) (assessing legal
distinctions between employees and independent contractors).
201 See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Making Globalism Work for Employees, 54 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 427 (2010) (reviewing the forms of collective action that have arisen due to globalism). But see James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: The Perils and Promises
of Transnational Labor Solidarity, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 85 (2004) (analyzing shifts in labor
rights due to increasing globalization); Kolben, supra note 97 (discussing the
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The focus on union democracy has often left U.S. labor activists
rediscovering the next new precedent for union revitalization
among what essentially amounts to tactical victories.202 The broadest action taken under the renewed union democracy rubric was the
split of several unions from the AFL-CIO to form the Change to Win
Federation in 2005. However, in just a few years, several of the unions re-affiliated with the AFL-CIO, and what studies have been
done have shown little success by the remaining Change to Win affiliates in new member organizing.203 This only replays the general
and consistent trend toward union mergers that has characterized
the U.S. labor movement even prior to the Wagner Act.204 Recent
case studies of some of the most hopeful, committed and sophisticated local union organizing drives shown them ultimately stymied
by but one unfavorable aspect of the current regulator regime.205
The normal dissipation of social capital derived from exceptional
moments of crisis flows directly into John Godard’s claim that systems with more decentralized forms of organizing, such as in the
U.S., are doomed to perpetual cycles of conflict and contention.206
Yet, the legacy of union democracy is so strong that even dedicated
activists who seek to shift the view of unions from legal to social
actors still decry their aspirational corporatism as an impediment to
their revitalization. 207
The apotheosis of the individual rights frame underlying the
core metaphor of union democracy has been the near-complete deracination of U.S. union’s financial base through litigation attacking
disconnect between existing transnational labor regulation systems within developing states).
202 Melvin J. Rivers and Tim Truitt, A Union Representative’s Perspective of Declining Union Membership, 3 INT’L J. MANAG. ECON. & SOC. SCI. 125 (2014).
203 See Tracy Roof, CTW vs. the AFL-CIO: The Potential Impact of the Split on Labor’s Political Action, 10 INT’L J. ORG. THEORY & BEHAV. 245 (2007); Rachel Aleks, Estimating the Effect of “Change to Win” on Union Organizing, 68 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
584 (2015).
204 See Jasmine Olivia Kerrissey, Union Mergers in the United States, 19002005 (2012) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Irvine) (analyzing the
causes and effects of union mergers in the twentieth century).
205 The exhaustive case study carried out by Scott Cummings after the dynamic Clean Truck Program campaign in L.A. ends with its derailment by federal
pre-emption after a variety of local strategic and tactical innovations. Scott L. Cummings, Preemptive Strike: Law in the Campaign for Clean Trucks, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
939 (2014). See also VIRGINIA DOELLGAST, DISINTEGRATING DEMOCRACY AT WORK:
LABOR UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GOOD JOBS IN THE SERVICE ECONOMY (2012).
206 John Godard, The Exceptional Decline of the American Labor Movement, 63
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 1 (2009).
207 ARONOWITZ, supra note 192.
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the ability of unions to require mandatory dues from the shrinking
number of workers they represent.208 The 2014 decision of Harris v.
Quinn demonstrated the continuing trend of using free speech
norms to attack union spending on political lobbying, almost culminated in 2017 in a complete rejection of agency fees narrowly, and
potentially only temporarily, avoided in the case of Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association.
Notably, this trajectory of judicial and legislative deconstruction
of labor power is not unique to the United States. In many ways, the
modern history of labor unions in many common law countries parallels the centrality of employer property rights in the feudal origins
of the common law itself.209 The decline of unions during and after
Thatcherism in the United Kingdom anticipated much of the constitutional language of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions about the
illiberalism of corporatist politics.210 The comparatively stronger
history of corporatist arrangements has led to some pushback outside the U.S., even as the frame of individual employee choice has
led to similar unsuccessful scrambles for organizing strategies
around employment law.211
208 See Sachs, supra note 178 (assessing opt-out rules and their effects on unions); Garden, supra note 178. See generally Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015) (examining courts’ growing incorporation of
Lochner premises into religious liberty doctrine); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years
of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. (2016) (discussing the revitalization of Lochnerism and “liberty of contract” jurisprudence).
209 See Anthony Honeybone, Introducing Labour Flexibility: The Example of New
Zealand, 134 INT’L LAB. REV. 493 (1997) (exploring change within the industrial relations system in New Zealand); Roger Undy, New Labour’s ‘Industrial Relations Settlement’: The Third Way?, 37 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 315 (1999) (discussing the U.K.’s election of a Labour government in 1997 and its impact on British industrial relations);
Sandra Fredman, The Ideology of New Labour Law, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW:
LIBER AMICORUM BOB HEPPLE QC 9 (Catherine Barnard et al. eds., 2004); Peter Waring et al., Comparing Patterns of Re-regulation of Labour in Three Liberal Market Economies (Paper, 29th Conference of the International Working Party on Labour Market
Segmentation, 2008).
210 See Bob Jessop, From Thatcherism to New Labour: New-liberalism, Workfarism
and Labour-market Regulation, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT:
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF THE (UN)EMPLOYMENT
QUESTION 137 (Henk Overbeek ed., 2003).
211 See Trevor Colling, Caught In A Trap? Legal Mobilisation by Trade Unions in
the United Kingdom (Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations No. 91, 2009) (exploring
the idea of “legal mobilization” and unions’ role in pressuring employers and galvanizing support amongst members); Mark Bray and Pat Walsh, Different Paths to
Neo-Liberalism? Comparing Australia and New Zealand 37 INDUS. REL. 358 (1998) (reviewing Australia and New Zealand’s shift from compulsory arbitration towards
neo-liberalism in the twenty-first century); Ingrid Landau and John Howe, Trade
Union Ambivalence Toward Enforcement of Employment Standards as an Organizing
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3.3. Realism in Rebuilding the Corporatist Terrain of U.S. Labor
Power
It is important to note that even as the Wagner system is ostensibly infused with liberal democratic norms, in fact regional and national unions in the U.S. have been relatively conservative social actors when it comes to more aggressive participatory visions of the
workplace.212 Whatever corporatist power labor unions have
achieved through electoral politics is similarly restrained by the bargaining dynamics of corporatism more generally. For example, in
the 1980s when popular interpretations arose that the Japanese
workplace was more participatory and successful than those in the
U.S.,213 hopes were expressed that the next wave of corporate governance reforms would move teleologically toward greater employee voice if not outright ownership.214 Such optimism located a
new flaw in the Wagner Act regime, the ban on in-house unions and
other forms of non-union employee representations.215 Yet, union
leadership aggressively resisted these claims—a resistance partially
validated by the adoption of such individual rights rhetoric by antiunion activists in the form of the TEAM Act of 1995.216
Strategy, 17 THEOR. INQ. L. 201 (2016) (assessing shifting roles for Australia trade
unions towards enforcement of minimum employment standards).
212 See Charles B. Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the
Twenty-first Century, U. ILL. L. REV. 633, 696 (1983) (arguing that the U.S. labor movement will need to implement innovative cooperative techniques in place of conventional adversarial tactics in the near future); Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key
Institution in the Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149 (1993)
(asserting that voluntary and informal employee caucuses will emerge as a new
model for protecting employees’ rights).
213 See Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1736 (1984) (reflecting on social commentators’
call for American enterprises to adopt Japanese management techniques following
the Japanese economic miracle).
214 Lipton, supra note 33, at 44.
215 See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (1994) (examining President Clinton’s establishment of the Commission for the Future of
Worker-Management Relations and its investigation of whether U.S. labor law required a major overhaul); Karl G. Nelson, Moving Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Joint
Management-Employee Committees in the Twenty-First Century, 87 IND. L.J. 119 (2012)
(reviewing the impact of the Employee Free Choice Act on labor law).
216 See Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening up
the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827 (1996).
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Newer scholarship on workplace participation now largely presumes a tangential relationship between unions and the promotion
of a participatory workplace, placing their hopes instead on voluntary employer self-regulation, popularly known as “new governance” approaches.217 These approaches present unions as obstacles
as often as allies,218 and such approaches further individualize workplace justice by emphasizing employee voice219 or actively portraying worker participation as not a social or dignitary good, but as efficiency-enhancing.220
Yet, in the U.S., as elsewhere, arguments extolling the virtues of
employee voice have not won over employers, who have only further sought extensive powers over their workers through increased
monitoring and demands for demonstrations of workplace loyalty
in workers’ private and public lives.221 Moreover, arguments about
employee voice and participation have fed into an entire industry
devoted to manipulating the psychology of workers to improve
productivity through creating the illusion of individual empowerment.222 All of which further undermines the capacity of individual
217 See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Leal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (introducing the “Renew Deal,” in which innovative approaches to law is preferred to promote collaborative and dynamic planning); REGULATING LABOUR IN THE WAKE OF GLOBALISATION:
NEW CHALLENGES, NEW INSTITUTIONS (Brian Bercusson and Cynthia Estlund eds.,
2008) (proposing new labor regulatory schemes that shift power away from national governmental regulation and towards smaller units of governance).
218 See John Godard and Carola Frege, Labor Unions, Alternative Forms of Representation and the Exercise of Authority Relations in U.S. Workplace, 66 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 1 (2013).
219 See Orly Lobel, Agency and Coercion in Labor and Employment Relations: Four
Dimensions of Power in Shifting Patterns of Work, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 129 (2001)
(exploring the multidimensional structure of workplace hierarchy and the possibilities of employee voice in various settings).
220 See Andrew B. Dawson, Labor Activism in Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 97
(2015); Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information, and Corporate Combinations: The Case
for Nonbinding Employee Referenda in Transformative Transactions, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
871 (2007).
221 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American
Economy: A Call for Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765 (2011) (discussing
the benefits of granting employees more agency within the workplace setting); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091 (2011) (conveying that
despite holding rights to engage in collective action, workers commonly face barriers to act together against employers).
222 See, e.g., Jon L. Pierce and Donald G. Gardner, Self-Esteem Within the Work
and Organizational Context: A Review of the Organization-Based Self-Esteem Literature,
30 J. MGMT 591 (2004) (reviewing organizations’ active efforts to promote self-esteem among the workforce and improve workplace productivity).
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workplaces to serve as generators of bottom-up social capital for collective action.223
Unions’ original post-Wagner Act turn to corporatism, and its
consistent pull since, can thus be read not as a failure of union democracy but as an inevitable defensive measure in a system with
irresolvable internal logistical conflicts that amplifies Michels’ institutional necessities of hierarchy.224 Yet, union leadership in the U.S.
is thus ultimately left in a double-bind. Trying to organize individual workplaces as a starting point for collective action is increasingly
difficult, and organizing investments have not led to significant returns. At the same time, when unions attempt to engage in electoral
politics, the only genuinely corporatist activity they can still simulate, they also now receive fewer and fewer returns.
Such developments have seeded new calls to sidestep union democracy and facilitate, rather than fight, the centralization of labor
power, either within the current system225 or through the formation
of a labor party.226 These minority arguments recall earlier labor
scholars who saw union growth prior to the Landrum-Griffin Act as
already fragile.227 Their arguments track both the empirical record
of union decline following the Landrum-Griffin Act and the fact that
the one consistent stronghold of unionization in the public sector
operates on a de facto sectoral basis and has, hereto, been largely
insulated from the contemporary logic of workplace

223 But see Oswalt, supra note 74, (discussing the impact of improvisational unionism in promoting workers’ rights).
224 A further example is the total failure of more anarchical versions of economic democracy to translate into any effective form of social organization following the Occupy Movement. TOM MALLESON, AFTER OCCUPY: ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2014) (discussing alternatives to economic organizational
schemas like neoliberalism and social democracy in the wake of the Occupy movement’s participatory democratic promise).
225 See, e.g., Kim Voss, Democratic Dilemmas: Union Democracy and Union Renewal, 16 TRANSFER 369 (2010) (arguing that union revitalization is largely due to
central consolidation, contrary to prevailing scholarly opinion); Dimick, supra note
44 (arguing for the importance of centralization to achieving union goals).
226 See, e.g., Secunda, supra note 194 (explaining the insufficiency of the Wagner model of labor law, but does not advocate for a political party, instead noting
that while a political party would be the “best” path, it is likely impossible in the
current political environment).
227 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 158 (pointing to deficiencies among union leadership as a source for weak unionization). See also Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Regulation of Labor Unions, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 299 (1982) (discussing the Labor Reform Act of 1959 with respect to the internal affairs of these organizations and
corrupt practices that sometimes occur).
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authoritarianism.228 Furthermore, attempts under the current paradigm to expand union membership to unorganized workers now
faces the popular perception that unions are themselves weak,229
and unable to compete with the increasingly rapid regulatory arbitrage that employers can engage in, often directly subsidized by local and state governments.230 Again, this fosters the calculus by union leadership that the costs of organizing new populations are less
cost-effective than defensive legislative expenditures.231
There is little doubt that many of wholesale pro-union electoral
reforms popularly argued for under the union democracy would
improve the state of union membership. However, the Wagner system still requires intensive and constant processes of social organization and social capital formation to overcome its localized logic no
matter how extensive union membership might become—almost
catching up to an economic system whose steady-state operations
agitate against solidarity and participation.
These tensions have left U.S. labor scholars and activists on an
uneasy ground between defensive calls for continued pragmatism
and more aggressive attempts to imagine more systemic change.232
Naturally, some calls for reform address social or technological
changes in the workplace through modulated aspects of the current
regime.233 For labor activists, it is increasingly attractive for new initiatives that actively side-step the NLRA system in its entirety.234 It
228 See, e.g., Cory R. Fine and Paul Baktari, Public Sector Union Democracy: A
Comparative Analysis, 22 J. LAB. RES. 391 (2001) (arguing that state protections for
those employees not covered by national labor law—namely public sector employees—in a majority of U.S. states is insufficient); Joseph E. Slater, Public Sector Labor
Law in the Age of Obama, 87 IND. L.J 189 (2012) (surveying the state of public employee labor law and relations in the past decade).
229 See, e.g., Barenberg, supra note 215 (arguing for an expanded labor law system that encourages collaboration and organic growth among the workforce).
230 Chris Brooks, Why Did Nissan Workers Vote No?, LABOR NOTES; DETROIT 1
(2017).
231 Leticia M. Saucedo, Everybody in the Tent: Lessons from the Grassroots about
Labor Organizing, Immigrants, and Temporary Worker Policies, 17 HARV. LATINO L. REV.
65 (2014) (discussing the obstacles—perceived and actual—to organizing immigrant workers).
232 Secunda, supra note 194.
233 See, e.g., Jeffrey Hirsch and Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern
Economy, FORD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (discussing the collective bargaining status of the Uber Guild (comprised of Uber drivers), as well as other non-traditional
forms of labor organization whose members are technically not protected by the
NLRA).
234 See, e.g., Eli Naduris-Weissman, The Worker Center Movement and Traditional
Labor Law: A Contextual Analysis, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 232 (2009) (explaining
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is an open question whether its full collapse would simply accelerate
the very outcomes for workers which such innovations seek to prevent.235
While not explicitly rejecting union democracy, the continued
decline of labor power in U.S. society has led in recent years to calls
to look more directly at labor as social movement than merely an
extension of workplace elections.236 The lack of a formal constitutional frame for labor regulation continues to spur new arguments
based on free speech,237 civil rights,238 or direct constitutionalization.239 Furthermore, some labor scholars are becoming more aggressive arguing for the need to add formal elements of centralization into collective bargaining.240 These calls have been more
consistent from industrial relations lawyers outside of law
schools,241 but not uncommon among comparative labor scholars.242
The pace of this shift has been accelerating, with established labor
how traditional labor laws, such as the NLRA and LMRDA should apply to worker
centers); Michael C. Duff, ALT-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor Organization Bargain, 63 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 837 (2014) (addressing legal problems that
might arise from ALT-labor coordination).
235 Id.
236 See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: Structural Approach to
the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV L. REV. 655 (2010) (addressing whether enabling employees to limit managerial intervention in union campaigns is an appropriate goal for federal law in the context of the EFCA); Rogers, supra note 185 (stressing that U.S. labor discourse has been predicated on anti-union themes).
237 Catherine Fisk and Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest Under the New First Amendment, 36 BERK. J. EMPLOY. & LAB. L. 277 (2015).
238 RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG AND MOSHE Z. MARVIT, WHY LABOR ORGANIZING
SHOULD BE A CIVIL RIGHT: REBUILDING A MIDDLE-CLASS DEMOCRACY BY ENHANCING
WORKER VOICE (2012).
239 See James A. Gross, Worker Rights as Moral Rights: Wagner Act Values and
Moral Choices, 4 U. PA. J. LABOR & EMP. L. 479 (2002) (asserting that U.S. domestic
labor law needs to be re-examined through the lens of international human rights
principles); Marion Crain and Ken Matheny, Beyond Unions, Notwithstanding Labor
Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 561, 564 (2014) (developing a new framework to support
labor representation within a healthy democracy).
240 One illustrative shift is the normative move toward centralization in the
empirical scholarship of Matthew Dimick. Compare Matthew Dimick, Revitalizing
Union Democracy: Labor Law, Bureaucracy, and Workplace Association, 88 DEN. UNIV.
L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing that the triumph of oligarchy over democracy in U.S. labor
unions is not inevitable), with Dimick, supra note 44 (proposing ways that unions
can uproot their organizational strcutures and avoid the pitfalls of decentralized
bargaining structures).
241 BRUCE WESTERN, BETWEEN CLASS AND MARKET: POSTWAR UNIONIZATION IN
THE CAPITALIST DEMOCRACIES, 29 (1997) (reviewing differences and advantages of
centralized and non-centralized labor markets).
242 Daniel J. Gifford, Labor Policy in Late Twentieth Century Capitalism: New Paradoxes for the Democratic State, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 85 (1997).
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law scholars now making a variety of argument for mandatory sectoral bargaining243 and returning their focus to social unionism.244
Younger scholars are openly positing the question of abandoning
the Wagner Act model,245 though not without detractors who claim
that the risks are too high,246 or that their ideas are not necessarily
new.247 From a comparative and historical perspective, it is not so
important that such ideas are new or feasible in the near-term, but
that such a conversation shifts the discourse away from its preoccupation with union democracy as a near or long-term solution.
What remains clear is that the Wagner system represents a
flawed system that could only be propped up by attempts to re-create genuine corporatist dynamics—which then could only achieve
any real political clout when sustained by a larger labor movement.
Hope that the system’s own anti-corporatist design features can lead
it out of this fundamental conundrum only exacerbates this weakness. If an existing or newly imagined future labor movement
should walk away from the Wagner Act, and the aspirational corporatism it induces, it cannot be simply for some as-of-yet unrealized
model of union democracy.

243 MARK BARENBERG, WIDENING THE SCOPE OF WORKER ORGANIZING: LEGAL
REFORMS TO FACILITATE MULTI-EMPLOYER ORGANIZING, BARGAINING, AND STRIKING
(2015).
244 Gillian Lester, Beyond Collective Bargaining, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR Law 320
(Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011).
245 Brishen Rogers, Libertarian Corporatism is Not an Oxymoron, 94 TEX. L. REV
1642 (2016) (considering a labor law regime that can mediate tensions within broadlevel goals to disperse economic and political power through robust secondary associations).
246 Matthew Ginsburg, Nothing New Under the Sun: The New Labor Law Must
Still Grapple with the Traditional Challenges of Firm-Based Organizing and Building SelfSustainable Worker Organizations, 126 YALE LAW J. F. 488 (2017).
247 Marion Crain and Kenneth Matheny, The 'New’ Labor Regime, 126 YALE
L.J.F. (2017) (linking new calls for worker mobilization across entire sectors with
pre-NLRA labor goals).
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4. THE SUCCESS OF UNION HYPER-CORPORATISM IN BRAZIL

4.1. A New Unionism and Democratization
Among contemporary labor intellectuals, the international reputation of Brazilian unions has been quite high in recent decades.248
While aspects of Brazil’s legal system have traditionally been subject
to critique by some foreign legal scholars on efficiency grounds,249
the contemporary success of Brazilian unions in playing a central
role in Brazilian politics has not gone unnoticed by labor scholars
looking for comparative successes.250 Moreover, in Latin America
labor scholars have routinely idealized Brazilian unions in their
search for institutional exemplars,251 especially in countries with
pro-labor administrations in power.252 In contrast to the decline of
unions in the U.S., Brazil has presented to the initial observer what
many consider to be purely aspirational elsewhere—a labor party in
power for over a decade, broad and mandatory sectoral unionization, and little to no constitutional restrictions on collective bargaining. Economically liberal observers lament the influence of unions
in Brazil much as social democrats decry the powers of corporations
in the United States.
Yet, as recently as 2014, street-sweepers in Rio de Janeiro were
sanctioned by a Brazilian labor court (Justiça do Trabalho) for carrying out an illegal strike during the peak tourist season of Carnival
248 Ladislau Dowbor, Economic Democracy - Meeting Some Management Challenges: Changing Scenarios in Brazil, 8 PROBS. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. 17 (2013) (pointing
to the Brazilian approach as a productive way to expand internal consumption and
open new opportunities for businesses and laborers).
249 Keith S. Rosenn, Trends in Brazilian Regulation of Business, 13 Law. Am. 169
(1981).
250 See Chris Tilly and Marie Kennedy, Latin America’s “Third Left” Meets the
U.S. Workplace: A Promising Direction for Worker Protection?, U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 539,
552-55 (2014) (identifying successes of Latin American labor organization and assessing their viability for implementation within the U.S. labor system).
251 See Graciela Bensusán, Organizing Workers in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Mexico: The Authoritarian-Corporatist Legacy and Old Institutional Designs in a New
Context, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 131 (2016). This idealization often leads to
some descriptive errors, especially as to the right to strike and the nature of Brazilian internal democracy.
252 See Maria Lorena Cook and Joseph C. Bazler, Bringing Unions Back In: Labour and Left Governments in Latin America (Cornell Univ. ILR School, Working Paper
No. 3, 2013) (using a labor lens to review the rise of left-party victories in presidential elections across Latin America in the 2000’s).
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and they were subsequently dispersed by police using tear gas. The
strike was deemed illegal as it was neither initiated nor endorsed by
the street-sweepers union.253 Six months later, another strike was
held by subway workers in Sao Pãulo prior to the World Cup, which
was again declared illegal and dispersed by the police under orders
from the administration of President Dilma Rousseff—a former
communist rebel and putative head of the Workers Party (Partido
dos Trabalhadores, or PT).254 In recent years as Brazil had witnessed
some of its most active and robust instances of public protest, this
civil society unrest did not proclaim the PT as the conduit through
which to voice its discontent, but was rather, in many cases, the object of it—leaving unions in a politically ambivalent position.255 This
ambivalence belies a more complicated relationship between unions, workers and political power than the reputation that Brazilian
unionism has built up over the past two decades—diagnoses of
which have begun to emerge in more critical scholarship on Brazilian unions, often informed by U.S. labor scholarship.256
The origins of this critique are far from purely foreign-inspired.257 During the rise of the PT in the 1980s, the labor history of
Brazil was often presented as tightly linked to failures of union democracy, wherein corporatist labor unions ignored their rank-in-file
members and neglected truly agitating for their interests.258 While
there were moments in the 19th and 20th centuries when Brazilian
workers organized for political change, such movements were either
directly repressed by the state or their energy siphoned away by the
253 Benjamin Parkin, Rio Trash Workers Stay on Strike Through Carnival, RIO
TIMES, (Mar. 24, 2014), http://riotimesonline.com/dev2/brazil-news/rio-politics/rio-trash-workers-stay-on-strike-through-carnival/ [https://perma.cc/N9L5P9AB].
254 Transport Chaos in Sao Paulo Following Second Day Running of Metro Strike,
MERCOPRESS (June 7, 2014), http://en.mercopress.com/2014/06/07/transportchaos-in-sao-paulo-following-second-day-running-of-metro-strike
[https://perma.cc/6W2Y-WCFF].
255 See, e.g., Luciana Tatagiba and Karin Blikstad, The Left and the June Protests
in Brazil, MOBILIZING IDEAS (Sept. 4, 2013, 7:00 AM), https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2013/09/04/the-left-and-the-june-protests-in-brazil/
[https://perma.cc/K5CT-BQHN] (suggesting that the political articulation of the
Political Left that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s is fading because it is no longer
connecting with people of lower classes and the youth).
256 See infra (Section 4.3).
257 Alvaro Santos, The Trouble with Identity and Progressive Origins in Defending
Labour Law, in CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 207 (Gráinne
de Búrca et al. eds., 2014).
258 MAURICIO BARROS, LABOUR RELATIONS AND THE NEW UNIONISM IN
CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL (1999).
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machinations of corrupt and unaccountable union leaders. Much of
the early 20th century history of Brazilian labor is told through the
plight of the Confederação Operária Brasileira (COB), a radical labor
union which first attempted to form a Brazilian labor party and was
central to the historic 1917 general strike in Sao Paulo.259 Yet, in the
following decades a variety of socialist, communist and anarchistinspired labor organizations were unable to coalesce into a political
force sufficient to challenge the rural landowners who had taken
power after the end of the post-colonial monarchy.260
The major early 20th century turning point in Brazilian history
was the military coup that brought the dictatorship of Getulio Vargas to power in 1930. Vargas’s consolidation of power over the next
decade culminated in his overt adoption of corporatism as a general
political model for Brazil, known as the New State (Estado Novo).
In contrast to the lack of genuine corporatism underlying the Wagner Act, Vargas’s corporatist model for labor functioned in the context of his general reshaping of the entire Brazilian state under corporatist logics.261 The labor code that Vargas’s regime adopted in
1943 (the Consolidaçâo das Leis do Trabalho, or CLT) would serve
as the foundational labor law of Brazil throughout the 20th century
and, many would say, today. The brand of nationalism that the Vargas dictatorship promoted in Brazil was far removed from the republican ideologies of the U.S., and the CLT system was unapologetically centralized and state-directed. Overseen by a Ministry of
Labor, only one union was recognized by the government in each
industry, in which membership was mandatory and to which all
workers were required to pay mandatory dues (imposto sindical).
Following the general corporatist logic of the New State, unions did
not need to organize workers through elections or bargaining with
259 KENNETH ERICKSON, THE BRAZILIAN CORPORATIVE STATE AND WORKING
CLASS POLITICS (1977).
260 See JOEL WOLFE, WORKING WOMEN, WORKING MEN (1993) (describing the active, if unsettled, labor politics of this early era); Samuel Baily, The Italians and the
Development of Organized Labor in Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, 1880-1914,
3 J. SOC. HIST. 123 (1969) (providing a comparative study of immigrant influences
during this era).
261 See Fernando Silva, The Brazilian and Italian Labor Courts: Comparative Notes,
55 INT'L REV. SOC. HIST. 381 (2010) (comparing the Brazilian and and Italian labor
courts while critiquing past discussion of the Labor Court as either a typically national product or as the transcription of an international model); Melissa Teixeira,
Law, Race, and Development in the Writings of Oliveira Vianna (Paper, Commerce,
Corportions and the Law at Princeton University, 2013) (analyzing the works of
Oliveria Vianna to understand how race shaped corporatists movements in Brazil).
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individual enterprise owners. Furthermore, unions were a conduit
for state benefits rather than a bargaining instrument for private
welfare. Although not technically members of the government, union leaders (pelegos) were deeply embedded in the state as a result
and gained a notorious reputation for corruption. The success of the
New State in dampening labor unrest was significant, and even allowed the military regime to relax the CLT’s initial ban on striking
in 1946 without fear of political reprisal.
Brazilian political history over the following decades was far
more systemically contested than that of the U.S. post-New Deal, but
the integration of the corporatist labor system within the general
logic of the corporatist Brazilian system gave it a durability far
greater than that of the progressive disintegration of the NLRA
founded during the same historical era.262 Many local Brazilian labor
movements still organized and resisted inclusion in the corporatist
system, but more often than not they ended up settling for trying to
reform unions from within. Similar on the surface to U.S. discourse,
the rallying cry of such reform was union democracy as unions’ predemocratic corporatist bargaining not only failed to provide workers with wage increases commensurate with productivity gains,263
but also failed to transcend urban/rural and racial divides that cleft
the working classes in Brazil.264 Clearly, under an authoritarian regime, state corporatism was far more effective as a tool of social control than as a collective force for worker welfare.
In contrast to narratives popular later in the 20th century, Brazilian labor activists were never quiescent during this time and often
their efforts were quashed not only by the seductive corruption of
the corporatist system, but also by direct military violence.265 At the
same time, even these more militant challenges from outside of the
system were as susceptible to ignoring union democracy in practice,
especially when broader working class sympathies were given over
to the variety of nationalist populism Vargas promoted.266
262 See JOHN FRENCH, THE BRAZILIAN WORKERS' ABC (1992) (emphasizing a narrative of opportunism in the success of the corporatist model while deemphasizing
the issue of union democracy).
263 Renato Colistete, Productivity, Wages, and Labor Politics in Brazil, 1945–1962,
67 J. ECON. HIST. 93 (2007) (noting the issues with corporatist bargaining in Brazil).
264 Sheldon Maram, Labor and the Left in Brazil, 1890-1920: A Movement Aborted,
57 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 254 (1977) (discussing the failures of pro-democratic corporatist bargaining regarding class and regional divides).
265 See ERICKSON, supra note 259.
266 Id.
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One of the more telling transnational moments from these midcentury decades was the failed attempt of government sponsored
attempts by the AFL-CIO to move Brazilian labor regulation towards the U.S. model, often marketed during the Cold War as “business unionism,” in order to “democratize” Brazilian labor unions.267
Such efforts fared poorly, like most attempts to reshape foreign legal
systems based on stylizations of U.S. law. Specifically, this attempt
suffered from misunderstanding the nature of the corporatist Brazilian state.268
While scholarly revision of this era continues, it is undisputed
that the corporatist model of unionization remained dominant in
Brazil up until the 1980s. However, during this era, the Brazilian
labor movement began to take on the role common to unions in the
20th century, that of a key actor in mobilizing for the political democratization.269 The notion of a “new unionism” emerged, with union
leaders in southern urban Brazil arguing that they would bring
about a new era of union democracy with true union accountability.270 Central to this movement was the interrelated formation in
the early 1980s of the PT and the reformist national trade union organization CUT (Central Única dos Trabalhadores), bringing together leftist intellectuals and disaffected members of the labor
movement. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, popularly known as Lula, had
been the leader of several successful strikes in the 1970s by the powerful ABCD Steelworkers Union in Sao Paulo. He became the figurehead of both the PT and CUT.271

267 See George Bass, Organized Labor and U.S. Foreign Policy: (2012) (Diss.,
Walden University, 2012); Cliff Welch, Labor Internationalism: U.S. Involvement in
Brazilian Unions, 1945-1965, 30 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 61 (1995); Larissa Correa, AIFLD
in Brazil Under the Military, in AMERICAN LABOR'S GLOBAL AMBASSADORS 177 (Van
Goethem et al. eds., 2013); Larrissa Correa, International Solidarity and Foreign Interventionism, 57 LAB. HIST. 92 (2016). See, e.g., Martha Riche, The American Institute for
Free Labor Development, 88 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1049 (1965) (arguing that the United
States should abandon the practice of law and development, where it exports
American laws in an effort to catalyze foreign legal development, and instead adopt
a comparative law model).
268 Jedidiah Kroncke, Law and Development as Anti-Comparative Law, 45 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 477 (2012) (highlighting the issues of transporting US legal systems
abroad).
269 See BARROS, supra note 258; JOHN HUMPHREY, CAPITALIST CONTROL AND
WORKERS' STRUGGLE IN THE BRAZILIAN AUTO INDUSTRY (1982).
270 ROBERT ALEXANDER, A HISTORY OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN BRAZIL (2003).
271 Jose Moises, Current Issues in the Labor Movement in Brazil, 6 LATIN AM.
PERSP. 51 (1979).
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CUT specifically championed the idea that it represented an alternative to the corporatist labor regime and criticized the attributes
of the CLT that left unions more dependent on the state than on
workers for their legitimacy. Indeed, the creation of unions outside
of the corporatist system, which elected their own leaders, was an
open break with the corporatist politics of the extant military regime. Much of CUT’s contribution to the democratization movement was its broadening of the inclusiveness of the labor movement,
incorporating both middle class professionals as well as rural and
ethnically diverse constituents symbolized by its alliance with the
Landless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem
Terra). The victories of CUT in the political arena were significant,272
and it initially succeeded in gaining concessions for workers well
beyond those of the traditional corporatist unions.273 The effusive
praise for CUT from international observers was encouraged by efforts of labor intellectuals with the PT, many of whom contributed
to writing the narrative of union democracy’s ascendance in this era
of the “new unionism.”274
4.2. The Iron Rule and Neo-Corporatism
The success of CUT and the PT in pressuring the military regime
to hold elections for a national Constituent Assembly and paving
the way for democratic transition is undeniable. However, the crucial point in evaluating modern Brazilian labor unionism is interpreting the process of forming the 1988 Constitution and the PT’s
subsequent rise to power. In the course of broadening its social appeal during democratization, CUT had already jettisoned much of
its more radical ideological elements and embraced the type of social
unionism of other successful labor parties in Europe and Latin
America.275 Its emphasis on union democracy, rather than more extensive forms of social revolution or economic redistribution,
272

(1992)

MARGARET KECK, THE WORKERS' PARTY

AND

DEMOCRATIZATION

IN

BRAZIL

Silva, supra note 261.
Marco Santana, Brazil: The Swinging Pendulum: Between Labor Sociology and
Labor Movement, 36 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 96, 104 (2009).
275 See Marco Santana, Entre a Ruptura e a Aontinuidade: Visões da História do
Movimento Sindical Brasileiro, 14 REV. BRAS. CI. SOC. 1 (1999); Ricardo Antunes & Laurence Hallewell, The World of Work, the Restructuring of Production, and Challenges to
Trade Unionism and Social Struggles in Brazil, 27 LATIN AM. PERSP. 9, 18 (2000).
273
274
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provided a broader political basis for building a democratic movement. After 1988 it notably retreated from the land redistribution
called for by its one-time ally, the Landless Workers Movement.276
CUT’s most immediate impact on the 1988 Constitution was the
removal of the discretionary powers of union recognition from the
Ministry of Labor, and thus towards greater union self-regulation—
formal privatization.277 Yet, the basic corporatist structure created
under Vargas’s New State was not undone.278 With some semantic
alterations, the main components of the CLT remained unchanged:
only a single union could be formed within any economic sector,
membership and dues were mandatory, and there was no new requirement for the direct election of representatives.279 The lack of
reform within the labor system reflected the highly negotiated nature of the transition to democracy that gave rise to the 1988 Constitution, as was seen in the election of more economically liberal presidents until 2002.280
As a result, while the authoritarian logic of the Brazilian political
system was weakened through this transition, in the context of labor
this privatization simply allowed for the proliferation of unions who
could make a legal claim (through litigation) to a new category of
economic activity and then reap the guaranteed rewards of such
representation.281 Unions still were not charged with bargaining to
create a system of private welfare, but again engaged with employers on a sectoral and national basis while serving as conduits for social welfare benefits granted by the state.282 Yet, the scale and scope
276 Rebecca Tarlau, Thirty Years of Landless Workers Demanding State Power, 58
BERK. J. SOC. ART. 1 (2014).
277 See Ana Gomes & Mariana Prado, Flawed Freedom of Association in Brazil, 32
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 843, 867 (2011) (discussing the role of labor unions as private associations representing private interests, and the shift of power to these unions after the 1988 Constitution)
278 See, e.g., Graciela Bensusán, Organizing Workers in Argentina, Brazil, Chile
and Mexico, 17 THEOR. INQ. L. 131, 153 (2016) (noting that there were some pathdependent “advantages of the ongoing authoritarian legacy”)
279 Richard Buchanan, The Future of Brazilian Labor Law under the Federal Constitution of 1988, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 214 (1988).
280 See, e.g., Margaret Keck, Update on the Brazilian Labor Movement, 11 LATIN
AM. PERSP. 27 (1984) (noting, for example, the politicians at the time who put pressure on the Labor Ministry to withdraw or defeat legislation that hurts workers);
Leigh Payne, Working Class Strategies in the Transition to Democracy in Brazil, 23
COMP. POL. 221 (1991).
281 Helio Zylberstajn, President Lula's Union Reform, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF
GLOBALISATION (International Industrial Relations Association ed., 2005).
282 Álvaro Dias et al., Pension Funds and Brazilian Unions, 2 REV. BRASIL.
PREVIDENCIA Art. 2 (2013).
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of these benefits far outstripped any enjoyed under the old labor regime. Trade union groups like CUT and others continue to reap the
reciprocal rewards of this performance, and engage in a range of social programming and mobilizations both routine and episodic.
When the PT finally won the national presidency after Lula’s
third campaign, a new opportunity arose again to revisit these earlier calls for union democracy. By this point, the power of the PT
relied heavily on existing unions, and CUT itself benefited from cementing its place within the new corporatist structure. One of Lula’s
first moves as President was to form a corporatist consultative body
drawn from representatives across society, the Council for Economic and Social Development (Conselho de Desenvolvimento
Econômico e Social, or CDES), and to establish a related commission
on labor reform, the National Labor Forum (Forum Nacional do Trabalho, or FNT). However, the union reforms that emerged from this
did not, once again, advance union democracy as liberal proceduralism beyond requiring older unions to meet the low threshold of
20% direct worker representation.283 Later in 2008, Lula moved to
guaranteeing the existing central trade unions 10% of all trade union
dues.284 In essence, the PT under Lula created a hyper-corporatist
labor regime with even less internal democracy and more entrenchment than before he was in office. These developments did not sit
comfortably with some members of CUT and defections have occurred at different moments since 1988, most notably in the formation of Coordenação Nacional de Lutas (Conlutas) in 2004 and
the later splintering of formally communist and socialist unions.285
As of yet, very few new or older Brazilian unions have embraced
union democracy or have developed formal systems for the workers
they represent to lodge complaints.286 The bargaining that does go
on between unions and employers, even when highly splintered sectors of the economy, need not involve any of the actual employees
But, as the recent
affected unless striking is called for.287
283 Mahrukh Doctor, Lula’s Development Council Neo-Corporatism and Policy Reform in Brazil, 34 LATIN AM. PERSP. 131 (2007).
284 See Gomes & Prado, supra note 273, at 878.
285 See, e.g., Danilo Corregliano, O Sistema de Controle Social do Direito do
Trabalho no Brasil (Thesis, University of Sao Paulo, 2014); BERNARD EDELMAN, LA
LÉGALISATION DE LA CLASSE OUVRIÈRE (1978) (positing a Marxist critique of labor
unions).
286 See Iram Rodrigues, O Modelo Sindical Corporativo Mudou?, 15 REV. BRASIL.
DE CI. SOC. 184 (2004).
287 Jorge Arbache, Unions and the Labor Market in Brazil (IPEA-World Bank Brazil Jobs Report, 2002); Gomes & Prado, supra note 273, at 843.
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unauthorized strikes in Rio and Sao Paulo illustrate, unions in Brazil
have a primarily disciplinary relationship to workers.
Representatively, Brazil under the PT has continued to refuse
signing major ILO conventions guaranteeing freedom of association.288 When two preeminent contemporary Brazilian labor law
scholars were asked by a U.S.-based journal to describe restrictions
on union speech in the workplace, their initial reaction was puzzlement–there are no restrictions, for why would a Brazilian union
need to speak to the workers in their own workplace?289
The tangential bureaucratic relationship of many unions to their
workers also helps explain why so many workers have turned to
Brazil’s specialized labor courts to resolve their individual employment problems. In practice, routine labor disputes have been effectively judicialized290 and expose the gap between the aspirational
and real conditions of many workers.291 And while Brazilian labor
courts are often seen as favoring employees over employers,292 they
have not only grown less protective of union strikes, but act consistently to reinforce incumbent union organization.293
This lack of reform and CUT’s close ties to the PT have inspired
calls for recognizing the operation of “neo-corporatism” and open
laments that the PT has succumbed to Michels’ iron rule.294 This critique found adherents from the both the left and right, and benefited
from the growth of critical empirical studies of Brazilian labor unions over the past twenty years.295 Although much of the critique
288 Ana Gomes, The Effects of the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work on the Evolution of Legal Policy in Brazil (Thesis, University of Toronto, 2009) (noting that Brazil has not succeeded in including agreed
upon principals into its Constitution. “As of June 2009, the constitutional amendment proposal is still in Congress, without any sign of the necessary political momentum to move it through to approval”).
289 Roberto Filhot & Ronaldo Lobdott, Captive Audience Speech in the Brazilian
Labor Law, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 341 (2007).
290 See, e.g., Roberto Filhot, Employment Litigation on the Rise? A Brazilian Perspective, 22 Comp. Labor Law & Pol’y J. 281 (2001) (describing how the litigation
explosion the Brazilian judicial labor system has experienced).
291 JOHN FRENCH, DROWNING IN LAWS LABOR LAW AND B RAZILIAN POLITICAL
CULTURE (2004).
292 Carolina Mercante, As Raizes Autoritarias da Atual Lei Greve Brasileira, 7 REV.
DIR. MACKENZIE 42 (2014).
293 Gomes & Prado, supra note 273.
294 Pedro Floriano, Robert Michels e a Oligarquia do Partido dos Trabalhadores, 19
TEORIA & PESQUISA 119 (2010); Mario Ladosky, CUT and Corporatism in Brazil, 3 LAB.
SCI. J. 109 (2014).
295 NADYA
CRUZADOS, ESTRATÉGIAS DE EMPRESAS E TRAJETÓRIAS DE
TRABALHADORES 43 (2004).
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from the right focuses on more traditional arguments about the negative impact of labor unions in growth and efficiency terms,296
among some labor scholars the focus has been on the unfulfilled
promise of union democracy and the effective continued enmeshment of unions with the state rather than direct electoral accountability to workers.297
It would elide too much to claim that these critiques are simply
tied to views that union democracy is a good in itself. Many critiques tie a lack of union accountability to concrete issues stemming
from the natural conservatism of corporatist unions regarding other
issues of social reform, such as environmental degradation.298 Furthermore, the primarily industrial membership (and thus financial)
base of unions left employment conditions in many rural areas, especially outside of the South, neglected even in the post-1988 era.299
Brazil’s informal sector also has little trade union representation,300
as well as many other low-wage sectors of employment.301 There are
still exceptions to these general rules, but exceptions they remain.302
4.3. The New Reality of Union De-Corporatization
A number of reasonable and often technically measured reform
proposals emerged from the new critiques of labor neo-corporatism
296 FORCA SINDICAL, UM PROJETO PARA
SINDICAL (1993).

O

BRASIL: A PROPOSTA

DA

FORCA

297 See, e.g., Karen Lang & Mona-Josée Gagnon, Brazilian Trade Unions, 64
INDUS. REL. 250, 252 (2009) (reporting results from field enquiries into the daily lives
of two Brazilian unions to show the relationship between unionism and labour legislation).
298 See, e.g., Bruno Dobrusin, Sustainability in Brazil and Argentina: The Trade
Unions Within the Commodity Consensus (Paper, Ninth Global Labour University
Conference, 2014) (arguing that both Argentina and Brazil have undergone socioeconomic improvements, but that their development has been based mainly on the
extractive industries); Carolina Mercante, As Centrais Sindicais e o Neocorporativismo
à Brasileira, 5 REV. ESTUD. POLIT. 301 (2014).
299 Anthony Pereira, Regime Change Without Democratization (Diss., Harvard University, 1991).
300 Lorenzo Frangi and Supriya Routh, From Employee to Home Faber?, 21
Just Labour 42 (2014).
301 Ana Gomes & Patrícia Bertolin, Regulatory Challenges of Domestic Work:
The Case of Brazil (LLDRL Working Paper Series, Paper No. 3, 2010).
302 See, e.g., RENATO COLISTETE, TRADE UNIONS AND THE ICFTU IN THE AGE OF
DEVELOPMENTALISM IN BRAZIL, 1953-1962 (2010) (discussing recent auto-industry
election and strikes).
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in contemporary Brazil.303 Some of this moderation reflects a kind
of resignation that the existing political power of corporatist unions
would be difficult to overcome. At the same time, it is important to
recognize that not only have some areas of Brazilian labor regulation
improved dramatically in recent years, such as labor inspection,304
but the centralized power of Brazilian unions have also allowed
them to provide some of the better examples of transnational labor
action to date. CUT alone participates in fifty transnational partnerships as part of its CUTMulti project.305 Brazilian unions have been
active in bringing lawsuits against foreign employers attempting to
enforce stricter forms of Taylorist discipline into the Brazilian workplace,306 with their globally rare successes serving as a noticeable deterrent to private equity takeovers.307
But perhaps most importantly, since democratization, and intensified during the national reign of the PT, corporatist strikes and
bargaining have garnered significant above-inflation wage increases
for workers unprecedented for a country at Brazil’s level of economic development.308 Beyond wage-bargaining, the PT has used
its political clout to successfully expand welfare state protections on
a number of fronts, including those to make Brazil’s traditionally
feudal social order more open to minoritized groups.309 In other areas of Brazilian governance, the rhetoric of participatory citizenship
has yielded experiments that are now studied worldwide, such as

303

Gomes & Prado, supra note 273, at 43.

304 ROBERTO PIRES, FLEXIBILITY, CONSISTENCY AND RESULTS IN THE MANAGEMENT
OF BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE (2010).

305 See, e.g., Chad Gray, Riding Bicycles When We Need Cars: The Development of Transnational Union Networks in Brazil, (Diss., Cornell University, 2015)
(discussing vale and metal workers’ unions of Canada)
306 See, e.g., Neil Munshi, McDonald's Franchisee Sued by Brazilian Unions,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 24th, 2015) (noting that Brazilian lawsuits against McDonalds
also provide an interest moment of transnational regulatory interaction, as the
NRLB has recently ruled McDonald a “co-employer” for workers at its franchises.
)
307 See also José Gonçalves & Maria Caporale, Private Equity Investment and Labour, in TRADE UNIONS AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS: LABOUR’S VISIONS, STRATEGIES AND
RESPONSES (Serrano et al. eds., 2011) (noting that many of the limited union pension
funds invest in private equity).
308 Armando Boito, Paula Marcelino & Laurence Hallewell, Decline in Unionism? An Analysis of the New Wave of Strikes in Brazil, 38 LATIN AM. PERSP. 62, 71
(2011).
309 WENDY HUNTER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORKERS’ PARTY IN BRAZIL,
1989-2009 (2010).
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participatory budgeting.310 And, in contrast to the more reactionary
positions of union movements elsewhere, Brazilian unions have
been much more supportive of the development of fourth-way
modes of cooperative management and capital spreading.311 Yet, to
the extent that Brazilian unions have made Brazilian workplaces less
subject to employer authoritarianism, they have not done so by directly empowering workers’ participation in the workplace or
within their own operation.
In the wake of these gains, the drive for union democracy must
again be weighed against the current relative success of Brazilian
unions in material terms. What Pedro Ribeiro has called the “amphibian” nature of the PT would not be an inherently negative attribute if the alternative was, for example, less labor participation in
the democratization process.312 Again, one of the common outcomes
of labor union stimulation of democratization movements is how little they gain afterwards and how often they are then politically marginalized.313 The very process of the CUT’s deradicalization and depluralization followed exactly the track of Michels’ iron law, not
solely because of raw opportunism but the necessity of effective coalition politics.314 Here again, we confront the issue that generating
social capital to inspire democratization is far different from putting
in place a steady-state system of union organization that requires
constant social capital formation derived from the workplace.
Until very recently, potential reforms of critics of Brazilian union
hyper-corporatism were theoretical and aspirational. No doubt, the
great success of the PT in pluralizing Brazil politically and economically had begun to create expectations far more hopeful than in earlier points in Brazilian history. Many of the pressures that had beset
unions globally had also been far less acute, especially as the Brazilian economy is still relatively insulated from the forces of globalization and the arbitrage of capital mobility that have made labor
310 See GIANPAOLO BAIOCCHI, MILITANTS AND CITIZENS: THE POLITICS OF
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN PORTO ALEGRE (2005).
311 Paul Singer, The Recent Rebirth of the Solidarity Economy in Brazil, in
ANOTHER PRODUCTION IS POSSIBLE 1 (Boaventure de Sousa Santos ed., 2006).
312 Pedro Ribeiro, An Amphibian Party? Organisational Change and Adaptation in
the Brazilian Workers' Party, 1980–2012, 46 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 87 (2014).
313 See, e.g., María Cook, Labor Reform and Dual Transitions in Brazil and the
Southern Cone, 44 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 1 (2002) (contrasting the experiences of
organized labor efforts in Argentina and Brazil with Chile, which consolidated its
market economic policies and labor reform under military dictatorship).
314 See JEFFREY SLUYTER-BELTRAO, RISE AND DECLINE OF B RAZIL'S NEW UNIONISM
(2010).
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organizing difficult elsewhere. It is notable that beyond critics who
claim that unions depress Brazilian productivity more generally,315
some have already claimed that Brazilian unions will suffer the
same fate once the economy more extensively internationalizes.316
Moreover, the demographics of Brazil’s workforce are only growing
more diverse, making the traditional recourse to social unionism
more challenging.317 And in those areas of the Brazilian economy
that have already witnessed trade liberalization, unions’ power to
bargain effectively has been diminished.318
Thus, as appealing as union democracy may be in theory, and as
imperfect as Brazilian labor unions are, the paramount question for
Brazilian labor scholars just a few years ago would be whether diminishing their current corporatist privileges solve these problems
or simply leave workers as helpless as those in the United States today? Did CUT’s open embrace of the logistical advantages of Michels’ iron rule avoid a much worse fate for Brazilian labor after
1988? If workers have benefited under a hyper-corporatist regime,
what does this say about the necessary relationship, if any, between
general and specific economic democracy?
Unfortunately, these questions are being answered, but in a form
that no one sympathetic to labor unions in Brazil would desire. The
economic and political crises that began to roil Brazil in 2013 culminated in the empowerment of a new regime under former vice-president Michel Temer after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff.319
Central to Temer’s asserted legitimacy, and reflective of his membership in the far more centrist Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), was a reform agenda that would supposedly help
bring Brazil out of recession. Like many conservative regimes in

315 Naércio Menezes-Filho, José Chahad, Hélio Zylberstajn & Elaine Pazello,
Trade Unions and the Economic Performance of Brazilian Establishments, 38 EST. ECON.
SÃO PAULO 55 (2008).
316 See LEONCIO RODRIGUES, DESTINO DO SINDICALISMO 301 (2002).
317 David Flores et al, Social Movement Unionism and Neoliberalism in São Paulo,
Brazil, 6 SOC. WITHOUT BORDERS 73, 97 (2011).
318 See Jorge Arbache, Does Trade Liberalization Always Decrease Union Bargaining
Power?, 5 ECONOMIA 99 (2004).
319 Ruy Braga, The End of Lulism the Palace Coup in Brazil, 6 GLOBAL DIALOGUE
(2016), available at http://globaldialogue.isa-sociology.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/v6i3-english.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3BK-XJLU].
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time of economic crisis, Temer’s constituency cast labor reform as
key to this reignition.320
In mid-2017, Temer and his allies were successful in significantly
rolling back labor protections for Brazilian workers across the board.
And when it came to unions, the labor reform possessed only one
key element—removing the system of mandatory union dues under
a rhetoric of worker choice and freedom. The enemies of Brazilian
labor choose to strike exactly at the base of its corporatist power.
Critiques about the democratic character of Brazilian unions are
now resoundingly absent from the public discourse, even as workers resist the formal authority of current union leaders. The future
of the Brazilian labor movement is now far more uncertain than
those of the halcyon days of hyper-corporatism.
5. SIMULATING UNION CORPORATISM TO MANAGE LABOR UNREST IN
CHINA

5.1. Communist Failures and the Restlessness of Chinese Labor
Like many post-socialist countries, China in the past three decades has witnessed dramatic shifts in the nature of work during its
rapid pace of economic reform. The lingering ideological commitment to worker welfare that adorned its communist-era practices of
complete state ownership of industry and full-employment has been
progressively transformed after 1978 through a range of hybridized
economic actors who used wage labor to structure employment relations.321 The future shape of labor relations in China was initially
unclear as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sought to promote
market logics while maintaining its tight grip on a legitimacy provided by quite a different economic ideology. The CCP cautiously

320 Brazil Senate Passes Controversial Labour Reform, BBC NEWS (July 12,
2017),
available
at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40577868
[https://perma.cc/G28J-EM9D].
321 Daniel Ding et al., The Impact of Economic Reform on the Role of Trade Unions
in Chinese Enterprises, 13 INT’L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 431 (2002).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

686

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 39:3]

loosened its traditional opposition to private property in land and
industry,322 but fully embraced the commodification of labor.323
In fact, while many contemporary observers in and outside of
China are rightly critical of the CCP’s current treatment of labor, in
the 1980s there was a great deal more excitement about the possible
outcomes of the reforms for workers. One object of this interest was
Township Village Enterprises (TVEs), where partial privatization resulted in communal ownership and regulation of local industry.324
As Teemu Ruskola has shown, the productivity of TVEs often
eclipsed that of much larger State Owned Enterprises (SOEs),325 but
they were abandoned by the CCP for reasons unrelated to worker
welfare.326
Nonetheless, creating a new labor law regime to manage its massive mixed state-private economy became one of the many facets of
the CCP’s rapid legalization strategy.327 The CCP’s massive buildup
of legal infrastructure and personnel beginning in the 1980s has
sought to use law as an intermediary logic for strengthening regulatory capacity while shoring up the regime’s domestic and international legitimacy.328 In recent decades, the varieties of Chinese
workplaces has proliferated,329 and designing legal rules to govern
this diversity has presented one of the great challenges of the CCP’s
project of legal reconstitution.
At the outset of the 1978 reforms, the CCP had a pre-existing
state union, known as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) (Zhonghua Quanguo Zonggong Hui). Formally, the
322 CHIH-JOU CHEN, TRANSFORMING RURAL CHINA 74 (Routledge, 2004);
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 10 (Oi and Walder eds., 1999)
and Yingyi Qian, How Reform Worked in China, in IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY 297 (Dani
Rodrik ed., 2003).
323 Hilary Josephs, Measuring Progress Under China’s Labor Law, 30 COM. LAB.
L. & POL’Y J. 373 (2009).
324 Xiao-Yuan Dong et al., Share Ownership and Employee Attitudes, 30 J. COMP.
ECON. 812, 814-5 (2002).
325 Philip Huang, Chongqing: Equitable Development Driven by a "Third Hand”?,
37 MOD. CHINA 569 (2011).
326 Teemu Ruskola, A Tale of Two Chinas: The Law and Politics of Economic
Development (unpublished paper, on file with author).
327 KEVIN O’BRIEN, REFORM WITHOUT LIBERALIZATION (Cambridge University
Press,1990).
328 Margaret Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese Courts, in THE
LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 163 (Karen Turner et al. eds., 2000); Robert Berring, Chinese Law, Trade, and the New Century, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 425 (2000) and
Pitman Potter, China and the International Legal System, 191 CHINA Q. 699 (2007).
329 WORKING IN CHINA: ETHNOGRAPHIES OF LABOR AND WORKPLACE
TRANSFORMATION (Ching Kwan Lee ed., 2007).
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ACFTU predates the CCP, having its historical roots in labor organizations of the 1920s during the rule of Chiang Kaishek’s authoritarian regime.330 When the CCP rose to power in 1949, it folded the
ACFTU into its new regime—promising worker empowerment after
decades of repression by Chiang’s administration. However, many
labor leaders objected to the vision of a single state union advanced
by the CCP, wherein the independence of unions was unnecessary
given the traditional communist assertion that state and worker interests were perfectly aligned. As a result, after 1949 many original
ACFTU leaders were purged and suffered various forms of retaliation.331 In contrast to the corporatist social theories that influenced
the U.S. and Brazilian labor regimes of the early 20th century, the
ACFTU was clearly seen as solely an instrument for transmitting labor policy without a need to balance worker interests with that of
other social groups, as the state union neither needed to bargain on
behalf of workers nor represent their distinct interests.
After 1978, the role of the ACFTU—which had been temporarily
disbanded during the Cultural Revolution—was less clear as the
CCP shifted away from complete state ownership and its membership levels fell. The TVE experiment and the widespread persistence of SOEs showed that the CCP lacked a coherent vision of how
it wanted labor markets to operate, and it was not until the early
1990s that there was any significant legislation passed related to future intentions for the ACTFU.
In 1992, a new Trade Union Law communicated that the CCP
wanted the ACTFU to play an expanded role in labor markets, but
still as a unitary actor from within the state.332 As such, the ACTFU
operates like many state agencies, with a vertical legal relationship
to a relevant Ministry, here the Ministry of Labor, and a horizontal
political relationship with parallel party organs.333 Critically, chief
ACTFU personnel continue to be CCP members and its leadership
holds positions in these same parallel party organs.334

JACKIE SHEEHAN, CHINESE WORKERS: A NEW HISTORY (1998).
Ching Kwan Lee, Pathways of Labor Insurgency, in CHINESE SOCIETY 48 (Perry
& Selden eds., 2000).
332 CHANG KAI (常凯) & DERONG ZHANG (张德容), GONGHUI FA TONGLUN (工会
法通论) [A General Theory of Trade Union Law] (1993).
333 Bill Taylor & Qi Li, Is the ACFTU a Union and Does it Matter?, 49 J. INDUS.
REL. 701, 703-5 (2007).
334 Miao Qingqing, An Urge to Protect is Not Enough, 2 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV.
159, 179 (2010).
330

331

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

688

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 39:3]

The CCP’s legal re-institutionalization of the ACTFU, reinforced
again through amendments to the revised Trade Union Law in 2001,
reflected a need to respond to growing labor unrest following economic liberalization. The dislocations of new insecure employment
patterns and the fallout from intense industrialization and urbanization left many workers facing harsh working conditions with little
to no legal or political recourse.335 Labor protest grew in tandem
with the speed of Chinese economic growth, stimulating labor unrest that elicited sharply divided responses in Chinese intellectual
and policy debates regarding labor law and the ACFTU.336 The
scope of this unrest only continues to intensify, and is today considered one of the major systemic challenges to CCP rule.337
Recently, this unrest has come to greater global attention with
strikes and other forms of collective protest highlighting abuses at
Foxconn, one of the largest private manufacturers in the world and
supplier to well-known U.S. consumer electronics firms such as Apple and Microsoft.338 In such cases, the priorities and aims of the
ACFTU demonstrate what Feng Chen has called its “double institutional identity”: both disciplinary agent of the state and putative
representative of workers’ interests.339
5.2. Elections as Authoritarian Innovation
Defining China’s economic or political regime after 1978 has
claimed the energy of many scholars, all of whom try to reconcile
the CCP’s simultaneous monopoly on political power with the

335 Feng Chen, Privatization and Its Discontents in Chinese Factories, 185 CHINA
Q. 42 (2006) and Stephen Frenkel & Chongxin Yu, Chinese Migrants’ Work Experience
and City Identification, 68 HUM. REL. 261 (2015).
336 CHANG KAI (常凯), LAOQUAN BAOZHANG YU LAOZI SHUANGYING (劳权保障
与劳资双赢) [Protecting Labor Rights and Workplace Cooperation], (2009) and
DONG BAOHUA (程延园), LAODONG HETONG FA DE ZHENGMING YU SIKAO (劳动合同法
教程) [Debate and Deliberation on the Labor Contract Law], (2011).
337 CHING KWAN LEE, AGAINST THE LAW: LABOR PROTESTS IN CHINA'S RUSTBELT
AND SUNBELT (2007) and Dorothy Solinger, Labor Discontent in China in Comparative
Perspective, 48 EURASIAN GEO. & ECON. 413 (2007). For the recent intensifications,
CHINA ON STRIKE (Zhongjin Li et al. eds, 2016).
338 Hilary Josephs, Productions Chains and Workplace Law Violations, 3 GLOBAL
BUS. L. REV. 211, 216 (2013).
339 Feng Chen, Between the State and Labour, 176 CHINA Q. 1006, 1007-8 (2003).
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dizzying complexity of Chinese social and economic development.340 Corporatism has had its share of proponents in this effort,
as well as it critics. Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger influentially
argued during the mid-1990s that China was corporatist because the
CCP designated group representatives for collective interests who
were allowed to bargain with or become included in the state.341
They also claimed that China was undergoing a transition from state
to societal corporatism, as defined earlier by Schmitter—a claim they
have recently retracted.342
Critics of the corporatist label do not deny the aspiration of the
CCP to use corporatist-like policies to manage its close relation with
private businesses and new social actors. They do argue that such
policies do not capture the diversity of relations that escape direct
corporatist inclusion,343 especially following the often highly decentralized nature of legal and political administration.344 In the economic realm, Holbig has called this “fragmented corporatism”345
and "Bruce Dickson has described the relationship of private sector
elites and the party as one of coopted inclusion rather than true negotiation.346 The corporatist frame continues to be popular as way
of describing local state-business relationship as well.347
What remains evident is that whatever complexities exist within
Chinese society, the CCP has pursued a strategy of simulating corporatist structures as it constructs what many consider the most

340 The corporatist term has a longer history in Chinese studies, especially in
describing guild and family based businesses of the pre-CCP era and in the Chinese
diaspora. Daniel Fitzpatrick, Chinese Family Firms in Indonesia and the Question of
‘Confucian Corporatism,’ in LAW AND THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 150 (Hooker
ed., 2002).
341 Jonathan Unger & Anita Chan, China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model,
33 AUSTRALIAN J. CHINESE AFF. 29, 38 (1995).
342 Jonathan Unger & Anita Chan, State Corporatism and Business Associations
in China, 10 INT’L J. EMERGING MKTS. 12 (2015).
343 Ray Yep, The Limitations of Corporatism for Understanding Reforming China, 9
J. CONT. CHINA 547, 548 (2000).
344 ZHENG YONGNIAN, DE FACTO FEDERALISM IN CHINA (2007). Contra Thomas
Foley, A Devolution Revolution?, 37 HONG KONG L.J. 951 (2007).
345 HEIKE HOLBIG, FRAGMENTED CORPORATISM INTEREST POLITICS IN CHINA’S
PRIVATE BUSINESS SECTOR (Paper, ECPR Joint Sessions, 2006).
346 Bruce Dickson, Cooptation and Corporatism in China, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 517
(2000) and JIE CHENG & BRUCE DICKSON, ALLIES OF THE STATE (Harvard University
Press, 2010).
347 Jean Oi, Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism
in China, 45 WORLD POL. 99 (1992) and Melanie Manion, Authoritarian Parochialism,
218 CHINA Q. 311 (2014).
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durable instance of modern bureaucratic authoritarianism.348 The
recent CCP slogan of promoting a “harmonious society” directly
echoes the corporatist sentiments of Vargas and other early 20th century authoritarians.349 While disconnected from the intellectual currents that influenced the U.S. and Brazilian union models, the CCP
is a partial inheritor to the type of group based democratic theories
that inspired the nomenclature of the “democratic republic” of various communist regimes. The messiness of attempts to categorize
Chinese governance as “corporatist” stems from the fact that, in contrast to a formally corporatist system, this is no overarching institutionalization that defines legal bargaining units, their powers, or facilitates their bargaining. The struggle to reconcile centralized CCP
political power with the sheer transactional volume of modern Chinese society has produced any number of ongoing experiments by a
variety of often-opposed intra-CCP stakeholders. Instead, the CCP
is introducing corporatist dynamics to simulate the social and political effects of corporatist they desire, without formally devolving
any legally independent power to designated bargainers. Thus, the
emergent dynamics of interest group bargaining are best characterized as “simulated corporatism.”
Emerging CCP policy regarding the ACFTU reveals that it sees
labor as one issue where experiments with simulating corporatism
will be most pronounced as collective wage-bargaining can serve
both as an indirect instrument of state policy and, most critically, as
a manager of labor unrest.350 In drawing comparisons between historical U.S. and contemporary Chinese labor relations, Cynthia
Estlund concludes that the CCP hopes these reforms can achieve

348 Baogang He, China’s Responses to the Arab Uprisings, in DEMOCRACY AND
REFORM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA: SOCIAL PROTEST AND AUTHORITARIAN RULE
AFTER THE ARAB SPRING 161 (Saikal & Amitav eds., 2014). The other call China’s reaction the Arab Spring an “ingenious neo-Foucauldian approach to policing, monitoring and controlling society.”
349 LI HUAN (李环主编), HEXIE SHEHUI YU ZHONGGUO LAODONG GUANXI (和
谐社会与中国劳动关系) [The Harmonious Society and China’s Labor Relations]
(2007). See LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC
MOUNTAIN VILLAGE (Stanford University Press, 1990).
350 Mingwei Liu, Union Organizing in China, 64 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 30
(2011); Chris Chan & Elaine Hui, The Dynamics and Dilemma of Workplace Trade Union
Reform in China, 54 J. INDUS. REL. (2012) and Xian Huang, Collective Wage Bargaining
and State-Corporatism in Contemporary China, in THE CHINESE CORPORATIST STATE 50
(Jennifer Hsu & Reza Hasmath eds., 2013).
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exactly the promise of “labor peace” that Roosevelt sought to quell
more radical reforms with the NLRA.351
It is often forgotten today that the formation of a private labor
organization in the late 1980s, the Workers Autonomous Federation,
was the primary motivation for the CCP’s violent repression of the
Tiananmen Protests in 1989.352 This fear of labor protest reflects the
CCP leadership’s long-standing recognition of labor solidarity’s role
in other democratization movements.353 The CCP has similarly
moved to actively undermine the independent labor unions of Hong
Kong after the British turnover, who remain a foundation of political
resistance to the Mainland.354
In this vein, the CCP has promoted new organizing drives by the
ACFTU and made total workplace representation an open policy
goal, including foreign owned enterprises.355 In these drives, the
CCP has remained relatively agnostic as to the specific organizational forms and tactics of unions, allowing both industrial and enterprise, or grassroots, unions to be formed, as well as other unions
based on a variety of demographic and geographic frames. These
flexible organizing rubrics also reflect the incentives provided by the
mandatory fees paid by members to these often overlapping unions.356
While far from legally mandatory, the CCP has encouraged
broad ACFTU-sanctioned collective bargaining at the sectoral level
as a form of de facto administrative negotiation in order to secure
workplace concessions and depress private labor mobilization.357
351 CYNTHIA ESTLUND, A NEW LABOR LAW FOR CHINA’S WORKERS (Harvard University Press, 2017).
352 Kai Chang (常凯), Gongchaowenti de Diaocha yu Fenxi (工潮问题的调查与分
析) [A Survey and Analysis of the Strikes], 1 DANGDAI GONGHUI (当代工会文丛)
[Contemporary Trade Unions] 1 (1988) and Andrew Walder & Gong Xiaoxia, Workers in the Tiananmen Protests, 29 AUSTRALIAN J. CHINESE AFF. 1 (1993).
353 Masaharu Hishida, Introduction, in CHINA’S TRADE UNIONS xvi (Masaharu
Hishida et al. eds., 2010).
354 Robert Berring, Farewell to All That, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 431,
446 (1997) and Andy Chan, Trade Unions in Hong Kong: Worker Representation or Political Agent?, in TRADE UNIONS IN ASIA 81, (John Benson & Jing Zhu eds., 2008).
355 Tomoaki Ishii, Trade Unions and Corporatism Under the Socialist Market Economy in China, in CHINA’S TRADE UNIONS 1, 12 (Masaharu Hishida et al. eds., 2010)
and Zana Bugaighis, What Impact Will the Revised Trade Union Law of China Have on
Foreign Business?, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 405 (2007).
356 Wu Qingjun, Corporate Governance and Trade Unions in Foreign Companies in China (Paper, Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Innovation
& Management, 2014).
357 Eli Friedman, Economic Development and Sectoral Unions in China, 67 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV. 481 (2014).
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The new collective agreements are contracts in name only, as they
are more accurately understood as political settlements containing
broad employment contract minimums of the industrial or geographic area implicated.358 At the highest level, the Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security represents national government
interests and the Chinese Enterprise Directors’ Association those of
employers.359 These negotiations rarely contain robust private welfare provisions, but can provide supplements to the basic level of
welfare state benefits available from national and local government.360 Yet, these bargains have yet to be robustly enforced, and it
is important to remember that the CCP primarily views them as administrative labor coordination devices.361 Notably, during the
Global Financial Crisis such agreements were no bar to the quick
renegotiation of wage freezes and rollbacks.362 Some observers have
expressed optimism that such consultative arrangements will lead

358 For example, in 2014 a joint agreement among a variety of unions and business associations formed a “Food and Beverage” collective wage agreement that
formally covered 22 million workers and detailed wage minimums, benefits and
job training programs. Eli Friedman, Experimentation and Decentralization in China
Labor Relations, 68 HUMAN REL. 181 (2015).
359 CEDA describes itself as a “bridge and link” to government. CHINA
ENTERPRISE CONFEDERATION/CHINA ENTERPRISE DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION, www.cecceda.org.cn/english [https://perma.cc/X4JM-D93L]
360 A Complete Guide to China’s Minimum Wage Levels by Province, City, and District, CHINA BRIEFING (Jan. 28, 2013), available at http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2013/01/28/a-complete-guide-to-chinas-minimum-wage-levelsby-province-city-and-district.html [https://perma.cc/7JF5-JMVA]; Mark Frazier,
After Pension Reform, 39 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 45 (2004); Robert Guthrie & Mariyam Zulfa, Occupational Accident Insurance for All Workers: The New Challenges for
China, 3 E. ASIA L. REV. 1 (2008); China Labour Bulletin, Beijing to Increase Municipal
Minimum Wage, Pensions and Welfare Benefits (Dec. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.clb.org.hk/content/beijing-increase-municipal-minimum-wagepensions-and-welfare-benefits [https://perma.cc/PBU9-FQTZ].
361 TIM PRINGLE, TRADE UNIONS IN CHINA (Routledge, 2011). Also see Xin He,
Administrative Law as a Mechanism for Political Control in Contemporary China, in
BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 143 (Stephanie Balme & Michael Dowdle
eds., 2010).
362 Sarah Biddulph, Responding to Industrial Unrest in China: Prospects for
Strengthening the Role of Collective Bargaining, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 35 (2012).
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to meaningful gains for workers,363 but as an empirical question this
is still quite open-ended.364
Moreover, new ACFTU expansion has not changed the basic fact
that Chinese workers enjoy no right to strike or anti-retaliation protections. Like Brazil, the CCP has never signed ILO treaties acknowledging a private right of labor association.365 Strikes are not
per se illegal, but without these protections workers assume huge
risks to engage in collective action of any form. Employers and local
governments often ally with the ACTFU to actively suppress privately organized strikes.366
While the CCP fear of labor solidarity attracts national attention
to collective labor actions,367 even when administrative bargaining
results in employer concessions this is fundamentally a self-interested longitudinal calculation by the government actors involved.368
The essentially non-legal characteristic of these bargains is core to
the nature of simulated corporatism. Their negotiated status also in
part explains why the once lauded symbol of the ACFTU’s organizing at Walmart stores was met with little final resistance by perhaps
the most well known anti-union corporation in the United States.369
Similarly, the facilitative function of the ACFTU was also well

363 Tim Pringle, Labour as an Agent of Change, in POLARISING DEVELOPMENT 192
(Lucia Pradella & Thomas Marois, eds., 2015) and Fuxi Wang & Mingwei Liu, Collective Consultation in China, in A LABOUR PROCESS PERSPECTIVE ON THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK AND EMPLOYMENT IN CHINA 233 (Mingwei Liu & Chris
Smith eds., 2016).
364 Xian Huang, Collective Wage Bargaining and State-Corporatism in Contemporary China, in THE CHINESE CORPORATIST STATE 50 (Jennifer Hsu & Reza Hasmath
eds., 2013).
365 Pitman Potter, China and the International Legal System: Challenges of Participation, 191 CHINA Q. 699 (2007). The participation of the ACFTU in the ILO has
remained a point of contention within and without the organization.
366 Yang Su & Xin He, Street as Courtroom, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 157, 162 (2010)
and Chen Feng, Trade Unions and the Quadripartite Interactions in Strike Settlement in
China, 201 CHINA Q. 104, 108 (2010).
367 Jidong Chen, Jennifer Pan & Yiqing Xu, Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China. (MIT Political Science Department Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 11, 2014).
368 Feng Chen, Legal Mobilization by Trade Unions, 52 CHINA J. 27, 44 (2004) and
Feng Chen, Union Power in China, 35 MOD. CHINA 662 (2009).
369 The meaning of Walmart’s unionization is still a key symbol in evaluations
of the future ACFTU activism. Baogang He & Yuhua Xie, Wal-Mart’s Trade Union in
China, 32 ECON. & INDUS. DEMO. 1 (2011); Anita Chan, The Fallacy of Chinese Exceptionalism, in CHINESE WORKERS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 11-12, 12 (Anita Chan
ed., 2015) and Chunyun Lu & Mingwei Liu, A Pathway to a Vital Labour Movement
in China, in CHINA AT WORK 278 (Mingwei Liu & Chris Smith eds., 2016).
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demonstrated in the Foxconn agreement to allow union representatives to help guide self-monitoring proposals.370
5.3. Union Democracy as a Siphon of Solidarity
Labor scholars in, and especially outside, of China have begun
to argue that the nascent corporatist character of the ACFTU should
be infused with representative mechanisms or replaced with a regime of independent democratic organizing.371 Some observers
were and still are optimistic that the expansion of the ACFTU can
pave the way for its re-orientation as a more representative institution,372 while others remain doubtful that it can ever unmoor itself
from its state dependence.373 It is certainly an open question as to
whether the CCP’s will be able to sufficiently simulate corporatist
dynamics to quell labor unrest and ward off destabilization of its
regime. Thus, while the CCP clearly has a corporatist future in mind
for the ACTFU, the basic fact remains that its ability to manage local
social and political actors is one of its core governance dilemmas.
Hope emerges from the fact that local chapters of the ACFTU
have been empowered by recent organizing campaigns, greatly bolstered from increased dues payments. New spaces for innovation
have opened up at the local level.374 Grassroots unions in provincial
industrial hubs such as Zhejiang and Guangdong have been the sites
of experimentation with direct cadre elections, including in foreign
companies.375 Such elections would constitute a significant intervention in local unions, as generally enterprise union leaders are
370 Ying Zhu et al., Employment Relations ‘With Chinese Characteristics,’ 150 INT’L
LAB. REV. 127 (2011); Tony Fang, Ying Ge & Youqing Fan, The Cooperative Roles of
Chinese Unions in Multinational Corporations (unpublished paper, 2003) and Jeffrey Huvelle & Cecily Baskir, A Fair Labor Future for Foxconn? The 2012 FLA Audit of
Apple's Largest Chinese Supplier, 1 PEKING U. TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 212 (2013).
371 Toby Merchant, Recognizing ILO Rights to Organize and Bargain Collectively,
36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 223 (2004) and Mayoung Nham, Note, The Right to Strike
or the Freedom to Strike, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 919 (2007).
372 Bill Taylor, Trade Unions and Social Capital in Transitional Communist States,
33 POL’Y SCI. 341 (2000).
373 Mingwei Liu, Union Organizing in China, 64 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 30
(2010).
374 Youqing Fan & Peter Gahan, What Are Chinese Unions Doing?: Explaining
Innovation and
Change in Grassroots Unions (available at: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2113221).
375 Anita Chan, Trade Union Elections in Foreign-Owned Chinese Factories, 13
CHINA: INT’L J. (2015).
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members of the local business community who are either appointed
or who run unopposed.376 More controversially, provincial-level
unions have introduced potential reforms to protect limited
strikes.377 The reinvigoration of the worker congress system as a
form of in-house consultation popular in the era of greater stateownership has also garnered attention as a potential new focal point
for more representative dynamics within Chinese companies.378
Yet, as much as the CCP has frequently allowed experimentation
in local governance, even plainly illegal improvisations,379 it has
from the outset closely monitored local unions for any sign of horizontal worker solidarity.380 While it is likely that discrete experiments in intra-union democracy may be allowed to the extent that it
increases internal ACFTU effectiveness and external legitimacy, it is
equally unlikely to foster logics of representation related to collective action.381 So as experiments with internal elections continue, the
proposals for a protected right to strike in Guangdong was withdrawn, even when labor unrest remained relatively unabated.382 The
takeaway here is that focusing the energies of aggrieved workers
anywhere but collective action is a worthy experiment to an authoritarian looking to sap the energies of the labor market.
It is important to remember that one of the CCP’s core political
strategies has been to portray its intentions in populist terms and
leave the administration of unpopular practices to local

376 Jude Howell, All-China Federation of Trades Unions Beyond Reform? The Slow
March of Direct Elections, 196 CHINA Q. 845, 863 (2008).and Anita Chan, Challenges
and Possibilities for Democratic Grassroots Union Elections in China, 34 LAB. STUD. J. 293
(2009).
377 Guangdong Regulations on the Democratic Management of Enterprises [Guandong Sheng Qie Minzhu Guanli Tiaoli Cao’an Xiugai]; Shenzhen Jingji Tequ Hexie
Laodong Guanxi Cujin Tiaoli [Regulations to Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on
the Promotion of Harmonious Labor Relations]).
378 Cynthia Estlund, Will Workers Have a Voice in China’s “Socialist Market Economy”? 36 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 89, 96n27 (2015).
379 Eva Pils, Waste No Land: Property, Dignity and Growth in Urbanizing China,
11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 41 (2010) (describing illegal “sales” of land between
peasants and villagers).
380 Chang Kai (常凯), Laoquan Lun (劳权论: 当代中国劳动关系德法律调整)
[Theory of Worker’s Rights], 26 (2004).
381 Youqing Fan, Worker Participation and Union Revitalization: A Comparison of
“Bottom-Up” and “Top-Down” Workplace Unions in RetailCo (available at: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2128003).
382 Aaron Halegua, Strike a Balance, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 26, 2015,
at A15.
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governments.383 In the context of labor, this had led to what Eli
Friedman called the “insurgency trap,” whereby national political
and legal organs like the Ministry of Labor claim to be responsive to
labor unrest, produce national legislation and intervene when labor
protests grow intense. Yet, subsequent day-to-day administration is
still left to local governments where intimate relations among unions and local business are most intense and the enforcement of legal
rights is costly.384 Friedman’s thesis is supported by the continued
exertion of authority over the ACFTU by the Ministry of Labor,385
and the structural fact that the career trajectories of ACFTU members are still determined by promotion policies dictated by the Ministry.386 Thus, even reforms that appear analogous to representative
dynamics in other systems are in practice, more akin to the type of
internal party discipline with which many modern authoritarians
use to improve their administrative capacity.387 Some of these experiments do open space for bottom-up forms of worker representation,388 but the CCP has no particular aversion to improved worker
welfare—just the means by which it can be achieved while maintaining their political power.389 More critically, for all of the
ACFTU’s recent organizing activity, few studies have shown an actual wage premium associated with new union representation that
would reflect any genuine bargaining power and potentially generate worker loyalty to these institutions.390
383 Diana Fu, Fragmented Control Governing Contentious Labor Organizations in
China, 30 Governance 445 (2017).
384 Eli Friedman, The Insurgency Trap (Cornell University Press, 2014).
385 David Metcalf & Jianwei Li, Chinese Unions: Nugatory or Transforming? (CEP
Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 708, 2005).
386 Chelsea Chia-chen Chou, The Expansion of Social Rights in Authoritarian Regimes: The Politics of Labor Policy Reform in China, 1978–2009 (Diss., Cornell University, 2009).
387 Some sub-national unions have attempted to learn about collective bargaining from foreign unions, including the AFL-CIO. The Guangdong Provincial
Federation of Trade Unions and the Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions have
done so in the past, but exhibited little interest in actually bringing workers into
their consultative processes with employer groups. Katie Quan, One Step Forward,
in Chinese Workers in Comparative Perspective, 174 (Anita Chan ed., 2015).
388 Tom Mitchell, Union Star Rises from Walmart China Labour Dispute,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 7th, 2014); Katie Quan, One Step Forward, in Chinese Workers,
in Comparative Perspective, 174 (Anita Chan ed., 2015).
389 A Labour Process Perspective on the Transformation of Work and Employment in China (Mingwei Liu & Chris Smith eds., 2016).
390 Chang Lee & Mingwei Liu, Collective Bargaining in Transition, in The Role of
Collective Bargaining in the Global Economy, 205 (Susan Hayter ed., 2011). Contra Yi
Lua, Zhigang Taoa, & Yijiang Wang, Union Effects on Performance and Employment
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In a similar fashion, the CCP has been mixing its new top-down administrative bargaining strategy alongside the ACFTU with legislation aimed at remediating labor unrest through re-emphasizing employment rights based on individual labor contracts.391 This dualstrategy reflects the larger CCP pattern of governance through simultaneous individuation and state-dependence, with a bias for
mechanisms that are effective for high-skilled workers, and especially those with the resources to enforce them.392 Chinese workers
have been undoubtedly eager to litigate based on their new rights,393
and while enforcement of employment rights has been traditionally
very uneven,394 at least one recent study argues for an empirical link
below employment law reforms and the positive economic outcomes for some workers.395 The CCP has allowed foreign labor
NGOs to operate in the employment law realm, signaling that it sees
employment law as a more open site for experimentation than labor
organizing,396 much like its formal embrace of corporate social responsibility campaigns.397 When employment law innovations do
occur at the local level, the CCP has been eager to embed those
deemed successful into its formal administrative structure.398

Relations, 21 China Econ. Rev., 202 (2010) (finding that union participation had a
moderate positive effect on labor productivity, contrary to the conclusions of the
majority of studies examining this link). There are many local union leaders who
have been more aggressive in their attempts to represent workers. Unfortunately,
they have been ultimately met with the same fate as many social activists in China.
391 Mary Gallagher et al., China's 2008 Labor Contract Law: Implementation and
Implications for China's Workers (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 6542,2013), and Hilary Josephs, Labor Law in China (2003).
392 Eli Friedman, Alienated Politics, 45 DEV. & CHANGE, 1001 (2014), and Lu
Zhang, Inside China' Automobile Factories (2015).
393 Timothy Webster, Ambivalence and Activism: Employment Discrimination in
China, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 643 (2011) and Jenny Chan, Meaningful Progress or
Illusory Reform?, 18 NEW LAB. F., 42, 51 (2009).
394 Ronald Brown, China’s Employment Discrimination Laws During Economic
Transition, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 361 (2006) and Virginia Harper Ho, From Contracts
to Compliance?, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35 (2009-2010).
395 Zhiming Cheng, Russell Smyth & Fei Guo, The Impact of China’s New Labour
Contract Law On Socioeconomic Outcomes for Migrant and Urban Workers, 68 HUM. REL.
(forthcoming 2015).
396 Anita Chan, Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in PostMao China, 29 AUSTRALIAN J. CHINESE AFF. 31 (1993) and Feng Chen, Individual Rights
and Collective Rights, 40 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 59 (2007).
397 Lance Compa, Corporate Social Responsibility and Workers’ Rights, 30 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 9 (2008).
398 Joseph Cheng, Kinglun Ngok, & Wenjia Zhuang, The Survival and Development Space for China's Labor NGOs, 50 ASIAN SURV. 1082 (2010).
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Before hopeful parallels are drawn to arguments made by U.S.
labor scholars regarding the social unionism potential of employment rights-based organizing, it should be noted that the CCP has
universally prohibited class action procedures,399 and that such
rights are often not available to China’s substantial migrant and informal labor sectors.400 Employers have also themselves been quick
to innovate to avoid new employment law protections, including the
use of labor sub-contracting and other forms of non-standard workers.401 SOEs and unionized workplaces often exhibit higher than average use of contingent workers.402 Alongside the same genre of authoritarian workplace monitoring regimes increasingly found in
U.S. workplaces,403 Chinese workers face increasingly irregular, or
precarious, work patterns. These practical delimitations again help
explain why even foreign companies have provided little pushback
against new employment rights legislation.404
In sum, the CCP has to date prevented any legal processes of
interest aggregation from occurring around labor.405 Again, whether
it will continue to do so successfully is unresolved. In recent years,
the CCP has begun to exhibit a loss of faith in its capacity to use legal
regulation as an effective force to combat social unrest, and the
costly surge of labor cases into the court system has been one significant factor in the CCP’s redeployment of more traditional authoritarian forms of repression.406 As strong as the CCP incentives have
399 Yin Zheng, Note, It’s Not What Is on Paper, but What Is in Practice, 8 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 595 (2009).
400 From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization (Sarosh Kuruvilla et al eds., 2011) and
Lu Zhang, From Detroit to Shanghai?: Globalization, Market Reform, and Dynamics of
Labor Unrest in the Chinese Automobile Industry (Indiana University Research Center
for Chinese Politics & Business Working Paper Series, Paper No. 3, 2010).
401 Pun Ngai & Lu Huilin, A Culture of Violence, 64 CHINA J. 143 (2010) and
Yojana Sharma, Vocational Students Face Exploitation in Sweatshops, 209 University
World News (Feb. 19, 2012). But see Virginia Ho & Huang Qiaoyan, The Recursivity
of Reform, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. (2014).
402 Xiangmin Liu, How Institutional and Organizational Characteristics Explain the
Growth of Contingent Work in China, 68 INDUS. & LAB. RES. REV. 372 (2015).
403 Yang Cao & Beth Rubin, Market Transition and the Deinstitutionalization of
Standard Work Hours in Post-Socialist China, 67 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 864 (2014).
404 William Hurst et al., Implementing China’s Labor Law Reforms: Interests and
Obligations at the Firm Level, in LAW AND POLICY FOR CHINA’S MARKET SOCIALISM 118
(John Garrick ed., 2012) and Aaron Halegua, The Debate Over Raising Chinese Labor
Standards Goes International, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE (2007).
405 Eli Friedman, Experimentation and Decentralization in China’s Labor Relations,
68 HUM. REL. 181 (2015).
406 Carl Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011); Pierre
Landry, The Institutional Diffusion of Courts in China: Evidence from Survey Data, in
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been to move labor NGOs into the employment law realm,407 many
have turned to try and promote collective bargaining.408 Yet, the
CCP response, as in other areas of public interest legal work, has
been to continue to actively repress any private horizontal solidarity,409 and has begun to match this repression by increasing government legal aid lawyers to limit the demand for private labor NGO
representation.410
Still, workers have remained uncowed by a lack of ACFTU reform, and have even begun to engage in offensive strikes against
employers.411 All of these changes recall the democratizing precedent that the CCP fears. Yet, here again the focal concerns of the still
inchoate Chinese labor movement seem tangential to outside calls
for union democracy. Ching Kwan Lee has directly criticized the
seduction of voluntarism in labor organizing, what she calls a “politics of freedom” in contrast to a more grounded “politics of necessity.”412 As such, procedural formalism within unions seems to be
an experiment that only the CCP seems consistently concerned with,
and the existence of this permitted experimentation is evidence itself
of how the broader potential of union elections is perceived. Chinese workers seem far more taken with organizing collective action
on a popular basis and gaining substantive concessions, than with
ACFTU reform itself.413
Centralization and hierarchy, the products of Michels’ iron rule,
is exactly what the CCP fears and what the labor movement is denied. The view of the CCP is clarifying to the extent that it sees labor
RULE BY LAW 207 (Ginsburg & Moustafa eds., 2008), and Benjamin Liebman, Legal
Reform: China’s Law-Stability Paradox, 143 DAEDULUS 96 (2014).
407 Anita Chan, The Fallacy of Chinese Exceptionalism, in Chinese Workers in
Comparative Perspective 1, 16 (Anita Chan ed., 2015).
408 Chunyun Lu, Unmaking the Authoritarian Labor Regime (Jan. 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file with author).
409 Aaron Halegua, Who Will Represent China's Workers?, U.S.-Asia Law Institute New York University of School of Law (2016).
410 Aaron Halegua, Legal Preemption in China: How Government Legal Aid
Squeezed Out Barefoot Lawyers and Labor Non-Governmental Organizations, in LABOR
LAW RESEARCH NETWORK (LLRN) CONFERENCE (2017), https://economics.harvard.edu/files/economics/files/halegua-aaron_legal_preemption_in_china_ec2342_25oct2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ33-ML8K].
411 Manfred Elfstrom & Sarosh Kuruvila, The Changing Nature of Labor Unrest
in China, 67 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 453 (2014).
412 Ching Kwan Lee, Precarization or Empowerment?, 75 THE J. ASIAN STUD. 317
(2016).
413 Dorothy Solinger has claimed that even without traditional unions Chinese
workers were able to agitate for better concessions than established corporatist unions in Mexico and France. Dorothy Solinger, States' Gains, Labor's Losses (2009).
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organizing purely through a social movement lens. Without a labor
movement, no amount of legal change will transform the fundamental reality of Chinese workers, even if the CCP manages to increase
their social welfare over time through simulated corporatism.414 The
recent reassertion of central authority in China, alongside systemic
and violent crackdowns on legal activism, has only made the CCP’s
simulated corporatism a more likely site of further investment. But
it also shows that the terrain of resistance must match this scale, lest
it be mired in more myopic views of workplace justice that only feed
that power and legitimacy of new corporatist bargainers.
If a Chinese labor movement does rise to challenge the CCP, it
would need to engage the same process of establishing internal discipline rather than formal democratic process—bringing workers
out of the myopia of their disheartening workplace realities. Especially for outside observers, union democracy seems as easy as a selfevident ideal to promote as it was in Brazil, but is far less attractive
in a practical sense, if not destructive, to the political bargaining
power of an even more genuinely representative Chinese labor
movement.
6. CONCLUSION
The national labor law traditions of the 20th century are almost
universally beset by the need to re-institutionalize the outcome of
acute political struggles, a process that invariably leaves them with
substantial gaps between ideal and real functions.415 The collective
bargaining inherent in most such systems has also been essentially
reactive to other social and economic pre-conditions—it requires
constant energetic inputs and is subject to intense feedback from labor market dynamics and ongoing political contests.
The aspiration for economic justice that gives rise to calls for
strong and active labor unions recurrently confronts how, in the context of labor commodification, there will always be mismatches between the present and any desired future. The preoccupation with
union democracy under the decentralized and privately ordered
form of U.S. unionization may, at first blush, serve as an ideal
414 Chunyun Lu & Mingwei Liu, A Pathway to a Vital Labour Movement in China,
in China at Work 278, 285-6 (Mingwei Liu & Chris Smith eds., 2016).
415 Gary Vause & Dulcine de Holanda Palhano, Labor Law in Brazil and the
United States, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 583 (1995).
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platform for better facilitating the emergence of a more radical economic change. Yet, in practice it only exacerbates this underlying
mismatch by engaging with capital through its ideological presumptions of free individual contracting than by engaging its practical tactics of agglomeration and delocalization. The relative success of the Brazilian system and regulatory tactics of China’s
authoritarian regime posit the hard-to-swallow possibility that embracing, rather than fleeing from, Michels’ iron law of oligarchy may
be the better strategy. This is in essence a claim about institutional
ecology—truly democratically organized workplaces struggle to
thrive in an economic system that otherwise operates on authoritarian governance norms,416 or will only form to the limited extent they
can find specific occupational niches.417
This dynamic may seem dismal to those that hold to more aspirational functions for labor unions, but it is quite understandable
how the social unionism underlying the most successful labor movements has been invariably tied to moments when labor unions,
whatever their formal structures, could produce high-levels of social
capital needed to overwhelm the operational logics of wage-labor
markets.418 The production of this social capital is not centered in
workplaces as microcosms of political democracies, or produced
through variations of liberal electoral proceduralism. It is built
through the work of social engagement, performance and internal
discipline necessary for any political agent and at the heart of any
non-utopian social movement.
Especially for labor law scholars, the creative use of legal strategies within an existing legal framework is always attractive—it is
inherent in the nature of legal intellectual work. But such tactical
constraints risk continuing the reality Harry Arthurs noted for labor
intellectuals, where the “disjuncture between good ideas and bad
outcomes is deeply disturbing.”419
It may seem that at points in this paper, comparative examples
have been used only to implicitly critique U.S. labor law and
416 David Laycock, Representative Economic Democracy and the Problem of Policy
Influence, 22 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 765 (1989).
417 Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (1996).
418 George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
187 (1994); Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer, 12 GERMAN L.J. 210 (2011); Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (1999).
419 Harry Arthurs, Mining the Philosophers Stone (Osgoode Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 58, 2016).
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scholarship. But the recent and growing challenges to Brazilian labor unions signal that no system, however comparatively successful
to date, is safe. Certainly, even the most lucid analysis of Chinese
labor unrest yields no clear answers, and points to dark future possibilities. While the more genuinely corporatist legacy of many European labor systems has gained a great deal for their workers, even
the historically strongest unions have begun to buckle under decades of pressure from globalization.420 The cultural and occupational diversification of Europe has made convincing workers of
their common cause more difficult,421 and many systems have already been seriously weakened by efforts to decentralize bargaining
structures.422 Some see labor unions as a bridge to a re-democratized
European Union,423 but even the recognition of a right to collective
bargaining by the European Court of Human Rights has not staved
off the growth of nativist movements which seek to cleave the class
solidarities built by earlier labor movement.
The discussion over labor union design thus cannot be a simple
retelling of the victories of the past, but must delve into how to recreate and most durably re-entrench them. As Herbert Hoovencamp
noted in his study of labor conspiracies, once the assumption that
combinations of labor and capital are functionally equivalent is accepted in legal doctrine or social analysis, labor will always face devising compensatory and defensive strategies.424 The fight for labor
power and social democracy will thus always be a combination of
cultural messaging and legal tactics—as with any social movement.425 And it also involves centralization, hierarchy and internal
self-discipline in order to achieve political change-not satisfy idealisms.
420 Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, From National Corporatism to
Transnational Pluralism, 19 POL. & SOC'Y 133 (1991); Kathleen Thelen, Beyond Corporatism, 27 COMP. POL. 107 (1994); Federico Fabbrini, Europe in Need of a New Deal, 43
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1175 (2012).
421 Magnus Rasmussen & Øyvind Skorge, The Determinants of Trade Union Centralization (CES Conference, 2014).
422 Paul Windolf, Productivity Coalitions and the Future of European Corporatism,
28 INDUS. REL. 1 (1989) and Henning Jorgensen, The Role of Trade Unions in Social
Restructuring in Scandinavia in the 1990s, 4 REVUE FRANCAISE DES AFFAIRES SOCIALES
151 (2003).
423 Roland Erne, European Unions (2008).
424 Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEX.
L. REV. 919 (1988).
425 Cassandra Engeman, Social Movement Unionism in Practice, 29 WORK,
EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIETY 444 (2015). Contra Karl Von Holdt, Social Movement Unionism, 16 WORK, EMPLOYMENT & SOCIETY 283 (2002).
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There is no shortage of reforms possible to improve the lives of
workers that do not involve unions.426 There has been a drive in the
past decade to more aggressively imagine possibility for social reform beyond that deemed immediately feasible. Erik Olin Wright
has coined the term “real utopias” to capture the fusion between intelligent institutional design and social aspiration.427 Some such reforms can still fall into the old category of legal transplant, such as
attacks on at-will employment.428 But today, the sense of ongoing
crisis in economic organization has made the common contemplation of ideas that were considered irresponsibly unrealistic just a few
years ago, most notably renewed calls for job guarantees or basic
minimum incomes.429
Various corporate governance reforms continue to try to reconcile worker empowerment with owner self-interest, from modes of
direct representation430 to private governance reforms aimed at
maximizing Dau-Schmidt’s cooperative surplus.431 Just as with collective bargaining, these are compensatory measures whose ambition starts from the assumption that labor commodification is an inevitability. Whatever their individual capacity to improve the lives
of workers, it is notable that most of these reforms no longer argue
in the language of class conflict, but do so increasingly in a non-conflictual language of productive efficiency or technological utopianism.
The diagnosis of the counterproductive aspiration of union democracy presented in this article casts overlapping doubts on the
power of these reforms.432 Such doubts do not return us to communist visions of labor that degenerated on their own terms, but to
426 A concise overview is present in Partnership at Work (Paul Gollan & Glenn
Pattmore eds., 2002).
427 Erik Olin Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias (2009).
428 Zev Eigen, Nicholas Menillo & David Sherwyn, Shifting the Paradigm of the
Debate, 87 IND. L.J. 271 (2012).
429 Ive Marx, A New Social Question? On Minimum Income Protection in the
Postindustrial Era (1992).
430 Margaret Blair and Mark Roe, Employees and Corporate Governance (1999).
431 Marleen O’Connor, The Human Capital Era, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993)
and Leo Strine, Toward Common Sense and Common Ground 33 J. Corp. L. 1, 20 (2007).
Contra Stephen Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management, 23 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 979 (1998).
432 A thorough defense of the new governance paradigm is provided by David
Doorey, A Model of Responsive Workplace Law, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 47 (2012). These
reforms are antithetical to the corporatist principles argued for in this article, but
they do reflect how the sense of powerlessness has pushed many committed labor
scholars to try and find new solutions.
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the radical republican visions which embrace cooperative or employee ownership.433 The ideal of either expanding the extensivity
and intensivity of capital ownership to allow for widespread employee ownership or promoting various forms of mandatory profitsharing have always garnered formal, if superficial, endorsement by
often antagonistic political interests. But whatever episodic support
has been given to such efforts, attempts to systemically promote
such alternative configurations have remained quite weak.434
Some of this weakness reflects a variation of the ecological problem—developing truly different forms of economic organization
from within logically antagonistic systems leads to unpredictable
mutations435 and often incredibly high interface costs with existing
legal and economic institutions.436 The non-replication of even successfully run employee-owned business and the less-than-stellar
global track-record of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs)
speaks to this difficulty.437 At their core, conceptions of labor are
about the basic distribution of power in any society, and systemic
changes, as with Meidner’s wage-fund proposal, cannot be expected
to be met without enduring resistance.438
Following their function as corporatist bargainers, unions have
historically devoted little effort to expanding capital ownership as a
long-term solution,439 and leading ownership advocate Robert
Hockett does not even mention unions in his review of possible
“ownership spreading” mechanisms.440 Even pro-union advocates
433 For a more extensive view of the possibilities of co-determination, see Isabelle Ferreras, On Economic Bicameralism (Thesis, MIT, 2004).
434 Saioa Arando et al., Efficiency in Employee-Owned Enterprises, 68 INT’L LAB.
REL. Rev. 398 (2015).
435 Aditi Bagchi, Varieties of Employee Ownership: Some Unintended Consequences
of Corporate Law and Labor Law, 10 U PA. J. BUS. & EMPLOY. L. 305 (2008).
436 Abby Scher, This Rust-Belt Town’s Survival Strategy Is All About Giving Workers Control, YES! Magazine (Jan. 13, 2015).
437 Jedidiah Kroncke, ESOPs and the Limits of Fractionalized Ownership, U. CHI.
LEGAL F. (Forthcoming, 2018).
438 Peer Zumbansen, The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191 (2007) and Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 579, (2009). Contra Richard Epstein, A Common
Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357
(1983).
439 Exceptional but also telling is Michele Robert’s comment that players’ unions in modern sport leagues could do exactly the same thing—render owners unnecessary. Pablo Torro, NBPA Director: ‘Let's Stop Pretending,’ ESPN ONLINE (Nov.
13, 2014).
440 Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1
(2005)
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across the globe who seek to constitutionalize more radical anti-subordination principles stop short of the historical radical republican
arguments about wage-labor,441 in what James Pope would call full
“constitutional insurgency.”442
Perhaps any proposal that conceptualizes the workplace as an
instance of shared property or argues that labor can gain property
rights in the workplace by accretion are considered unworkable as
much as they may be consonant with populist sentiments.443 Yet,
even if more radical reforms regarding the property/commodity divide are deemed unrealistic or unattainable, union democracy is not
a productive long-term solution to achieving any future desired
state.
In many ways, this is again an old argument about the goals of
labor movements and the possibilities of radical reform.444 Naturally, to proponents of end of history arguments about the rise of
modern corporate capitalism claims that union democracy is a distraction from radical economic change may seem obtuse.445 Nonetheless, for those labor advocates caught up in Mundlak’s anomie,
the diagnosis in this article is offered as an empirical point about
how to think about labor unions as they are, not as we might hope
them to be. We should not despair that labor unions are not working
to render themselves obsolete; they are valuable for too many other
reasons.
If unions are to transition away from corporatism, or even away
from electoral politics, it should not be to perform experiments in
procedural democracy, but to better build and aggregate political
capital. As divergent from the social and legal context of the U.S.
Brazil and China may appear to be,446 they all point to the fact that
solidarity and power are the core aim of any labor movement, and
great liability exists when idealism about the nature of the

441 Eric Tuckert, Labor’s Many Constitutions (and Capital’s Too), 33 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL'Y J. 355 (2012).
442 James Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997).
443 Katherine Stone, The Future of Labor and Employment Law in the U.S. (UCLA
School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-11, 2008).
444 DEMOCRATIC WEALTH (White & Smith eds., 2014).
445 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Reflections on the End of History for
Corporate Law, in CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Rasheed & Yoshikawa
eds., 2012).
446 Anita China, The Fallacy of Chinese Exceptionism, in CHINESE WORKERS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Anita Chan ed., 2015).
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workplace, or even labor itself, overwhelms this concern.447 And
perhaps there can never be a substitute for a genuine labor party that
is related to, but independent from, labor unions themselves to serve
as the final locus of labor power.
When we want to imagine labor unions as something beyond
collective bargainers, such imagining is only responsible if it serves
to give workers what labor markets invariably do not. Not power
against individual employers, but solidarity. This form of pragmatism, where labor corporatism is the least-worst form of collective
bargaining, frees us to think more directly about how to achieve this
solidarity without conceptual or intellectual distraction.

447 Even given their very different political contexts, the common challenges
and interconnection of U.S. and Chinese labor are increasingly hard to ignore.
Mingwei Liu et al., Globalization and Labor in China and the United States: Convergence
and Divergence, in CHINESE WORKERS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 44 (Anita Chan
ed., 2015).
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